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Abstract 
 
The  human  face  displays  mild  asymmetry,  with  measurements  of  facial  structure 
differing from left to right of the meridian by an average of three percent.  Presently 
this source of variation is of theoretical interest primarily to researchers studying the 
perception  of  beauty,  but  a  very  limited  amount  of  research  has  addressed  the 
question of how this variation contributes to the cognitive processes underlying face 
recognition.  This  is  surprising  given  that  measurement  of  facial  asymmetry  can 
reliably  distinguish  between  even  the  most  similar  of  faces.  Furthermore,  brain 
regions  responsible  for  symmetry  detection  support  face-processing  regions,  and 
detection of symmetry is superior in upright faces relative to inverted and contrast-
reversed face stimuli. In addition, facial asymmetry provides a useful biometric for 
automatic  face  recognition  systems,  and  understanding  the  contribution  of  facial 
asymmetry in human face recognition may therefore inform the development of these 
systems.  In  this  thesis  the  extent  to  which  facial  asymmetry  is  implicated  in  the 
process of recognition in human participants is quantified. By measuring the effect of 
left-right  reversal  on  various  tasks  of  face  processing,  the  degree  to  which  facial 
asymmetry is represented by memory is investigated. Marginal sensitivity to mirror 
reversal is demonstrated in a number of instances, and it is therefore concluded that 
cognitive representations of faces specify structural asymmetry. Reversal effects are 
typically  slight  however  and  on  a  number  of  occasions  no  reliable  effect  of  this 
stimulus manipulation is detected. It is likely that a general tendency to treat mirror 
reversals as equivalent stimuli, in addition to an inability to recall lateral orientation 
of objects from memory, somewhat obscure the effect of reversal. The findings are 
discussed in the context of existing literature examining the way in which faces are 
cognitively represented. 
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1.1 Introduction 
 
In this thesis I investigate the degree to which the subtle morphological asymmetries 
present in the human face are represented in memory. The form of a human face, in 
common with the human form and biological mechanisms in general, displays a high 
degree of bilateral symmetry. Biologically determined factors contribute to the degree 
and quality of the asymmetry present in a given organism (e.g. Mather, 1953), and 
this ‘breaking of symmetry’ is thought to communicate important social information 
(e.g. Simmons et al. 2004). Furthermore, symmetry is detected more readily in faces 
than in other objects (Rhodes et al. 2005), and it would appear that the face processing 
system and perceptual mechanisms responsible for symmetry detection are mutually 
supportive of one another (Chen et al. 2007). Given the importance of asymmetry to 
face processing, it was hypothesised that memory for familiar faces would represent 
structural asymmetry. 
 
In this chapter I will introduce the topic of my research by firstly offering a broad 
description of the factors that determine asymmetry in biological form: a topic that 
incorporates  both  the  physical  structure  of  the  human  face  and  the  human  brain. 
Additionally, asymmetry in the organisation of cognitive function and behavioural 
asymmetry will be briefly summarised. Following that, I will introduce a number of 
phenomena  associated  with  the  perception  of  asymmetry  before  discussing  why 
asymmetry in faces is important to visual systems. I will then summarise literature 
emphasising the importance of configural information in face recognition and explain 
why research showing a significant degree of tolerance to geometric transformations 
of  images  complicates  this  issue.  Finally,  I  will  describe  previous  research 
investigating perceptual sensitivity to the mirror reversal of familiar faces, outline the 
overall structure of this thesis, and summarise the methodological approach. 
 
1.2 Asymmetry of form and function 
 
Although symmetry is a salient visual property of the natural and man-made worlds, 
organisms do not conform with any great rigour to the law of symmetry. Asymmetry 
in biology is observed from molecular (see Johnson, 2005) to multicellular levels (see   9 
Wolpert, 2005) and deviations from perfect bilateral symmetry are common to all 
organisms. The degree to which an individual organism displays structural asymmetry 
is determined by a combination of two factors. Firstly, there exist consistent biases 
within species for greater development on one side of the body than the other such as 
the  positioning  of  the  heart  to  the  left  of  the  axis  of  symmetry  (Directional 
Asymmetry). In addition, environmental factors induce departures from symmetry in 
individual  organisms.  The  latter  source  of  asymmetry  is  known  as  Fluctuating 
Asymmetry and its degree is thought to vary as a function of the individual’s genetic 
health (e.g. Mather, 1953).  
 
Directionally asymmetric traits exhibit normally distributed right-left differences but 
have a mean that is either significantly greater or less then zero. The human face is 
considered to show mild directional asymmetry, with the right side being generally 
larger than the right (e.g. Farkas & Cheung, 1981), however some studies have failed 
to  replicate  these  directional  patterns  (e.g.  Hardie  et  al.  2005).  The  degree  of 
directional asymmetry present in a typical face is small in relation to the degree of 
fluctuating asymmetry (i.e. normally distributed right-left differences with a mean of 
zero), which is implicated in the perception of beauty (e.g. Rhodes et al. 1998), and 
our perceptual systems are highly sensitive to this latter source of variance (Simmons 
et al. 2004).  
 
The appearance of the human brain is characterised by the longitudinal fissure that 
divides the organ into two halves, and the two hemispheres appear, on a superficial 
level at least, to be mirror images of one another. In common with faces however, 
subtle  anatomical  asymmetries  have  been  reported,  with  the  plannum  temporale 
(found under the sylvian fissure) commonly lager on the right side of right-handers 
and the left side of left-handers. This asymmetry is thought to be associated with left-
hemisphere  dominance  in  language  (Geschwind  &  Levitsky,  1968;  Petty,  1999; 
Shapleske et al. 1999). In addition, the neurochemistry of the brain is asymmetric 
(e.g. Glick et al. 1982), and disruption of normal brain asymmetries can underlie 
psychopathologies.  Abnormal  cerebral  asymmetry  in  both  neurochemistry  (e.g. 
Reynolds, 1983; Shirakawa et al. 2001) and anatomy (e.g. Petty, 1999; Falkai et al. 
2002)  has  been  shown  in  schizophrenic  patients.  Abnormal  lateralisation  has  also   10 
been observed in children with learning disabilities (Cornish & McManus, 1996) and 
cognitive disorders (Hugdahl, 1998). 
 
The development of directional asymmetry during embryonic development is non-
random and is dependent upon firstly specifying the midline of the organism before 
specifying which side is the left and which side is the right. This process of specifying 
the left-right axis of the body leads to asymmetry in morphology and positioning of 
visceral organs such as the heart, which is invariantly positioned to the left of the 
body in vertebrates and this process is driven by molecular mechanisms (Ramsdell & 
Yost, 1998). Normal directional asymmetry in the visceral organs can occasionally be 
disrupted  however.  In  a  bizarre  and  very  rare  condition  known  as  situs  inversus, 
disorder  of  these  molecular  mechanisms  (the  nodal  cilia)  can  cause  the  entire 
physiology  of  the  body  to  be  reversed  (e.g.  McManus,  2005).  This  disorder  also 
causes anatomical asymmetries in the brain to be reversed, but crucially these same 
patients do not show reversed handedness or language dominance (Kennedy et al. 
1999). In a more recent study it was shown that 7 out of 46 individuals with situs 
inversus were found to be left-handed, which is approximately equivalent to normal 
prevalence of left-handedness, making it highly likely that different mechanisms are 
responsible for determining anatomical and functional asymmetries (McManus et al. 
2004; see also McManus, 2005).  
 
Though  systems  responsible  for  the  development  of  functional  and  anatomical 
asymmetries may be dissociable, they nevertheless produce comparably asymmetric 
organisation. Functional organisation of the human brain is asymmetric (see Hugdahl 
& Davidson, 2002) and functional asymmetries have been observed in a variety of 
animal species (Corballis, Funnell & Gazzaniga, 2000). Although classical research 
has shown that the two cerebral hemispheres continue to function independently after 
nerves  connecting  them  are  severed,  the  two  hemispheres  continue  to  perform 
separate functions (Sperry, 1961). In fact, since Paul Broca’s initial observation that a 
lesion in the left hemisphere caused impaired language function (Broca, 1861), there 
have been shown to be many a great differences in cognitive function between the 
two hemispheres (Gazzaniga, 2005). Additionally, functional asymmetry is apparent 
from an early age and certain asymmetries would appear to be innately determined 
(e.g. Trevarthen, 1996).    11 
 
Humans also display asymmetry in their outward behaviour. Roughly 90% of humans 
prefer to use their right hand for manual tasks, a pattern that is consistent across 
culture, and this ratio is far greater than has been reported in any other mammal  
(Corballis, 2003). In addition, behavioural asymmetries are displayed very early in 
development,  with  embryos  showing  a  tendency  to  turn  their  head  to  the  right 
(Ververs  et  al.  1994a,  1994b)  and  newborns  typically  displaying  greater  motor 
development on their right (Grattan et al. 1992; Tan et al. 1992; Rönnqvist, 1995). 
The former tendency, established in embryonic development, is likely to contribute to 
a bias later in life to turn the head towards the right (Güntürkün, 2003). This tendency 
is further evidenced in portraiture, where subjects are more often shown with their 
left-cheek  facing  the  viewer  (McManus  &Humphrey,  1973;  Grüsser  et  al.  1988; 
Nicholls et al. 1999; ten Cate 2002). The causes of both anatomical and functional 
asymmetries are themselves difficult to determine (Hobert et al. 2002), however as 
functional  and  behavioural  asymmetries  are  observed  remarkably  early  in 
development,  it  is  likely  that  brain  asymmetry  and  lateralised  behaviours  are 
genetically determined (Sun & Walsh, 2006). As such, the distinction between the 
asymmetry of form and function, in the human brain at least, is not straightforward.  
 
Mechanisms  responsible  for  processing  human  faces  are  functionally  asymmetric, 
with a greater reliance on the right hemisphere than the left (e.g. De Renzi et al. 
1994). A number of small functional areas have been identified as responding more to 
faces than to other objects suggesting that these areas have developed specifically for 
the task of perceiving human faces. Two regions in particular have been repeatedly 
shown to respond selectively to faces (i.e. the ‘Fusiform Face Area’ and the ‘Occipital 
Face Area’) and activity in these two areas is often stronger in the right hemisphere 
(Halgren et al. 1999; Haxby et al. 1999; Rossion et al. 2000 & 2003). In addition, 
prosopagnosia  is  most  commonly  caused  by  damage  to  the  right  hemisphere  (see 
Sorger et al. 2007). This right hemisphere bias in face processing is accompanied by a 
number of leftward perceptual biases. When viewing faces people more commonly 
attend to the side appearing to the left  (Yarbus, 1967; Butler et al. 2005), and the left 
side of faces contributes more to perception of identity (Wolff, 1933) and emotional 
expression (Heller & Levy, 1981; David, 1993; Ferber & Murray, 2005).   12 
1.3  The  perception  and  representation  of  asymmetry  and  lateral 
orientation 
 
Although  examples  of  perfect  bilateral  symmetry  rarely  occur  in  nature,  humans 
display a priori knowledge of what it means for something to be symmetrical.  In fact, 
even organisms with relatively small nervous systems such as bees show an ability to 
discriminate  between  symmetrical  and  asymmetrical  stimuli  and  abstract  this 
understanding to novel patterns (Giurfa et al. 1996). Sensitivity to symmetry has also 
been found in insects and birds (Lehrer et al. 1994; Swaddle & Cuthill 1994; Møller 
1995; Møller & Sorci, 1998) and infants as young as four months show enhanced 
processing of vertically symmetrical stimuli relative to horizontally symmetrical or 
asymmetrical  stimuli  (Bornstein  et  al.  1981).  The  latter  advantage  has  also  been 
demonstrated  when  asking  adults  to  reproduce  visual  patterns  from  memory 
(Deregowski, 1971), and when detecting symmetry in random dot displays humans 
show  a  preference  for  a  vertically  oriented  axis  of  symmetry  (Barlow  &  Reeves, 
1979).  
 
The importance of bilateral symmetry in visual perception was recognised by Gestalt 
psychologists, who posited symmetry as one of key principles in the law of prägnanz 
(Wertheimer, 1923; Koffka, 1935). The rapid detection of symmetry is likely to aid 
early visual processing in tasks such as figure-ground seperation (Rock, 1983) and 
efficient processing of bilateral symmetry may also contribute to object constancy 
across changes in viewpoint (e.g. Vetter et al. 1994; Troje & Bülthoff, 1998). It has 
also  been  argued  that  symmetry  contributes  to  object  recognition  by  helping  to 
establish an object-centred axis against which coordinates can be represented (Marr & 
Nishihara, 1978). Perhaps most importantly however, symmetry allows objects to be 
represented  economically  (Barlow  &  Reeves,  1979).  For  bilaterally  symmetric 
objects, only one half of the object needs to be represented as it is physically identical 
to the other half, and this could provide the visual system with a basis on which to 
store  representations  in  a  reduced  form.  Furthermore,  when  viewing  symmetrical 
stimuli  participants  eye  movements  tend  to  cluster  on  one  half  on  the  stimulus, 
suggesting that perception is optimally efficient when perceiving symmetrical objects 
(Locher & Nodine, 1973).   13 
 
Although  biological  visual  systems  are  very  sensitive  to  both  symmetry  and 
deviations from symmetry (e.g. Wagemans, 1997) they also, somewhat paradoxically, 
have particular difficulty discriminating between figures that are mirror images of one 
other  (Bornstein  et  al.  1978;  Davidson,  1935;  Rudel  &Teuber,  1963;  Sutherland, 
1961). This difficulty is further evidenced in the course of childhood development 
with children under seven years of age often confusing letters that are mirror images 
of one another such as the letters ‘b’ and ‘d’ in reading (Mach, 1914; Davidson, 1935) 
and writing  (Cornell, 1985). In addition, individuals commonly report a difficulty in 
telling their left from right in their everyday lives and reproduce this confusion when 
tested under laboratory conditions (Snyder, 1991), a phenomenon which has been 
attributed to the (near) bilateral symmetry of the nervous system (Corballis & Beale, 
1976). More recent research has shown that the difficulty in discriminating mirror 
images is probably caused by neurones responding similarly to a given stimulus and 
its mirror reflection (Rollenhagen & Olson, 2000). 
 
Reports  of  difficulties  discriminating  mirror  images  in  the  normal  population  are 
paralleled by comparable (but significantly more profound) deficits in brain damaged 
patients.  Davidoff  &  Warrington  (1999,  2001;  Warrington  &  Davidoff,  2000) 
describe  two  individuals  that,  after  suffering  posterior  brain  damage,  display  a 
complete inability to decide if two simultaneously presented images are in the same or 
different mirror orientations. This phenomenon had previously been described in two 
separate case reports (Turnbull et al. 1995; Turnbull & McCarthy, 1996), and in all of 
these cases selective impairment of mirror discrimination occurred in the context of 
normal object identification. In fact, Warrington & Davidoff (2000) report one patient 
who displays reciprocal inhibition of these two abilities (i.e. her ability to discriminate 
mirror images was dependent upon her inability to recognise the presented stimuli). 
This disorder has been reported on a number of occasions subsequently (Karnath et al. 
2000; Cooper & Humphreys, 2000; Harris et al. 2001) and the disorder is thought to 
result from a deficit in determining object-centred orientation (Priftis et al. 2003). 
 
A similar deficit has been reported by Ramachandran and colleagues (1997) who 
describe a condition displayed by four right hemisphere stroke patients where their 
ability  to  create  representation  of  mirror  reflection  appears  compromised.  This   14 
condition, which they call ‘Mirror Agnosia’, is characterised by an inability to alter 
grasping behaviour when a mirror is placed in the non-neglected hemifield so that the 
patient can see an object located in the neglected hemifield. When asked to grasp this 
object  patients  are  observed  reaching  towards  the  mirror  itself  and  (somewhat 
bizarrely) searching behind the mirror, even though they report being fully aware that 
what they are looking at is a mirror (i.e. based on this knowledge the patient should be 
able to intellectually deduce the objects’ location). One explanation proposed by the 
authors is that patients cannot form representations of mirror reflection, and although 
this  deficit  may  be  linked  to  the  phenomenon  of  perceiving  mirror  reversals  as 
identical images (e.g. Davidoff & Warrington, 2001), there is no literature reporting 
mirror discrimination deficits in mirror agnostics.  
 
Further  case  reports  describe  patients  with  similar  disturbances  in  the  left-right 
orientation of their visual world. The phenomenon of ‘mirror-writing’ is observed in 
normal development (e.g. Cornell, 1985) but may also persist into adulthood and can 
occur  spontaneously  as  a  result  of  neurological  disorder  (Critchley,  1926). 
Furthermore, the tendency to write in mirror reversed script may occur as a result of 
abnormal development and could be genetically determined, with the prevalence of 
this disorder being estimated to be 1 in 6500 (Mathewson, 2004). Very rarely, mirror 
writing occurs in the presence of ‘mirror reading’ (i.e. written words are processed 
most efficiently when presented in mirror orientation), and this condition can cause 
the patients entire visual experience to be reversed in left-right orientation (Jokel & 
Conn, 1999; Lambon-Ralph et al. 1997; Pflugshaupt et al. 2007).  
 
As  mentioned  previously,  normally  functioning  humans  have  difficulty  in 
discriminating  between  mirror  images  when  the  objects  are  reversed  left  to  right, 
relative to the same task with top to bottom reversed stimuli (e.g. Bornstein et al. 
1978). In addition to difficulties perceiving the left-right orientation of visual stimuli, 
humans also display a profound difficulty in remembering the orientation of objects. 
In a classical demonstration by Nickerson and Adams (1979) it was shown that when 
asked  to  reproduce  the  orientation  that  a  monarchs’  head  appears  on  a  coin 
participants  performed  at  chance  level,  and  subsequent  studies  have  found 
performance on this task to be equivalently poor (Jones, 1990; Martin & Jones, 1997; 
Kosslyn & Rabin, 1999; Rubin and Kontis, 1983).   15 
1.4 Why is facial asymmetry important for visual systems? 
 
Faces  are  asymmetric  and  generally  larger  on  the  right  than  they  are  on  the  left 
(Farkas  &  Cheung,  1981;  Peck  et  al.  1991;  Sackheim,  1985).  This  directional 
asymmetry is not always observed however with some studies showing no difference 
between  average  measures  of  the  two  hemifaces  (Hardie  et  al.  2005),  and  others 
showing that directional asymmetry varies as a function of sex (Ferrario et al. 1993; 
Smith,  2000),  handedness  (Hardie  et  al.  2005)  and  occupation  (Smith,  1998). 
Although evidence for directional asymmetry is equivocal, asymmetry is a property of 
all faces, and even faces perceived as being highly symmetrical display significant 
levels of asymmetry (Peck et al. 1991). The structural asymmetry of faces is actually 
quite large, with distances from facial landmarks to centre points ranging from 4% to 
12% average difference, depending on the landmark measured (Ferrario et al. 2001). 
In addition, patterns of asymmetry are unique to an individual, to the extent that this 
information can discriminate between faces of identical twins (Burke & Healy, 1993).  
 
Psychological research on facial asymmetry has focused on the degree to which it 
affects the perceived attractiveness of a face.  Driven by the established link between 
fluctuating asymmetry (FA) and developmental instability (e.g. Mather, 1953), the 
covariance  of  facial  symmetry  and  perceived  attractiveness  has  been  repeatedly 
demonstrated (Jones & Hill, 1993; Grammer & Thornhill, 1994; Langlois et al. 1994; 
Rhodes et al. 1998, 1999; Scheib et al. 1999; Zebrowitz et al. 1996). Furthermore, it is 
considered that some of the variance in developmental stability of the face is caused 
by prenatal exposure to sex hormones (Fink et al. 2004).  
 
Our ability to detect asymmetry in faces is extremely well developed and we are 
highly sensitive to changes in symmetry (Rhodes, 1999). In addition, it would appear 
that  perceived  symmetry  reflects  actual  FA  accurately,  and  that  judgements  of 
symmetry  are  made  independently  of  directional  asymmetry,  suggesting  that 
developmental instability and perceived attractiveness are closely related (Rhodes, 
2004). The importance of symmetry in mate choice is further evidenced by the fact 
that women show an olfactory preference for more symmetrical men during periods   16 
of peak fertility (e.g. Gagenstad & Thornhill, 1998) and detect facial symmetry more 
accurately during these stages in the menstrual cycle (Oinonen & Mazmanian, 2007).  
 
In  addition  to  morphological  asymmetries,  faces  also  display  asymmetry  when 
expressing  emotion,  and  this  is  thought  to  result  from  underlying  functional 
asymmetry  in  brain  function  (e.g.  Sackheim  et  al.  1978).  Furthermore,  facial 
asymmetry  during  emotional  expression  is  determined  in  part  by  the  underlying 
anatomical structure of the face (Schmidt et al. 2006). Paradoxically however, visual 
information relating to expression is said to be processed in parallel to identity-related 
information  (Bruce  &  Young,  1986),  and  therefore  this  source  of  asymmetry  is 
unlikely  to  contribute  to  the  recognition  of  faces.  Facial  asymmetry  in  emotional 
expression  is  however  known  to  communicate  important  social  information,  with 
asymmetry  being  more  pronounced  during  intentional  compared  to  spontaneous 
displays of emotion (Ekman et al. 1981). 
 
That perceptual systems are so finely tuned to bilateral asymmetry in both face (e.g. 
Rhodes, 1999) and non-face objects (Wagemans, 1997) implicates the existence of 
mechanisms specialised for processing and representing spatial relationships in terms 
of  their  asymmetry.  Indeed,  as  the  ability  to  detect  symmetry  is  displayed  by 
organisms with relatively small nervous systems (e.g. Møller & Sorci, 1998) it is 
probable that this ability is driven by low-level visual mechanisms. However, it has 
been shown that symmetry is more accurately detected when faces are presented in 
upright  versus  inverted  orientation  and  inverting  the  polarity  of  face  images  also 
makes symmetry detection more difficult (Rhodes et al. 2005). This finding suggests 
that symmetry detection in faces is not entirely reliant on low level mechanisms (as 
low-level properties of face images are not altered by inversion), implicating higher-
level visual mechanisms in facial symmetry detection.  
 
In the same study however, Rhodes and colleagues (2005) found that tilting face 
stimuli by 45 degrees disrupted symmetry detection. They argue that mechanisms 
responsible for face recognition can therefore be dissociated from those processing 
facial symmetry, as this same manipulation does not disrupt normal face processing 
(e.g. McKone et al. 2001). Little and Jones (2006) report contrary evidence however, 
appearing  to  show  that  symmetry  detection  is  unaffected  by  inversion  whereas   17 
preference for symmetrical faces is significantly reduced by inversion. The authors 
argue  that  mechanisms  responsible  for  symmetry  detection  and  for  symmetry 
preference may too be dissociable. However, it is likely that participants’ familiarity 
with the test images prior to symmetry detection may have affected their results and 
that their design was not sensitive enough to detect the effect of inversion on this task.  
 
In  a  recent  study  by  Chen  and  colleagues  (2007)  the  close  relationship  between 
symmetry processing and face processing has been further established. Firstly, the 
authors found that regions of the brain responding to symmetry are located very close 
to the right occipital face area (OFA), which is heavily implicated in face processing 
(e.g. Rossion et al. 2003). In addition, researchers report that a large proportion of the 
BOLD response to faces in the right OFA can be attributed to the symmetry of faces 
(although symmetry alone does not evoke the same response). Taken together these 
results  imply  that  brain  areas  processing  symmetry  information  lend  support  to 
processing of face information in the OFA.   
 
Though it is uncertain whether the processing of facial symmetry can be functionally 
dissociated from face recognition mechanisms in human cognition, facial symmetry 
has nonetheless provided a useful biometric for automatic face recognition systems. 
The  use  of  facial  asymmetry  in  face  recognition  systems  is  a  relatively  new 
development,  with  Liu  et  al  (2002)  providing  the  first  demonstration  that  facial 
asymmetry can provide the basis for efficient identification. Early investigation has 
indicated that this biometric could be of use in situations requiring quick and accurate 
real-time identification across changes in expression (Liu et al. 2003; Mitra et al. 
2007). A key question that will be addressed in this thesis is the extent to which facial 
asymmetry  contributes  to  human  face  recognition  and  the  extent  to  which  this 
asymmetry is represented by cognitive mechanisms. Therefore the data reported here, 
in addition to resolving existing debate in psychological research, may inform the 
development of algorithms designed for automatic face recognition. 
 
 
 
   18 
1.5 How are faces cognitively represented? 
 
The  process  of  face  recognition  must  rely  on  some  sophisticated  process  of 
abstraction. Take for instance the variation of surface features present in the images 
shown  below  (Figure  1.1).  It  is  difficult  when  faced  with  this  collection  of 
photographs to articulate or determine just what aspect of the face is constant or what 
exactly its essence may be. Not only do the textural aspects of lighting, make-up and 
aging combine to produce vastly different patterns and absolute values of luminance, 
but the relations between the features of the face also vary between the images. Both 
the angle of the head relative to the camera and the camera lens itself contribute to 
variance in the two-dimensional positional relationships between component parts of 
the face. This degree of variation in the pattern of light produced by a given face 
poses a significant problem for computer systems designed to recognise faces, and 
changes  in  superficial  image  characteristics  can  severely  disrupt  performance  on 
automatic recognition systems (Phillips et al. 2000, 2003).  
 
 
Figure 1.1: 50 photographs of the Hollywood actress Cameron Diaz. 
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The object constancy displayed by the face recognition system is necessarily robust, 
as the ability to recognise faces despite the significant variation in visual sensation is 
essential  to  successful  social  interaction.  Memory  representations  of  faces  exhibit 
robustness in a greater sense than this however. For instance, we are able to remember 
a great number of faces and for a very long time, as was shown by Bahrick, Bahrick 
and  Wittlinger  (1975)  who  report  90%  correct  performance  level  when  showing 
pictures of classmates to subjects for up to 35 years after graduation. Furthermore, we 
can recognise a familiar face even when the image is severely degraded (e.g. Sergent, 
1986; Burton, Wilson, Cowan & Bruce, 1999), and recognition displays a stubborn 
resilience to profound image distortions such as stretching and blurring (Hole et al., 
2002).  When  one  considers  the  resilience  and  reliability  of  our  face  recognition 
abilities in this way, a picture begins to emerge of a cognitive system that is capable 
of embodying a huge number of abstract representations. The exact number of faces 
that can be recognised is difficult to determine, but it has been suggested that the 
average person can “…probably identify several thousand faces” (Ellis, 1981, p171). 
Each  of  these  representations  in  turn  is  required  to  assimilate  a  large  amount  of 
variance (Burton et al, 2005).  
 
Historically, debate regarding the nature of our mental representation of faces has 
centred on the question of whether the visual information is coded by segregating the 
separate features, or whether a configural mapping of the face results in a gestalt 
representation that enables ‘holistic’ processing  (e.g. Tanaka & Farah, 1993). The 
term ‘configural’ is used to refer to a process that achieves perception of a given 
object by virtue of the spatial-relations between its component features. This is in 
contrast to ‘featural’ processing which represents an object as an index of individual 
features  that  can  be  matched  to  the  perceived  stimulus  during  the  process  of 
identification. The use of this terminology is often ambiguous however, especially 
with regards to what is meant by ‘configural’ information (see Bruce and Humphreys, 
1994; Rhodes et al. 1993).  
 
In an influential review of literature on this subject, Maurer et al (2002) distinguished 
three types of configural processing that are all implicated in the stages of processing 
underpinning face recognition. The first of these processes detects the presence of a 
face in our visual scene and this is accomplished by perception of what is referred to   20 
as ‘first order’ configural processing: The general form of the face is detected (i.e. 
two eyes above a nose, with a mouth directly below the nose) and from here the 
process  of  identification  can  proceed.   Once  the  face  has  been  detected  a  further 
process coheres the various features of the face to form a gestalt representation that 
can be represented as a function of the ‘second-order’ spatial relationships between 
the component features, and these spatial relationships are then processed in the final 
process.  
 
The second-order configural information is implicated in the identification of a face, 
whereby  the  precise  distance  between  the  facial  features  provides  an  informative 
metric that the mind exploits for the task of recognition (see also Diamond & Carey, 
1986; Leder & Bruce, 2000). As the task of discriminating between two faces must 
necessarily involve divining very small differences in the configural information (e.g. 
Farkas, 1994; Farkas & Cheung, 1981; Farkas & Munro, 1978), it is of little surprise 
that  the  perceptual  mechanisms  implicated  in  this  task  are  finely  tuned  to  the 
perception  of  these  relations.  Using  experimental  stimuli  generated  by  the  facial 
reconstruction  tools  Photofit  and  Indentikit  (which  are  used  by  the  police  service 
when trying to generate a likeness to a  criminal from eyewitness accounts), Haig 
(1984)  demonstrated  that  adults  are  sensitive  to  extremely  small  changes  in  the 
distance between features. In fact, it would appear this sensitivity is constrained only 
by the limits of our visual acuity.  
 
This fine sensitivity to the spatial arrangement of features is characteristic of face 
recognition, yet it has been reported that sensitivity is markedly impaired when a face 
is either turned upside down (e.g. Leder et al. 2001; Collishaw & Hole, 2000) or if its 
luminance is reversed (e.g. Kemp et al. 1990).  These same manipulations have a far 
less drastic effect on recognition of objects and other non-face objects of expertise 
(Robbins & McKone, 2007), which has led researchers to argue that the processing of 
subtle second-order relations is specifically adapted for face recognition (McKone et 
al. 2007). Furthermore, the inversion effect (turning a face upside down) has little 
effect  on  tasks  where  subjects  are  required  to  make  judgements  based  on  the 
component features of the face (Friere et al 2000; Leder & Bruce, 2000; Leder et al. 
2001),  suggesting  that  processes  involved  in  extracting  featural  and  configural 
information are dissociable.    21 
 
The distinction between featural and configural processing is far from straightforward 
however,  and  research  on  this  topic  has  largely  failed  to  demonstrate  that  such 
processes are in fact separable. Riesenhuber et al (2004) demonstrated that inversion 
impairs performance on a face matching procedure when faces differ only in terms of 
their features. This finding is inconsistent with previous research showing a null effect 
of  inversion  when  participants  are  required  to  make  judgements  based  on  facial 
features (Friere et al 2000; Leder & Bruce, 2000; Le Grand et al, 2001; Leder et al., 
2001). However, subsequent studies have also reported similar inversion effects for 
discrimination of faces altered in configurational and featural aspects (Malcolm et al. 
2004; Yovel & Kanwisher, 2004a), and it has been shown that features are more 
easily matched when presented in the context of a whole face (Tanaka & Sengco, 
1997;  Tanaka  &  Farah,  1993).  These  findings  would  appear  to  implicate  an 
interaction between processing of facial features and their global configuration, and 
fMRI studies attempting to show dissociation between these types of processing have 
produced ambiguous results (Yovel & Kanwisher, 2004b; Yovel & Duchaine, 2006; 
Maurer et al. 2007). 
 
That processing of configural and featural information in faces has proved difficult to 
separate empirically is likely to stem from an inherent circularity in the definition of 
these apparently independent sources of information. For instance, although the eye 
region is generally considered to be a ‘feature’ (e.g. Riesenhuber et al. 2004, Leder et 
al. 2001), there is an abundance of ‘configural’ information within this area, such as 
the distance between the eyebrow and the eyelid. That said, it is difficult to see the 
value in making a psychological distinction between two types of processes if the two 
types  of  information  that  are  apparently  separated  by  these  processes  are  neither 
perceptually nor physically dissociable.  Just how inversion disrupts face-processing 
remains uncertain and it would appear unlikely that it selectively disrupts ‘configural’ 
processing, at least according to the current definition (see Maurer, 2002). It has been 
demonstrated that perception of vertical spacing is disrupted more by inversion than 
the  perception  of  horizontal  spacing  (Goffaux  et  al.  2007),  which  suggests  that 
inversion impedes face processing more selectively than had been previously thought. 
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An alternative hypothesis for why inversion disrupts face processing is that it prevents 
faces from being processed holistically. Farah et al (1995) provide strong evidence 
that the inversion effect is caused by selective disruption to holistic as opposed to 
configural processing in an experiment using dot pattern stimuli. Hypothesising that 
face recognition differs from other object processing because it relies on less ‘part 
decomposition’,  they  found  that  inversion  worsened  memory  for  random 
configurations of dots but did not affect performance when the dot patterns were sub-
divided (i.e. grouped) by colour. This result would appear to suggest that inversion 
disrupts the processing of complex stimuli that are not segmented into ‘parts’. In the 
same  paper,  Farah  and  colleagues  also  report  a  similar  result  obtained  with  face 
stimuli. They found that inversion does not affect the ability to recall a face broken 
into its component parts but it does impair performance on the same task when the 
face is presented in its normal arrangement.  
 
 
Figure 1.2: The composite face effect as reported by Young et al (1987). It is generally more 
difficult to identify the top (Tom Cruise) and bottom (John Travolta) halves in the image on 
the left than in the image on the right, where the face halves are misaligned.  This effect 
demonstrates that face perception is driven by powerful tendency to combine elements into a 
unified perception. 
 
Though  there  exists  significant  uncertainty  regarding  whether  or  not  faces  are 
processed  ‘configurally’  (most  likely  due  to  difficulty  in  defining  this  term)  the   23 
evidence that faces are processed ‘holistically’ is compelling (see Farah et al. 1998 for 
a  review).  In  a  classic  demonstration  of  the  inversion  effect,  Young  et  al  (1987) 
measured  participants  accuracy  at  recognising  images  of  familiar  people  showing 
either the top half or the bottom half of their face.  When the top and bottom halves of 
two  familiar  faces  were  fused  together  performance  on  this  task  was  very  poor, 
however  when  the  face  halves  were  separated  the  ability  to  recognise  the  two 
identities was greatly improved (see figure 1.2). The implication of this result is that 
perceiving the face as a whole somehow disrupted the ability to perceive its parts. 
Importantly, this effect was not observed when stimuli were inverted; lending further 
support to argument that inversion disrupts the normal processing of faces.  
 
Figure  1.3:  Stimulus  conditions  used  by  Tanaka  &  Sengenco  (1997,  Experiment  1). 
Performance was best when the feature appeared in the context of the original configuration 
(bottom row), and was better in the ‘new configuration’ relative to ‘isolated’ condition. 
 
The tendency for visual information in faces to be combined in a holistic manner   24 
would appear powerful, and has been repeatedly demonstrated. Tanaka & Sengco 
(1997) found that individual parts of faces were recognized best when presented in the 
context of the original face configuration compared to when they were presented in 
the context of a new face configuration or in isolation (see Figure 1.3). As no such 
effect  was  found  for  their  control  stimuli,  it  is likely  that  processing  of  non-face 
objects is not as reliant on the perceptual whole (see also Farah et al. 1995; Tanaka & 
Farah, 1993).  In addition, neurons in the temporal cortex of monkeys that  show 
sensitivity to whole faces and to faces with masked features do not show any response 
to faces where features are presented in a scrambled configuration (see Desimone, 
1991).  As  these  neurons  do  not  respond  to  the  presence  of  facial  features  in  an 
additive manner, it would  suggest that they represent faces as a function of their 
global configuration. Furthermore, global processing of faces by rhesus monkeys has 
also been demonstrated behaviourally by Dahl and colleagues (2007), who report a 
standard human composite effect (Young et al. 1987) in this species. 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Stimulus conditions used by Young et al (1992). Patient B.Q. neglected the left 
side of the face stimuli only in the ‘ordinary chimeric’ condition.  
   25 
The force of holistic perception in face perception is further evidenced by patient B.Q. 
who  displayed  symptoms  of  ‘object-centred  visual  neglect’  (Young  et  al.  1992). 
People with this condition neglect any information falling to one side of an attended 
object  so  that  when  viewing  face  images  made  by  merging  two  face  halves 
(bilaterally),  only  the  face  on  the  non-neglected  side  is  perceived.  However,  this 
phenomenon does not occur when the half faces are presented with a gap between 
them  suggesting  that  the  patients’  failure  to  recognise  the  left  side  of  a  face  is 
restricted to instances where the face can be perceived as a whole (see figure 1.4). 
Furthermore, B.Q. neglected the left side of non-face objects significantly less than 
the left side of faces, which provides further evidence that faces are processed more 
holistically than other objects. 
 
In addition to uncertainty regarding the manner in which faces are processed, there 
also  exists  significant  debate  as  to  whether  these  processes  are  exclusive  to  face 
perception. In a recent paper by Busey and Vanderkolk (2005) it was shown that 
fingerprint experts exhibit a similar inversion effect for faces and fingerprints on the 
electrophysiological  N170 response. This data further supports the notion that the 
negative effect of inversion on configural processing is common to all ‘objects of 
expertise’ and replicates previous demonstrations of this phenomenon (e.g. Diamond 
and Carey, 1986; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997). Furthermore, brain-imaging studies have 
demonstrated that extensive training at discriminating between highly homogenous 
stimuli  causes  activation  of  neural  networks  implicated  in  face  perception  (e.g. 
Gauthier et al. 1999).  
 
The issue of whether cognitive mechanisms involved in face perception are specific to 
this task remains highly contentious. In a recent review of behavioural data suggestive 
of similar processing of faces and other objects of expertise, Robbins & McKone 
(2007) contend that inversion effects for non-face objects are rarely demonstrated. In 
fact,  in  the  twenty  years  since  Diamond  and  Carey’s  (1986)  initial  result  (that 
processing objects of expertise is disrupted by inversion), no research has replicated 
this effect. Similar effects of inversion on reaction times and physiological responses 
have  been  reported  for  face  and  non-face  objects  (e.g.  Gauthier  &  Tarr,  1997; 
Gauthier et al. 1999), however inversion has never since been shown to reduce the 
accuracy  with  which  objects  of  expertise  are  recognised.  In  addition,  classical   26 
demonstrations of holistic processing in face perception such as the whole-part effect 
(Tanaka & Farah, 1993) and the composite effect (Young et al. 1987) have never been 
shown to occur in objects other than faces, regardless of the degree to which subjects 
were expert with the stimuli.  
 
Robbins  and  McKone  (2007)  reproduced  the  conditions  of  Diamond  and  Carey’s 
(1986) experiment and observed no inversion effect, no whole-part effect, and no 
composite  effect  for  images  of  Labradors  when  testing  Labrador  experts.    These 
results make it highly likely that Diamond and Carey’s (1986) demonstration was 
artefactual, most probably resulting from the fact that their expert participants were 
overly familiarised with the test images (their stimuli were copied from a ubiquitous 
text that most dog lovers would be familiar with). In light of this research it would 
appear that face processing is indeed reliant on a form of perceptual processing that 
combines visual information in a qualitatively different fashion to the processing of 
non-face objects (see also McKone et al. 2006).  
 
1.6  The  effects  of  global  geometric  transformations  on  face 
processing 
 
1.6.1 Stretching and Sheering  
 
Though face processing is undoubtedly disrupted by inversion, it has been shown to 
be robust to certain affine transformations. Hole et al (2002) show that images of 
famous  faces  can  be  stretched  to  twice  the  original  height  without  affecting 
participants’ response behaviour, despite the profound alteration of the ‘configural’ 
mapping of the facial features (Figure 1.5; c). This manipulation grossly corrupts the 
true relationship between the facial features, and such stretching may be seen as an 
extension of the spatial distortion produced by a standard camera lens (where any 
‘stretch’ is typically slight). Given that the shape information in the face is altered by 
this transformation (but not by inversion), it is surprising that it does not affect our 
ability to recognise the face, or the speed at which we do so.  
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Hole et al (2002) did find that ‘shearing’ an image (Figure 1.5; d) of a familiar person 
disrupted recognition performance however, as did stretching the image to twice its 
width,  but  these  effects  were  slight  and  could  not  be  considered  catastrophic  to 
recognition performance. Furthermore, where linear transformations were applied to 
only one half of the face, recognition performance suffered. Again however, the effect 
of this transformation on performance was not as great as might be expected given the 
nature of the distortion with performance dropping from a baseline of 93% to 79% 
accuracy. It would appear from this data that it is actually quite difficult to disrupt 
face recognition by distorting positional information, and recognition would appear 
robust even to severe levels of geometric distortion (see Figure 1.6).   
 
Figure  1.5:  A  veridical  representation  of  a  familiar  face  (a)  can  be  subjected  to  linear 
distortion (b, c) without effecting recognition behaviour. Illustration reproduced from Hole et 
al (2002). 
 
Figure 1.6: The reader is invited to identify the two images, which have been subjected to a 
severe degree of non-global distortion. 
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As discussed in the previous section, the distinction between configural and featural 
processing is somewhat arbitrary in the context of human face processing, and the 
results reported by Hole et al (2002) complicate this issue further. Not only do the 
geometric  distortions  executed  on  their  test  stimuli  grossly  alter  the  inter-feature 
distance measurements, but they also drastically change the appearance of the features 
themselves.  Furthermore,  and  perhaps  most  critically,  these  distortions  also  play 
havoc with the distance ratios across x and y coordinates. Such data would appear to 
preclude any explanation of configural processing that posits a simple x-y coordinate 
matching system as its basis (e.g. Cooper & Brooks, 2004). In addition, these findings 
highlight the need for a revised explanation of face recognition: one that relies not on 
cognitive representations of simple distance metrics at its foundation, but on a more 
sophisticated  and  flexible  representation  tolerant  to  systematic  distortions  in 
configural relations. 
 
Discussing their findings, Hole et al (2002) offer two explanations for the surprisingly 
slight  effect  of  their  experimental  manipulations.  The  first  is  that  the  ‘reverse 
transformation’ was applied to the stretched stimuli prior to recognition, and that this 
normalisation  was  easily  applied  to  images  stretched  in  only  one  dimension.  The 
existence of uni-dimensional normalisation in face processing is implicated further by 
reported dissociations between configural information in horizontal and vertical axes. 
Using  factor  analysis,  Fellous  (1997)  demonstrated  that  the  correlation  between 
measurements of facial configuration is explained by groups of dimensions belonging 
to either vertical or horizontal measurements (but not to both) and that horizontal and 
vertical  facial  measurements  are  therefore  statistically  independent.  Furthermore, 
there  is  more  between-face  variance  in  the  horizontal  dimension  relative  to  the 
vertical dimension of faces (Ferrario et al. 1997). In addition, it has recently been 
suggested  that  ‘iso-dimensional’  normalisation  may  have  developed  to  tolerate 
rotations  of  the  head  in  depth  around  the  x  and  y  axes,  which  causes  a  similar 
compression of configural information to geometric stretches (Sinha et al. 2006).  
 
A second proposed explanation for Hole’s findings is that the cognitive representation 
of the perceived face is transformed to match the incoming stimulus. This explanation 
implicates the existence of a mutable representation that is capable of altering its state 
in accordance with the appearance of the familiar stimulus, and as such predicts that   29 
stretching should disrupt unfamiliar face matching. As yet however there has not been 
a successful demonstration of disrupted performance on an unfamiliar matching task. 
A recent study reported null effects using this paradigm (Hole, unpublished data), 
suggesting that the perceptual invariance is a result of some automatic process of 
normalisation that is not contingent upon an existing representation of the perceived 
individual.  
 
1.6.2 Inversion and Rotation 
 
As has already been discussed, reversing an image of a face across the horizontal axis 
severely impairs normal face processing (e.g. Yin, 1969), and this effect is likely to be 
caused by disruption to normal holistic processing (e.g. Farah et al. 1998). Since Yin 
(1969) found that faces are more difficult to recognise upside down than they are the 
right way up, the ‘inversion effect’ has been repeatedly demonstrated and has become 
perhaps the single most important finding in the field of face perception. The effect of 
inversion is extremely robust and disrupts many aspects of normal face perception 
including emotion processing (Calder et al. 2000), perception of attractiveness (Little 
& Jones, 2006) and gender discrimination (Bruyer et al. 1993; Stevenage & Osborne, 
2006). Historically, it has been considered that inversion leads to a qualitative shift in 
the way faces are processed (e.g. Valentine, 1988), however recent reports have cast 
doubt over this assertion. 
 
It  has  been  argued  that inversion  causes  disruption  to  face  processing  because  of 
difficulty in mentally rotating inverted stimuli to their canonical (upright) orientation 
(e.g. Rock, 1973) and there exists a significant body of data supporting this theory. 
Valentine and Bruce (1988) were the first to show that face recognition performance 
varies as a function of the angle of rotation, and since then there have been further 
demonstrations of this monotonic relationship (Bruyer et al. 1993; Collishaw & Hole, 
2002; Stevenage & Osborne, 2006). By demonstrating the linear relationship between 
angle of rotation and recognition using blurred faces, Collingshaw & Hole (2002) 
demonstrated that configural processing is increasingly disrupted as the image of the 
face is oriented away from upright. This finding is evidence against any ‘processing 
shift’  caused  by  inversion  but  instead  points  towards  a  difficulty  in  retaining  the   30 
‘facial gestalt’ during the process of mental rotation. Therefore, it would appear that 
the ‘inversion effect’ may not be the product of inversion per se, but instead is the 
cumulative effect of angular distance from vertical orientation. One may even argue, 
in light of this data, that the ‘inversion effect’ would be more accurately named the 
‘rotation effect’. 
 
Figure 1.7: The original image (in the upper right quadrant) has been subjected to reflection 
across the x and y axes. N.B. reflection across the x-axis (classical inversion) comprises of 
lateral and vertical reversal, as evidenced by the location of Marilyn Monroe’s beauty spot. 
 
It should be noted however that rotation transformation is different to inversion (i.e. 
vertical reflection), and it produces different stimuli (see Phillips & Rawles, 1997). 
Whereas  the  classical  inversion  manipulation  reflects  information  across  an  axis 
perpendicular to the axis of symmetry, rotation instead rotates the face through 180 
degrees. Thus, the resulting stimuli from these manipulations are mirror reversals of 
one another (see figure 1.7), and it has been demonstrated that the effect of inversion 
is confounded by the effect of lateral reversal in a memory task (McKelvie, 1987). If 
inversion is indeed confounded by mirror reversal, then this would pose a problem for 
those researchers that argue the disproportionate disruption caused by inversion on 
face  processing  relative  to  processing  of  non-face  objects  is  of  great  theoretical 
importance  (e.g.  McKone  et  al.  2006).  Object  recognition  is  invariant  to  mirror   31 
orientation (e.g. Biedermann & Cooper, 1991), so if face recognition is negatively 
affected  by  mirror  reversal,  then  this  may  explain  why  inversion  impedes  face 
recognition more than it does object recognition. 
 
1.6.3 Mirror Reflection  
 
The effect of lateral reversal on face recognition has been subject to a limited amount 
of research relative to the extensive use of the classic inversion manipulation. This is 
due to the perceived importance of the theoretical distinctions associated with the 
‘inversion effect’, which is considered to selectively disrupt mechanisms intrinsic to 
face recognition (e.g. McKone et al. 2006). The present thesis will look at the effect 
of lateral reversal in detail and will try to resolve the question of whether or not 
asymmetry in the configuration of facial landmarks is explicitly coded in memory. 
This will inform current debate in face recognition research concerned with whether 
or  not  face  recognition  and  symmetry  detection  are  functionally  dissociable  (e.g. 
Rhodes et al. 2005), and also elucidate the contribution of facial configuration to face 
recognition. 
 
It is considered that whereas reversal across the horizontal axis alters the perception 
of both first and second order configural information (see Maurer et al. 2002), lateral 
reversal preserves the former whilst altering the latter. Therefore, it is expected that 
disruption  of  second  order  configuration  will  disrupt  the  task  of  recognition.  The 
effect of mirror reversal on face recognition was first investigated by Mita, Dermer 
and Knight (1977). They sought to replicate the Mere Exposure Effect (Zajonc, 1968) 
using  an  affective  ‘likeability’  decision  to  faces  in  their  original  and  reversed 
orientations. Subjects were shown an image of either themselves or of close friends in 
both original and reversed lateral orientation and had to decide which image they 
‘liked’  better.  Their  data  showed  that  people  are  more  likely  to  prefer images  of 
themselves in the mirror orientation (which is the orientation most often available to 
our  perception),  and  that  the  opposite  pattern  was  true  when  making  likeness 
decisions to close friends.  
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Brédart  (2003)  replicated  this  finding  using  a  more  explicit  test  of  orientation 
memory. He asked participants to indicate which of two images (original or reversed) 
were shown in the orientation most familiar to them for both images of co-workers 
and of themselves. Twenty-eight out of thirty-two participants correctly chose the 
veridical  representation  of  their  co-workers  and  twenty-four  out  of  thirty-two 
correctly chose the mirror reversal of their own face. This data is in agreement with a 
previous study by Rhodes (1986) showing that subjects are more likely to choose the 
veridical orientation when asked to indicate which image is the best ‘likeness’ of the 
person. 
 
Given that the cognitive system appears to be selectively responsive to faces in their 
most commonly perceived lateral orientation, one might expect to find a detectable 
effect of mirror reversal on the recognition of familiar faces. As yet however, there is 
a very limited amount of research supporting this assertion. McKelvie (1983) tested 
participants’ memory for unfamiliar faces and found that, if the images were reversed 
prior to test, memory performance was disrupted. Though McKelvie replicated these 
findings in 5 separate experiments, all of these experiments used the same images at 
learning as in test. This somewhat constrains the scope of the conclusions, as it has 
previously been demonstrated that memory for images of faces may be achievable 
without using mechanisms involved in human face recognition (Dyer et al. 2002). 
 
 A more recent study by Brooks et al (2002) used a repetition-priming paradigm to 
determine whether or not our memory representations for faces are sensitive to the 
lateral orientation of the perceived stimulus. They found no difference in response 
latency between original and reversed conditions. This contradicts McKelvie (1983) 
and suggests that the mental representations underpinning face recognition are coded 
in a manner that transcends the left-right orientation of the external world. This is an 
appealing possibility, as the same invariance to lateral orientation has previously been 
demonstrated in object recognition (Biederman & Cooper, 1991). Furthermore, this 
data  is  consistent  with  models  of  object  recognition  proposing  a  mode  of 
representation that is positionally invariant (e.g. Hummel and Biederman, 1992). 
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1.7 Thesis Overview 
 
The  empirical  approach  employed  in  this  thesis  is  characterised  by  the  stimulus 
manipulation of mirror reversal. The effect of this geometric distortion on a number 
of face processing tasks will be investigated in an attempt to improve understanding 
of how faces are cognitively represented. Lateral orientation does not appear to be 
specified in memory representations of other objects (e.g. Hummel and Biederman, 
1992), but faces may be exceptional in this respect as asymmetry in the face provides 
information enabling powerful identity discrimination (e.g. Burke & Healey, 1993), 
and facial asymmetry conveys important social information (e.g. Rhodes, 1999).  
 
The first experimental chapter will assess the contribution of bilateral information in 
an unfamiliar face-matching task. Following that, chapter 3 will examine the extent to 
which  the  left-right  orientation  of  facial  asymmetry  is  represented  in  memory  by 
quantifying the effect of mirror reversal on various face recognition tasks. Chapters 4 
and 5 then employ a two alternative forced-choice procedure (2AFC) where an image 
of a face is presented alongside its mirror-reversal and participants must decide which 
image is presented in the ‘real-world’ orientation. This procedure is considered to be a 
sensitive test of memory for lateral orientation of familiar objects (e.g. Kelly et al. 
2001)  and  will  be  used  to  assess  whether  memory  for  the  lateral  orientation  of 
familiar faces can be detected (chapter 4). A slightly different 2AFC procedure is 
used in chapter 5 where participants are asked to make a ‘likeability’ decision (see 
Zajonc, 1968) to simultaneous presentation of images of unfamiliar faces in normal 
and  reversed  orientations.  It  has  been  demonstrated  that  faces  are  generally 
asymmetric (e.g. Farkas & Cheung, 1981), and this may produce cognitive sensitivity 
to  the  mirror  reversal  of  unfamiliar  faces.  In  the  final  experimental  chapter,  two 
experiments  are  designed  that  demonstrate  facial  configuration  is  processed 
asymmetrically.  In  addition  to  asymmetrical  morphology,  perceptual  asymmetries 
may  contribute  to  the  asymmetry  of  cognitive  representations,  and  the  interaction 
between these two factors is discussed in chapter 6.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Facial asymmetry and unfamiliar face 
matching 
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Introduction 
 
The  typical  human  face  displays  mild  structural  asymmetry  along  the  vertical 
meridian, with average distances differing between right and left measurements by 
around  3  percent  (Farkas  &  Cheung,  1981).  In  a  more  recent  study,  average 
measurements from the facial landmarks to centre points were found to vary from 4% 
to 12% depending on the landmark measured (Ferrario et al. 2001). Even in studies 
using  samples  with  highly  symmetrical  facial  features  (e.g.  professional  models, 
beauty contest winners), researchers have failed to find an instance where a subject 
did not demonstrate asymmetry in one or more of the dimensions measured (Peck et 
al.,  1991).  Presently,  this  naturally  occurring  asymmetry  is  of  theoretical  interest 
primarily  to  evolutionary  biologists  (e.g.  Parsons,  1990;  Polak,  2003),  and  to 
psychologists studying the perception of beauty (e.g. Thornhill & Gangestad, 1994; 
Gangestad & Thornhill, 1997; Simmons et al, 2004; for a recent review see Rhodes, 
2006). However it is surprising that research concerning the cognitive process of face 
recognition has rarely focused on this source of variation.  
 
It  has  been  argued  that  cognitive  mechanisms  specialised  to  compute  fine-grain 
configural information have evolved specifically to process faces (Le Grand et al 
2004, McKone, Kanwisher & Duchaine 2007, Tanaka & Farah 1993). Furthermore, it 
would appear that this ‘configural’ information is integral to both our memory and 
perception  of  faces,  with  processes  requiring  sensitivity  to  the  fine-grain  spatial 
relationships  between  facial  features  having  been  heavily  implicated  in  tasks 
involving recognition of familiar faces (Sergent 1986, Hayes 1988, Collishaw & Hole 
2000, McKone, Martinin & Nakayama 2001) and in face discrimination tasks with 
novel stimuli (Freire et al. 2000, Le Grand et al 2001, Leder et al 2001, Leder & 
Bruce 2000). Given that humans show a high level of sensitivity to deviations from 
perfect symmetry in faces, and that the degree to which this source of asymmetry is 
present in a given face is thought to vary moderately between human individuals 
(Simmons et al. 2004), it is likely that the holistic property of asymmetry individuates 
facial identity. As such, a central hypothesis to be tested in this thesis is that the 
quality (and quantity) of this asymmetry contributes to the visual information that 
makes a given face unique.    36 
Figure 2.1: A portrait of John Innes (left) has been used to create a right (middle) and left 
(right) ‘chimera’, emphasising the differences between the left and right sides of a face 
(Taken from Roberts, 2006). 
 
One  can  illustrate  the  asymmetrical  nature  of  a  human  face  by  creating  what  are 
known as ‘chimeric faces’ (see figure 2.1). These images are generated by firstly 
generating a mirror reversed copy of a straight-on portrait, then marrying the left half 
of one image with the right half of the other (reversed) image, and then by fusing the 
remaining hemifaces in a similar manner (see Wolff, 1933). The resulting images (the 
middle and right pictures of figure 2.1) are strikingly distinct: So much so that they 
typically appear to depict two separate identities altogether. Chimeric faces have been 
used  to  investigate  the  asymmetry  of  perceptual  systems  responsible  for  face 
recognition  (Burt &  Perrett,  1997;  Butler  et  al. 2005),  and  these  findings  will  be 
discussed later in the thesis (chapter 6). For the moment however, they are relevant 
only  in  as  far  as  they  highlight  an  important  perceptual  consequence  of  facial 
asymmetry. 
 
Here  I  design  two  experiments  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  the  configural 
information that is distributed across the two hemispheres of the face is implicated in 
successful performance on an unfamiliar face-matching task. Previous research has 
shown that information specifying relations between the facial features is important 
when confronted with the task of individuating previously unfamiliar faces. Using an 
unfamiliar face discrimination task, Freire et al (2000) found an inversion effect in the 
order of 30% when faces differed primarily in configural information, but no effect of 
inversion  whatsoever  when  discriminating  faces  that  differed  mainly  in  featural   37 
information. Though appearing to implicate configural processing in unfamiliar face 
matching, this conclusion has been challenged by more recent evidence. Megreya and 
Burton (2006) show that performance on upright unfamiliar face matching is highly 
correlated  with  performance  on  the  same  task  when  stimuli  are  inverted;  a  result 
which  is  not  consistent  with  the  view  that  these  two  tasks  rely  on  independent 
processing mechanisms. 
 
A  further  sensitivity  to  bilaterally  distributed  configural  information  in  tasks 
involving unfamiliar faces was demonstrated by Leder et al (2001). Participants were 
shown two images of unfamiliar faces side-by-side and asked to decide in which face 
the interocular distance was greatest. They found that subjects performed this task 
better  when  the  faces  were  presented  in  upright  orientation  relative  to  inverted 
orientation,  and  that  this  effect  occurred  even  when  the  eyes  were  presented  in 
isolation.  Again  this  illustrates  that  some  degree  of  configural  processing  occurs 
during discrimination tasks involving unfamiliar faces, and also that this configural 
sensitivity extends to relationships between the two facial hemispheres. In the two 
experiments reported in this chapter I investigate more closely the importance of this 
bilaterally  distributed  configural  information  in  an  unfamiliar  face  discrimination 
task. 
 
It is subjectively apparent when looking at figure 2.1 that the two chimeric images 
appear  to  be  portraits  of  two  different  people  (if  one  ignores  the  hairstyle  and 
clothing), an effect that may be predicted given the fact that the two hemi-faces are 
morphologically  distinct.  This  observation  prompts  a  testable  hypothesis:  When 
shown two opposing hemi-faces (one left, one right) people will be unable to reliably 
decide if the hemi faces belong to the same person, or to two different people. So the 
first experiment will investigate the extent to which the visual information contained 
in  opposing  hemifaces  is  perceptually  distinct.  That  is  whether  simultaneous 
presentation of the two sides of the face (each from a different image of the person) 
will result in participants perceiving two separate identities. If it transpires that this is 
the case, then it can be concluded that the coherence afforded by the facial gestalt is 
not a result of any intrinsic similarity between the two sides of the face, but rather this 
holistic perception is constrained by familiarity with the face in question. 
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Previous research has shown that when target and ‘line-up’ array images are captured 
using different cameras, successfully picking out a target image from an array of ten 
images can prove difficult, with accuracy typically in the region of 70% (Bruce et al. 
1999). Further studies have shown that this task remains difficult even when the array 
is reduced to just a target image alongside one of the array images, with subjects 
being forced to decide if the images are of the same person, or of two different people 
(Megreya & Burton, 2006). In this situation mean accuracy is around 80%, which 
given that chance performance in this task is 50% (relative to the 10% level in the 1-
in-10 task) represents a meagre improvement.  
 
The difficulty of the unfamiliar face-matching task is considered to stem in part from 
the distorting effect that camera lenses have on their subject (Burton et al. 2005). 
Lenses of different focal length will produce qualitatively different projections of the 
subject, and this distortion can impede our ability to identify two faces as belonging to 
the  same  person.  We  encounter  such  distortions  in  our  everyday life  through  our 
experience with both static and moving images, and our ability to recognise faces in 
spite of these various perversions is testimony to the sophistication of our minds face 
recognition  systems.  Modern  day  wisdom  has  it  that  television  cameras  ‘add  two 
pounds’ to the weight of those who fall victim to their distortion, yet this degree of 
misrepresentation does not disrupt our ability to recognise this person. Furthermore, it 
has been demonstrated that face recognition is robust even to fairly profound degrees 
of geometric alteration. Stretching an image of a familiar face to twice its original 
aspect ratio in either the horizontal or vertical dimension leads to no detectable effect 
on recognition (Hole et al. 2002). 
 
Though robust to many distortions, one can disrupt both familiar (e.g. Hole et al. 
2002) and unfamiliar (Freire et al. 2000, Megreya & Burton 2006) face processing by 
simply turning an image upside down. This effect has been taken to reflect a disabling 
of  mechanisms  responsible  for  configural  processing,  thus  highlighting  the 
importance of this information in face processing tasks. Previous demonstrations of 
the inversion effect in the context of unfamiliar face processing (Freire et al. 2000; 
Megreya & Burton 2006) have shown performance to be extremely poor. In a second 
experiment I investigated the effect of an analogous manipulation by mirror reversing   39 
the target image. In this case the bilaterally distributed configural information (which 
is unique to the individual) has been reversed, but the facial schema (common to all 
faces) has not been violated, as in the case of inversion. This said it is not anticipated 
that this manipulation will impede normal performance on a face matching procedure 
as profoundly as has been reported in studies employing an inversion manipulation. 
Lateral reversal will not disrupt processing of configuration (as first order relations 
are unaffected), but it will alter the information pertaining to the identity of a face (as 
second order relations are reversed). Therefore it is anticipated that performance on 
the face-matching task will be disrupted by lateral reversal, because the two images 
will be more likely to be perceived as two different people.  
 
In the final experiment of this chapter a somewhat separate issue regarding unfamiliar 
face matching is addressed. Here I investigate whether performance on a task where 
participants had to decide whether one image in a pair was a mirror reversal of the 
other  (or  whether  they  were  presented  in  identical  orientation)  correlated  with 
unfamiliar face matching performance. The ‘mirror discrimination’ task used in this 
experiment forces participants to make image-level comparisons between two images 
presented adjacent to one another. It is hypothesised that this strategy is similar to the 
‘image  matching’  strategy  used  by  participants  when  performing  unfamiliar  face 
matching decisions (Megreya & Burton, 2006), and that performance on these two 
tasks will therefore be highly correlated. Furthermore, it has been argued that mirror 
discrimination  ability  may  be  related  to  our  ability  to  make  within-category 
discriminations (Rentschler & Jüttner, 2007), and this argument would also predict 
performance on these two tasks to be correlated.  
 
Experiment 1: Matching Unfamiliar Hemifaces  
 
Introduction 
 
Unfamiliar  face  matching  is  thought  to  be  characterised  by  a  matching  strategy 
(Mergeya & Burton 2006) that attributes particular reliance on the external features of 
a  face  (Bonner  et  al.  2003).  Others  have  argued  that  configural  information  is 
implicated  in  unfamiliar  face  matching  (Freire  et  al.,  2000;  Leder  et  al.,  2001).   40 
Regardless  of  the  process  used  to  achieve  normal  performance  however,  it  is 
anticipated that the task of matching given from two opposing sides of the face will be 
extremely error-prone. The asymmetry of a face not only ensures that there will be no 
direct mapping between the features of the two images in this condition, but also that 
relationships  between  the  features  of  face-halves  of  ‘same’  pairings  will  be 
incongruent. It is nevertheless predicted that performance in this condition will be 
superior to chance, as the visual characteristics of external cues (i.e. hairstyle), are 
somewhat transferable across hemifields. In addition, it can be reasonably assumed 
that although the two hemi-faces may be morphologically distinct they nevertheless 
are more similar in form than the hemifaces of two separate identities.  
 
It was further hypothesised that when presented with corresponding hemifaces (i.e. l-l 
or r-r pairings) subjects’ performance will be much improved relative to the opposite 
hemiface condition, and may even be equivalent to the whole-face control condition. 
In the l-l and r-r conditions the facial features and configuration are correspondent 
between the two images so any detrimental effect could be explained by a reduction 
in the visual information presented to participants. 
 
Method  
 
Stimuli and Materials 
 
One  hundred  and  sixty  face-image  pairs  were  selected  from  a  database  used  in 
previous studies (see Bruce et al. 1999 for a full description). These image pairs were 
created from images of eighty trainee policemen ranging between 18 and 35 years of 
age. For each of the eighty identities I created a matching pair, where two images of 
the  identity  (taken  using  different  cameras)  were  presented  side-by-side,  and  a 
mismatched pair, where the identity was presented alongside an image of a similar 
identity.    Similar  identities  had  been  previously  identified  using  a  card-sorting 
procedure outlined by Bruce et al (1999). 
 
The  experimental  manipulation  was  implemented  by  removing  pixel  information 
either to the right of the axis of symmetry in each image (left hemiface condition), or   41 
to the left of the axis of symmetry (right hemiface condition), or from the opposing 
sides in each image (opposite hemiface condition). All the face-pairs were subjected 
to  these  manipulations  giving  a  complete  set  of  160  original  pairs  (80  same/80 
different), 160 left hemiface pairs, 160 right hemiface, and 160 ‘opposite’ hemiface 
pairs from which experimental stimuli could be drawn. Figure 2.2 gives examples of 
the stimuli used. 
 
Figure  2.2:  Example  stimuli  for  experimental  conditions.  N.B.  For  “opposite  hemiface” 
condition 20 trials (10 same/ 10 different) were with right hemiface presented right of centre 
(see ‘different’ in figure) and 20 trials were with right hemiface left of centre (see ‘same’). 
 
Design and Procedure 
 
24 subjects from the student population at the University of Glasgow consented to 
participate in the experiment. There were 9 males and 15 females (mean age= 22.1) 
and all received cash payment as reward for their participation. 
 
Subjects  were  sat  at  a  Macintosh  workstation  running  the  experimental  software 
PsyScope (Cohen  et al. 1993). Face pairs  appeared one at a time (preceded by a 
fixation  cross  for  750ms)  and  remained  on  the  screen  until  subjects  made  their 
response. Subjects were instructed to respond as to whether the two images on the 
screen were of the same person or of two different people. There were 40 (20 same 
and  20  different)  trials  per  condition  and  counterbalancing  ensured  that,  across 
subjects, each face-pair appeared in each condition an equal amount of times.  In the 
‘opposite  hemiface’  condition  half  the  image  pairs  (10  same  and  10  different)   42 
appeared with the right hemiface on the right hand side of the screen and half with the 
right hemiface on the left. 
 
The experiment lasted approximately ten minutes and there were no breaks. After 
completion of the task subjects were debriefed as to the aims of the experiment and 
the experimental manipulations used. 
 
Results 
 
Figure 2.3: Mean accuracy in face matching task (error bars denote 95% confidence intervals 
which were calculated using the method described by Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
 
A one-way within subjects ANOVA showed the factor of experimental condition to 
be  statistically  reliable  [F(3,23)=  11.46;  p<0.01].  Post-hoc  Tukey’s  HSD  tests 
confirmed  that  performance  on  the  opposite  hemiface  condition  was  significantly 
poorer than in the full face condition (p<0.001), and was  also poorer than in the 
remaining  two  experimental  conditions  where  left  hemifaces  (p<0.001)  and  right 
hemifaces (p<0.001) were presented. There were no other significant differences in 
accuracy data.  
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Figure 2.4: Mean accuracy for same and different trials (error bars denote standard error) 
 
A  two-way  within-subjects  ANOVA  was  performed  on  the  data  with  “trial  type”  
(same/  different)  and  experimental  condition  (full  face/left  hemiface/right 
hemiface/opposite  hemifaces)  as  factors.  This  confirmed  the  main  effect  of 
experimental  condition  to  be  reliable  [F(3,23)=11.46;  p<0.01].  The  interaction 
between factors can also be reported as reliable [F(3,23)=13.47; p<0.01], however 
there was no significant effect of trial type. Analysis of simple main effects showed 
the effect of condition only to be reliable for trials in which the images were of the 
same person [F(3,23)=26.11; p<0.01]. Furthermore the effect of trial type was only 
reliable in the opposite hemiface condition [F(3,23)=10.79; p<0.01].  
 
Figure 2.5: Mean response bias for experimental conditions (error bars denote standard error)   44 
 
The interaction between stimulus congruency (same identity/ different identity) and 
experimental condition indicated a difference in response bias between experimental 
conditions. To investigate this more closely criterion scores (C’) and sensitivity (d’) 
scores  were  calculated  for  each  of  the  subjects  and  analysed  using  two  one-way 
ANOVAs. For criterion values the main effect of experimental condition was found to 
be  reliable  [F(3,23)=11.41;  p<0.01].  Post-hoc  Tukey’s  HSD  tests  revealed  a 
significantly different response bias in the opposite hemiface condition relative to full 
face (p<0. 001), right hemiface (p<0.001) and left hemi face conditions (p<0.01). The 
significantly larger (positive) criterion value in the opposite hemiface condition is 
indicative  of  a  bias  towards  ‘different’  responses  in  this  condition.  Although  the 
difference  between  matching  left  hemifaces  and  right  hemifaces  indicates  that 
different response strategies are used in these two conditions, this difference was not 
found to be significant (q=2.92; p>0.05). 
 
Figure 2.6: NB Error bars denote standard error. 
 
A reliable main effect of experimental condition was also detected in the measure of 
response  sensitivity  (d’)    [F(3,23)=10.45;  p<0.01].  Post-hoc  Tukey’s  HSD  tests 
showed that sensitivity in the opposite hemiface condition was significantly less than 
in  the  three  other  conditions  (fullface,  p<0.001;  left  hemifaces,  p<0.01;  right 
hemifaces,  p<0.001]).   45 
 
Figure 2.7: Mean accuracy data for opposite hemiface condition (error bars denote standard 
error) 
 
A  two-way  within-subjects  ANOVA  was  performed  on  data  from  the  ‘opposite 
hemifaces’ condition with “trial type”  (same/ different) and experimental condition 
(right hemiface to right of centre/ right hemiface to left of centre) as factors. The main 
effect of experimental condition was not found to be reliable in the context of this 
analysis [F(1,23)=2.291; p>0.1]. There was however a reliable main effect of trial 
type [F(1,23)= 23.109; p<0.001]. Although the interaction between factors was not 
statistically significant there was a trend apparent [F(1,23)= 3.507; p=0.073], with the 
simple main effect of condition only being significant in trials where the images were 
of the same person [F(1,23)= 6.675; p<0.05]. This result would appear to indicate that 
participants found it easier to cohere the two hemifaces into a whole face when they 
were placed in a natural spatial orientation (i.e. left on left and right on right), but that 
this compositional factor did not influence ‘different’ judgements. It is considered that 
this result is reflective of the greater ease with  which subjects could perceptually 
‘combine’ the halves into a unitary representation in this condition. 
 
Discussion 
 
There was no significant advantage for matching whole face relative to corresponding 
hemifaces  in  the  unfamiliar  face  discrimination  task.  This  finding  indicates  that 
bilaterally  distributed  configural  information  may  not  be  important  when   46 
discriminating between unfamiliar faces. This bilaterally distributed information is 
not  exclusively  configural  however.  Because  only  half  of  the  nose  and  mouth  is 
visible  when  occluding  half  the  face,  featural  information  is  equivalently,  if  not 
additionally  obscured  by  the  manipulation.  Indeed,  it  is  surprising  that  this 
manipulation does not lead to a significant effect on behaviour and this shows that 
unfamiliar face matching can be performed just as accurately based on half of the 
available  information.  That  normal  discrimination  occurs  in  the  context  of  this 
constraint suggests that this task may rely on matching of small regions of visual 
information, as has been previously proposed by Megreya and Burton (2006). 
 
The  principal  hypothesis  was  that  in  an  unfamiliar  matching  task,  showing 
participants opposite sides of a persons face would reduce performance relative to 
full-face and correspondent half-face presentations. This was found to be the case 
with performance in the opposite hemiface condition being roughly 12% worse than 
in the other three conditions.  Though matching performance was far greater than 
chance (50%) when opposing hemifaces were presented, this decrease in performance 
is nonetheless large and is reflective of both a decreased sensitivity and an increased 
tendency to make ‘different’ responses. The reduced sensitivity and elevated criterion 
characterising response behaviour in the opposite hemiface condition shows that the 
small  asymmetries  present  in  the  human  face  can  nonetheless  give  rise  to  large 
changes in behaviour. Participants were commonly mistaking two images of the same 
person as being two different people, presumably because the visual information in 
one side of a face does not predict the visual information in the other side of the same 
face with sufficient accuracy to elicit a ‘same’ response.  
 
Though performance in the opposite hemiface condition was reduced relative to the 
other  experimental  conditions,  and  despite  the  significant  alterations  of  response 
behaviour  induced  by  this  manipulation,  participants  were  still  fairly  accurate  in 
deciding whether or not the two images were of the same person. With an average 
accuracy  in  this  condition  of  70%  (sd=9.8),  the  effect  of  the  manipulation  could 
hardly  be  considered  catastrophic.  A  question  therefore  arises:  what  transferable 
information is there in the left side of a face that can be matched with information on 
the right half of a face?    47 
 
It is unclear what information subjects were basing their responses on in the opposite 
hemiface condition. Prior to the experiment I had considered that the external features 
of  the  faces  would  enable  successful  performance  on  the  matching  task.  This  is 
because aspects of their hairstyle and face-shape may be more easily transposed onto 
the opposite hemiface than an analogous ‘reflection’ of the internal features, which 
are more visually complex by nature. Even if this assumed to be the case however, it 
is not clear whether this would affect task performance positively, or whether (due to 
the relative homogeneity of the stimulus set) it would impede performance. As all the 
images were of young male police officers the hairstyles tended to be similar in length 
and style, this cue may have been misleading. However, if this was the case, then one 
would expect response behaviour to be biased in the opposite direction to that which I 
report here (i.e. an increased tendency to make ‘same’ responses). 
 
Therefore it is more likely that the above chance performance is due to the similarity 
of the facial features across hemifields, or of the face shape, or of the configuration 
between the facial features. That the two sides of a face are morphologically distinct 
does not perhaps give ample reason to believe that they cannot be recognised as two 
sides of the same face. After all, there is no direct manner in which the two images 
shown  in  their  entirety  relate  to  each  other  either.  If  their  ‘visual  templates’  did 
overlap in an exact manner then performance would be higher in this condition than 
the 84% reported here.  
 
The difficulty of this task is by virtue of the fact that the images are taken from 
different cameras (both distorting the aspect ratio in a qualitatively different manner) 
and that they vary to a small extent in the angle of the face with respect to the camera. 
This being the case, it may be that performance on this task involves a process that 
computes the similarity of the two images (or regions within the image), and that a 
‘same’  response  is  dependent  on  this  perceived  similarity  exceeding  a  certain 
threshold (see Burton et al. 1990). Thought of in this way, it is possible to see how 
two face-halves that are divergent in their morphology may yet be similar enough to 
elicit a ‘same’ response with sufficient frequency to produce a performance level of 
the order reported for the opposite hemiface condition.  
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This  explanation  has  been  previously  proposed  by  Troje  &  Bülthoff (1998),  who 
argue that viewpoint generalisation across mirror symmetric head rotation is achieved 
by  mirror  reversing  a  stored  representation  and  comparing  this  to  a  test  image. 
Because a high level of object constancy is displayed between opposing three-quarter 
views  of  faces  (Troje  &  Bülthoff,  1998;  Hill,  Schyns  &  Akamatsu,  1997),  it  is 
considered that a mirror reversal of presented stimuli is readily produced by cognitive 
systems,  and  that  this  representation  approximates  well  to  the  novel  three-quarter 
view. In light of the results reported here, it would appear that this object constancy is 
not as reliable when mirror approximations are made on the basis of one face-half. 
The fact that photographs of real people taken with real cameras were used as stimuli 
here (as compared with the computer generated stimuli used by Troje et al.) may also 
have contributed to the difficulty of this task. 
 
Experiment 2: The Effect of Mirror Reversal on Unfamiliar 
Face Matching 
 
Introduction 
 
In experiment 1 it has been shown that one can induce the perception of two separate 
people by showing participants opposing halves of an unfamiliar persons face. This is 
by virtue of the fact that the two halves of any given face are morphologically and 
perceptually distinct. Given that facial asymmetry has been shown to be profound 
enough to elicit such effects, an experiment was designed to test whether or not the 
same effect could be induced (i.e. a greater proportion of ‘different’ responses) by 
mirror reversing one of the images in the face-pair. Successful performance in this 
task  cannot  be  achieved  by  matching  the  configurational  information,  as  this  is 
essentially  asymmetric,  and  has  been  reversed.  Furthermore,  a  feature  matching 
strategy  would  also  lead  to  increased  error,  as  facial  features  are  also  typically 
asymmetric (e.g. Farkas, 1994).  
 
In the same way that the classic inversion manipulation alters the  configurational 
template common to all faces (i.e. two eyes above a nose, which in turn is above a   49 
mouth  etc.),  lateral  reversal  alters  the  configurational  template  describing  that 
individual face. Therefore it is predicted that the mirror-reversal of one image in a 
matched pair will result in an increase in ‘different’ responses to that pair.   
 
Method 
 
Stimuli and Materials 
 
A randomly selected subset of sixty identities were selected from the eighty used in 
the previous experiment. With 60 same pairs and 60 different pairs, there were 120 
face pairs used in total. Images were presented in greyscale on a 1024 X 860 display 
with typical dimensions of 500 by 350 pixels,  with each image in the pair being 
separated (measuring from the centre) by 250 pixels (see figure 2.8). 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Example stimuli for experimental conditions 
 
The experimental manipulation was implemented by mirror reversing either the left 
image or the right image. All the face-pairs were subjected to these manipulations 
giving a complete set of 120 original pairs, 120 left-reversed pairs and 120 right-
reversed pairs from which experimental stimuli could be drawn.   50 
Design and Procedure 
 
Thirty-six  subjects  from  the  student  population  at  the  University  of  Glasgow 
consented  to  participate  in  the  experiment.  There  were  17  males  and  19  females 
(mean age= 21.4) and they were all paid in cash. 
 
Subjects  were  sat  at  a  Macintosh  workstation  running  the  experimental  software 
Psyscope. Face pairs appeared one at a time (preceded by a fixation cross for 750ms) 
and  remained  on  the  screen  until  subjects  made  their  response.  Subjects  were 
instructed to respond as to whether the two images on the screen were of the same 
person or of two different people. There were 40 trials per condition (20 same/20 
different) and counterbalancing ensured that, across subjects, each face-pair appeared 
in each condition an equal amount of times.  
 
The experiment lasted approximately seven minutes and there were no breaks. After 
completion of the task subjects were debriefed as to the aims of the experiment and 
the experimental manipulations used. 
 
Results 
 
Figure 2.9: NB Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals, which were calculated using the 
method described by Loftus & Masson (1994). 
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Though the suggestion from the accuracy data charted above is that mirror reversing 
one image in a face pair makes the discrimination task more difficult, the main effect 
of  trial  type  does  not  reach  statistical  significance  [F(2,35)=2.03;  p=0.14].    In 
addition, there was no effect of reversal on response criterion [F(2,35)=0.66; p=0.52] 
or on sensitivity [F(2,35)=1.02; p=0.37]. Overall response latency (i.e. “same” and 
“different”  responses  combined)  was  statistically  equivalent  (F<1)  for  original 
(M=1758ms, SD=936), left reversed (M=1702ms, SD=762) and right reversed face 
pairs (M=1707ms, SD=694). 
 
Discussion 
  
It was hypothesised that the configural and featural asymmetry that is unique to an 
individuals face, if reversed, would lead to the perception of a separate identity. This 
hypothesis  was  not  supported  by  the  data  reported  here.  Reversal  of  one  image 
produced no detectable effect on the accuracy or response behaviour of participants 
on this task, which leads us to believe that the face-matching task is no more difficult 
when one of the images is reversed. This finding can be explained in one of two ways. 
Either the asymmetries present in the faces were not sufficient to significantly alter 
the appearance of the face after lateral reversal, or subjects were able to represent the 
images in both their veridical and mirror reversed orientation, therefore enabling a 
discrimination judgement to be made independently of lateral orientation. 
 
It is unlikely that the lack of an effect results from any lack of sensitivity to the 
differences  in  relationships  between  features  or  even  in  the  direction  of  the 
asymmetry present in the features themselves. If this were the case then a difference 
between the corresponding hemiface matching and opposite hemiface matching tasks 
in  the  previous  experiment  would  not  have  been  observed.  If  the  half-faces  were 
perceptually equivalent there would have been no decrement in performance in the 
opposite hemiface condition of experiment 1. That the two hemispheres of a face are 
perceptually distinct has already been established. 
 
Another  explanation  is  that  the  face-matching  task  can  be  achieved  by  somehow 
performing  the  opposite  transformation  on  one  of  the  images  prior  to  a  match   52 
decision. If this is the case however, the reverse transformation process is automatic 
and  does  not  involve  conscious  deliberation.  The  response  latencies  across 
experimental  conditions  were  equivalent  so  there  is  no  evidence  that  any  extra 
processing is required when one of the images has been reversed. The notion that two 
mirror representations are available to perceptual systems is an appealing one, and it 
has been proposed that the visual system is structurally disposed to represent both the 
veridical  and  laterally  reversed  representations  of  a  perceived  object  (Corballis  & 
Beale,  1976;  Noble,  1966,  1968).  In  addition,  it  has  been  argued  that  viewpoint 
generalisation  in  face  processing  may  be  achieved  by  mirror  reversing  previously 
encountered views (Troje & Bülthoff, 1998). 
 
There is an additional, more prosaic explanation of our findings in this experiment. It 
could be that performance was unaffected due to the salience of external features in 
this task, and given the previous literature indicating that this information is important 
in  tasks  involving  unfamiliar  faces  (Bonner  et  al.  2000),  this  remains  a  strong 
possibility. If a match decision was made based on the hairstyle (or hairline) of the 
person for example, it may be that this information is more readily reversible than the 
internal configurational information. As was discussed in experiment one however, 
the hairstyles of the policemen pictured in our stimuli are highly homogeneous, and 
this cue would commonly mislead participants if used as a discrimination criteria.  
 
Experiment 3: Discriminating between mirror images of 
unfamiliar faces 
Introduction 
 
It has been previously contended that the task of matching two previously unfamiliar 
faces is achieved through a rather unsophisticated “image matching” strategy (Bruce 
et al. 1999; Hancock et al. 2000; Megreya & Burton, 2006). In their 2006 paper, 
Megreya and Burton demonstrated that the ability to match two unfamiliar faces was 
highly  correlated  with  performance  on  the  same  task  when  the  test  images  were 
turned upside down. As ‘inverting’ face stimuli is thought to disable processes that   53 
have adapted to allow facial recognition, this is taken as evidence that unfamiliar 
faces are processed in a qualitatively different way to familiar faces. Furthermore, 
significant  positive  correlations  between  unfamiliar  face  matching  and  object 
matching tasks reported in this paper suggest that the process involved in matching 
unfamiliar faces is largely equivalent to an ‘image matching’ strategy.  Importantly 
however, performance on the inverted task was markedly inferior to performance on 
upright  face  matching.  This  suggests  that  the  process  involved  is  not  exclusively 
reliant on ‘image matching’, or at least that this process is in some way facilitated by 
existing face processing systems. 
 
The  present  experiment  was  designed  to  test  whether  performance  on  a  ‘mirror 
discrimination’ task would correlate with unfamiliar face matching ability. This task 
involves deciding whether or not one of two otherwise identical images has been 
mirror  reversed  and  as  such  requires  participants  to  make  fine-grain  image-level 
comparisons  between  two  adjacent  images.  It  is  considered  therefore  that  mirror 
discrimination provides a good analogy for the unfamiliar face-matching task. The 
definitive feature of human performance on this task is its reliance on image matching 
strategies  (Megreya  &  Burton,  2006)  and  these  same  strategies  are  important  for 
mirror discrimination. As faces are broadly symmetrical, lateral orientation of the face 
stimuli  used  in  this  experiment  can  only  be  disambiguated  by  subtle  image  level 
characteristics. It is therefore hypothesised that performance on these two task should 
be highly correlated.  
 
Mirror Discrimination  
 
Though the task of ‘mirror discriminating’ has been chosen for use in the present 
experiment because of its reliance on discerning differences between two very similar 
images, this same task has been used to address a quite separate issue in previous 
research. It has been noted that during normal development the visual system can 
often  confuse  stimuli  which  are  the  mirror  rotations  of  one  another,  and  this 
phenomenon has been most commonly reported during the acquisition of reading and 
writing skills, where characters such as ‘p’ and ‘q’ and syllables such as ‘on’ and ‘no’ 
are confused (Mach, 1914).     54 
 
Figure 2.10: Example of mirror discrimination stimuli similar to those used by Warrington & 
Davidoff (2000). Both ‘different’ (A) and ‘same’ (B) pairs are shown 
 
The mirror discrimination procedure used here is borrowed from existing literature 
investigating a neuropsychological phenomenon. Whilst difficulty in distinguishing 
mirror  reversals  of  letters  and  objects  is  mostly  overcome  during  the  course  of 
cognitive  development,  in  particular  cases  of  brain  disease  or  damage  individuals 
have been shown to have great difficult in perceiving any difference between two 
images that are mirror reversals of one another (Tarr & Bülthoff, 1995; Tumbull et al, 
1995; Davidoff & Warrington, 1999; Warrington & Davidoff, 2000). Examples of the 
stimuli used in these experiments are illustrated in figure 2.10.  
 
Interestingly, in each of the reports cited above the deficits apparent in participants’ 
ability to discriminate between mirror images occur in the context of a preserved 
capacity for object recognition. Furthermore, in one of these studies it is reported that 
mirror discrimination performance is greatly improved when the subject is unable to 
recognise the object (Warrington & Davidoff, 2000). This finding, in combination 
with  previous  demonstrations  of  dissociation  between  mirror  discrimination  and 
object recognition in neuropsychological (Davidoff & Warrington, 2001; Priftis et al. 
2003; Turnbull & McCarthy, 1996) and behavioural data (Jolicoeur, 1989) provides 
strong evidence that the demands of the mirror discrimination task can be dissociated 
from those of recognition. This has previously been demonstrated to be the case when 
matching unfamiliar faces (i.e. matching uses different processes than recognition,   55 
Megreya  &  Burton,  2006)  and  therefore  provides  further  reason  to  expect  that 
performance on these two tasks will be correlated. 
 
Unfamiliar Face Matching 
 
The  unfamiliar  face-matching  task  used  in  this  experiment  has  been  described  in 
previous  experiments,  however  the  stimuli  used  here  are  drawn  from  a  different 
database.   
 
Method 
 
Mirror Discrimination Task 
 
Stimuli and Materials 
 
Forty images of unfamiliar faces (20 male and 20 female) were taken from an in-
house  database  consisting  of  high-resolution  images  taken  under  diffuse  lighting 
conditions. These images, all of which were taken with the subjects looking straight at 
the camera, were used to create two types of image pair per identity. Either the image 
was placed in horizontal alignment alongside an exact duplicate of the image, or it 
was placed alongside a mirror reversed duplicate of the image (see figure 2.11). These 
image pair arrays measured 600 pixels by 400 pixels and each face was positioned 
with their eyes level with the vertical midline and offset by 200 pixels to the left or 
right of the horizontal midline. For each identity an ‘identical’ image and a ‘reversed’ 
image pair were created giving a total of 40 ‘identical’ and 40 ‘reversed’ image pairs. 
Though the stimuli in this task were taken from the same database as was used to 
create the face pairs in the unfamiliar matching task, it was ensured that no identities 
were used in both tasks.   56 
 
Figure 2.11: Example trial stimuli from the Mirror Discrimination task (‘different’ pair). 
 
Design and Procedure 
 
Forty-six people were recruited by way of an advert posted on the World Wide Web. 
Participants ranged from 18 to 66 years (mean age=32.2) and there were 22 males in 
the sample. All participants had either normal or corrected vision.  
 
Participants were sat in front of a Macintosh workstation running the experimental 
software Psyscope and were given the task instructions. Subjects were told that they 
would be shown a series of pairs of identical images and that in some cases these 
images would be in the same left-right orientation and that in others the two images 
would be mirror reflections of one another. Their task was to decide whether the 
images were identical or whether one had been reversed and they made their response 
by pressing one of two vertically adjacent keys on the keyboard. Face pairs were 
presented in a random order and responses and response times were recorded after 
each trial.  
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Unfamiliar Face Matching Task 
 
Stimuli and Materials 
 
Face  pairs  were  taken  from  the  same  in-house  database  used  to  create  the 
experimental stimuli in the mirror discrimination task. The stimulus materials were 
taken  from  an  existing  test  of  unfamiliar  face  matching  ability  in  which  high-
resolution images of individuals are either presented alongside Digital Video (DV) 
captures of the same person (matched pairs) or alongside a DV capture of a different 
person similar in appearance. The DV and high-resolution images were taken under 
the same diffuse lighting conditions and the two images were taken ten minutes apart. 
Similar  pairs  were  created  on  the  basis  of  similarity  data  collected  by  way  of  a 
procedure outlined by Bruce et al (1999), whereby participants sort the database into 
piles  based  on  the  perceived  similarity  of  the  faces.  The  faces  that  were  most 
commonly sorted together were paired to make “different” pairs. Same pairs were 
selected so that for each different pair there was a corresponding same pair (i.e. each 
target identity appeared in a  ‘same’ and a  ‘different’ trial). In all there were 168 
stimulus pairs (84 same/ 84 different). 
 
Figure 2.12: Example trial stimuli from the Unfamiliar Face Matching task (‘different’ pair). 
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Design and Procedure 
 
The same forty-six subjects that participated in the mirror discrimination task also 
completed the unfamiliar face-matching task. Participants were presented with all 168 
face-pairs in a randomly ordered series displayed on a Macintosh 15” monitor at a 
resolution of 1152 X 864 pixels. They were asked to respond as to whether the two 
images were of the same person or of two different people and the face-pair remained 
on the screen until the participant made their response. Although subjects were told 
that accuracy was more important than speed, they were further encouraged not to 
take too long in deliberating over each decision. The task typically took 10 minutes to 
complete.  
 
Results 
 
Performance on the mirror discrimination task [mean= 92.8% correct; sd=7.0] was 
superior to performance on the unfamiliar face matching task [mean= 91.3%; sd=8.0], 
but this difference was not found to be statistically reliable [t(46)= 0.63; p>0.05].  
 
 
Figure 2.13: Scatter plot of overall accuracy on unfamiliar face matching and mirror 
discrimination tasks. 
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Overall  performance  accuracy  in  the  mirror  discrimination  task  correlated  with 
performance  in  the  unfamiliar  face-matching  task,  and  this  result  was  highly 
significant using a Pearsons-r test of correlation [r=0.544; p<0.001]. However, it was 
considered  that  the  outlying  participants  represented  in  the  scatter  plot  above 
contributed to the significance of this correlation. When the analysis was repeated 
using a Spearmans Ranked Correlation Coefficient the analysis was non-significant 
[rho= 0.242; p=0.105]. It is likely that the high performance on these two tasks has 
obscured any pattern of correlation that may have existed between performance on 
these two tasks. 
 
Differences  between  performance  on  these  two  tasks  were  detected  when 
performance was treated separately according to trial type (see Table 1). Whereas 
performance on ‘same’ trials was highly correlated with performance on ‘different’ 
trials in the mirror discrimination task [r=0.743; p<0.001], the correlation between 
same  and  different  trial  performance  was  not  as  strong  for  the  unfamiliar  face 
matching  task  [r=0.496;  p<0.001],  and  the  difference  between  these  correlation 
coefficients was found to be statistically reliable [t(43)=3.63; p<0.001]. Correlation 
coefficients  computed  using  the  Spearman-rho  test  also  showed  performance  on 
‘same’ trials to be correlated with performance on ‘different’ trials for both unfamiliar 
face matching [rho= 0.341; p<0.05] and mirror discrimination [rho=0.626; p<0.01]. 
These results show that ‘hit’ and ‘false alarm’ responses did not have such a strong 
negative association in the unfamiliar face-matching task as they did in the mirror 
discrimination task. This difference may provide an important dissociation between 
performance in these two tasks. 
 
  UFM match  UFM mismatch  MD match  MD mismatch 
UFM match  -  0.496***  0.447***  0.579*** 
UFM mismatch  -  -  0.285  0.526** 
MD match  -  -  -  0.743*** 
MD mismatch  -  -  -  - 
Table 2.1: Pearson-r correlation coefficients for match/mismatch trials in the two cognitive 
tests (UFM= Unfamiliar Face Matching, MD= Mirror Discrimination; * = p<0.05,  ** = p < 
0.01, *** = p < 0.001)   60 
Discussion 
 
Unfortunately  this  experiment  did  not  provide  a  valid  test  of  the  hypothesis  that 
unfamiliar  face  matching  relies  on  an  image  matching  strategy  (e.g.  Megreya  & 
Burton,  2006).  As  the  mirror  discrimination  task  requires  purely  image-level 
comparison  of  two  adjacently  presented  face  images,  it  was  considered  to  be  an 
example  of  a  visual-matching  task  involving  faces  to  which  our  existing  face 
recognition systems can not lend any beneficial support, and correlation between this 
task and unfamiliar face matching would have provided support for the hypothesis 
proposed by Megreya and Burton (2006).  However, as performance on both these 
tasks was generally very high in this experiment, the analysis reported did not provide 
reliable  evidence  for  the  hypothesised  correlation.  The  weak  (non-significant) 
correlation detected using the ranked correlation test may suggest that these tasks are 
related, and that increasing their difficulty might produce a statistically significant 
result. 
 
Although there is a suggestion in this data that performance on the two tasks was 
broadly  associated,  a  reliable  dissociation  was  detected  when  performance  was 
separated  into  accuracy  scores  for  ‘same’  and  ‘different’  responses.  The  negative 
correlation between hit and false alarm rates on the mirror discrimination task is very 
high, however the correlation between these two response behaviours is not as high in 
the unfamiliar face-matching task. A similar finding has previously been reported for 
unfamiliar  face  matching  performance,  with  researchers  reporting  there  to  be  no 
significant correlation between hits and FA’s whatsoever (Megreya & Burton, 2007). 
Therefore, although the dissociation between performance on ‘same’ and ‘different’ 
trials was not as profound in this case, the correlation between hits and FA’s was 
weak in relation to the r-value for this same relationship in the mirror discrimination 
task.  
 
The difference between performance behaviour on these two tasks is likely to stem 
from an increased reliance on face recognition systems when matching unfamiliar 
faces relative to when participants were performing the mirror discrimination task. It 
has previously been demonstrated that unfamiliar face matching performance reliably   61 
predicts  participants  performance  both  on  the  same  task  inverted  (i.e.  the  stimuli 
turned upside down) as well as on other object-matching tasks, but that it does not 
predict  performance  in  tasks  involving  familiar  faces  (Megreya  &  Burton,  2006). 
Whilst  this  may  reflect  an  increased  reliance  on  image-based  strategies  during 
unfamiliar face matching, it is not certain from this data that mechanisms employed 
for  recognising  familiar  faces  are  disengaged  entirely  during  unfamiliar  face 
processing.   
 
It  may  be  that  as  a  purely  image-matching  strategy  does  not  provide  a  reliable 
technique for deciding if two different images are of the same person (Megreya & 
Burton,  2006),  other  processes  are  additionally  employed  to  enable  successful 
performance. The contribution of additional processes to behaviour during unfamiliar 
face matching most probably account for the differences in the extent to which false 
positive response behaviour predicts hit response behaviour in the two tasks reported 
here.  Furthermore,  it  is  likely  that  these  additional  processes  emanate  from  the 
engagement of existing face recognition mechanisms when performing the unfamiliar 
face-matching task.  
 
Chapter Summary 
 
In experiment 3 I tested participants’ ability to discriminate between mirror images of 
faces, a task that involves close examination of image level stimulus properties. This 
ability  was  not  found  to  correlate  with  unfamiliar  face  matching,  however  the 
experiment did not provide a valid test of the hypothesis that performance on this task 
is reliant upon a strategy most akin to mage-matching (Megreya & Buron, 2006). The 
high level of performance on these two tasks made it difficult to draw conclusions 
regarding the relationship between them  and therefore this experiment contributes 
little to our understanding of the processes involved in unfamiliar face matching. The 
poor performance for matching opposite hemifaces reported in experiment one does 
however  lend  support  to  the  notion  that  unfamiliar  face  matching  is  commonly 
achieved  by  matching  surface  information  in  two  images.  An  image-matching 
strategy would be a particularly unreliable way in which to perform this task, as the 
visual information in one hemiface relates in no exact manner to its opposite half.   62 
Thus, the image-matching hypothesis would predict the poor performance reported 
here. 
 
The findings of experiments one and two suggest that a given face is perceptually 
equivalent to its mirror reversal (experiment two), even though the two sides of the 
face  are  perceptually  distinct  (experiment  one).  This  slightly  paradoxical  finding 
suggests that when presented in full, the information present in a face can be readily 
reversed (in lateral orientation), but that the visual information in one half of a face 
does not reliably predict the visual information in the other half (or at least we find it 
difficult to project this information across the vertical meridian).  
 
An intriguing question is whether the effect reported in experiment one is a result of 
the incongruence between the face halves, or whether it is due to a cognitive difficulty 
in  reflecting  the  information  across  the  vertical  meridian.  It  may  be  that  the 
information each side of this meridian in a given face is sufficiently similar to elicit a 
‘same’ response in most cases, but that an inaccuracy in reflecting the image leads to 
a reduced correspondence between the face-halves and therefore to an increase in 
‘different’ responses.  However, if this is the case then it is puzzling that no effect of 
reversal was detected in experiment two. Presumably a cognitive ‘mirror reversal’ 
should be  equally achievable for whole faces and hemi faces, unless this process 
relies  on  a  whole  percept  being  available  to  the  senses.  However,  the  fact  that 
performance on the opposite hemiface condition was superior when half-faces were 
presented in their natural configuration (i.e. left hemiface on left and right on right) 
may be evidence that mental reversal is more difficult in the hemiface condition. This 
effect was not statistically reliable however, and therefore this argument would need 
to be subject to further empirical testing before being accepted. 
 
The most surprising result in the present chapter is that there was no effect of mirror 
reversal  on  the  unfamiliar  face  matching  procedure.  Given  that  we  discriminate 
between individual faces based on very small differences in facial configuration, and 
that we are extremely sensitive to deviations from symmetry in faces (Simmons et al. 
2004),  one  would  expect  reversal  of  this  information  to  produce  a  perceptually 
distinct  face.  Furthermore,  if  unfamiliar  face  matching  is  reliant  on  an  ‘image-
matching’  strategy  as  is  suggested  by  previous  research  (e..g  Megreya  &  Burton,   63 
2006) as well as the data reported in experiment three, it would be expected that the 
effect of mirror reversing an image would be greater as this manipulation pronounces 
surface differences. However, in experiment two subjects are behaving as though an 
image of an unfamiliar face is perceptually equivalent to the mirror representation of 
that  face.  Our  data  suggests  that  a  normalisation  process,  which  involves  mirror 
reversing one of the images, occurs prior to a match/mismatch decision being made 
and that this pre-processing is relatively automatic. In order for successful matching 
performance to be maintained despite incongruous lateral orientation however, the 
linear reversal occurring in our perceptual systems must be precise.  
 
Such precision does not characterise performance on tasks where images have been 
reversed relative to the x-axis. The ‘inversion effect’ is traditionally thought to occur 
due to the disruption this manipulation causes towards the processes responsible for 
configural processing. Whereas traditionally this reliance on an upright orientation 
has been thought to be an artefact of visual expertise, more recent research has instead 
proposed  that  it  reflects  a  difficulty  in  normalising  the  incoming  visual  input 
(Collishaw & Hole, 2002). Data showing a linear relationship between the angle of 
rotation from upright and performance in familiar face recognition tasks is taken as 
evidence to support this hypothesis (Collishaw & Hole, 2002; Parr & Heintz, 2006; 
Stevenage  &  Oborne,  2006;  Valentine  &  Bruce,  1988).  The  implication  of  these 
studies is that during the process of normalisation (i.e. mentally rotating the image to 
an upright orientation) some veridical aspects of the image are altered, leading to 
reduced recognition and matching performance. 
 
The  results  of  experiment  two  indicate  that  the  normalisation  of  mirror-reversed 
images is in no way as cumbersome as the rotation process described above. As there 
is no reliable effect of mirror reversal on matching accuracy or response latency, any 
processing that represents an image of a face in its reverse lateral orientation would 
appear to do so in a precise and automatic manner.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Is face recognition impaired by mirror 
reversal? 
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Introduction 
 
We  encounter  images  that  have  been  reversed  in  left-right  orientation  during  our 
everyday lives. When we look at photographs of ourselves we are seeing them in the 
reverse orientation relative to our normal experience, as we would typically inspect 
our own face whilst looking into a mirror. In addition, we encounter images of other 
people in a reversed orientation. Take for example the situation shown in Figure 3.1 
where an image of a famous celebrity has been sourced from the World Wide Web 
using the Google Images search engine. On the Google frame at the top a thumbnail 
of the original image is shown, and below that the image is shown in its published 
form. It is apparent that the original image has been mirror reversed so as to conform 
to the composition of the KINERASE website. This technique is commonplace in the 
world of publishing, and academic journals are not immune from such practise (see 
Figure 3.2).  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Google Image search result for “Courtney Cox” showing lateral image reversal  
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Figure 3.2: A figure taken from the journal The Journal of Experimental Biology (Dyer, 
Neumeyer & Chittka, 2005) where the original image (C, top row) has been subjected to 
reversal prior to publication (B). 
 
Despite the prevalence of mirror images in our everyday lives, we do not appear to be 
affected by these transformations. In fact, we are generally unaware of the fact that 
this  occurs,  and  would  not  appear  to  have  trouble  in  recognising  people  despite 
mirror-transformation.  In  addition,  we  have  no  trouble  in  recognising  images  of 
ourselves in the opposite orientation to which we would normally experience our own 
face (though this perception  can feel peculiar to subjects,  see Brédart 2003). The 
results of the previous chapter suggest that a form of object constancy that allows us 
to  perceive  a  mirror  image  as  equivalent  to  the  face  in  its  veridical  orientation 
mediates  our  perception  of  faces,  and  this  result  could  have  some  important 
implications for the study of face recognition.  
 
Historically, the importance of configural processing in familiar face recognition has 
been emphasised (e.g. Haig, 1984; Friere et al. 2000; Leder & Bruce, 1998). For this 
reason it is surprising that the mirror reversal manipulation in experiment 2 did not   67 
significantly  alter  participants’  response  behaviour.  After  all,  the  direction  of  the 
metric relations between the component features has been reversed in one of the test 
stimuli. It has previously been argued that unfamiliar face matching is made more 
difficult when the two images presented are taken using different cameras (Bruce et 
al. 1999). This effect is by virtue of the  small  distortions in aspect ratio that the 
different  lenses  produce.  If  unfamiliar  face  matching  is  disrupted  by  these  small 
perturbations then one might reasonably expect to detect a greater effect of mirror 
reversal, which alters the configural relationships more severely. It should be noted 
however that whilst the relationships  are altered by reversal, none of the original 
shape  information  has  been  lost  subsequent  to  this  transformation:  it  is  only  the 
orientation that has changed (see Rock, 1973). 
 
The process of face recognition is thought to rely on different processes than basic-
level object recognition (e.g. Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006; McKone, Kanwisher & 
Duchaine, 2007), and the ‘second-order’ relations between facial features are more 
important in face recognition than in object recognition (Robbins & McKone, 2007). 
Given that reversal changes the second-order relations between the facial features, 
one might expect that this would disrupt the recognition of a face. However, this 
assumes  that  our  memory  representations  for  faces  are  coded  in  a  manner  that 
preserves both the subtle asymmetries and the direction of these asymmetries (i.e. that 
the  representation  specifies  the  veridical  left-right  orientation).  The  experiments 
reported here each attempt to detect an effect of mirror reversal on face recognition 
using paradigms previously used to investigate familiar face processing. If differences 
in behavioural response between veridical and reversed orientations are detected, then 
it can be concluded that memories for faces retain the left-right orientation of their 
external analogues. 
 
There have been a number of previous reports of cognitive sensitivity to the mirror 
reversal of familiar faces (e.g. Mita et al. 1977; Rhodes, 1986; Brédart, 2003). As yet 
however, it has not been convincingly demonstrated that this stimulus manipulation 
disrupts face processing. McKelvie (1983) found that memory for images of faces 
was  worse  when  test  images  were  presented  in  the  reverse  left-right  orientation 
relative to when images were presented in their original orientation. Although this 
result  demonstrates  that  the  orientation  of  image  memory  is  disrupted  by  mirror   68 
reversal  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  stored  representations  of  the  faces 
necessarily specify lateral orientation. Certainly, McKelvie’s result implies that this 
effect (previously reported with images of common objects by Madigan & Rouse, 
1974) is robust enough to occur when using highly symmetric stimuli, however it 
does not necessarily reflect disrupted face processing. Dyer and colleagues (2005) 
have demonstrated that bees are capable of remembering images of faces. This result 
does not imply that a nervous system as small as this is capable of recognising faces 
per se. More likely is that memory for specific images of faces can be dissociated 
from memory for faces. Indeed, there exists evidence to suggest that face recognition 
proceeds normally when presented with a mirror reversed image of a familiar face. 
Brooks et al (2002) demonstrated using a two-alternative forced-choice procedure 
(2AFC) that mirror reversal does not significantly increase response latency to name 
verification responses and that identity priming is invariant to the left-right orientation 
of familiar faces.  
     
Experiment  4:  The  effect  of  Mirror  Reversal  on  Face 
Recognition 
 
Introduction 
 
Brooks et al (2002) reported that laterally reversing an image of a face at the test 
phase of a priming procedure resulted in statistically equivalent response latencies to 
those  corresponding  to  face  images  in  their  original  orientation.  Taking  this  to 
confirm their hypothesis that the mental representation of faces is invariant to mirror 
reflection,  they  sought  no  further  confirmation  of  their  finding.  In  the  present 
experiment a 2AFC name-verification paradigm was used to verify this conclusion. 
This methodology has been used to inspect the nature of mental representations in 
previous research  (e.g. Burton et al., 2005).  
 
This same task was used in the priming phase and test phase by Brooks et al (2002), 
yet they failed to find a difference between the original and reversed conditions in   69 
either test. Given that previous studies have shown that people are sensitive to mirror 
reversal of faces (e.g. Mita et  al., 1977; Rhodes, 1986; McKelvie, 1983; Brédart, 
2003), and that familiar face recognition relies on processing subtle relations between 
features that are altered by this manipulation (see Maurer et al, 2002), a replication of 
this result was considered necessary. If there is a difference in response behaviour 
between presentations of familiar faces in their original and mirror orientation then 
the null hypothesis can be rejected (i.e. that the mental representation of faces is 
invariant to mirror reflection). 
 
Method 
 
Stimuli and Materials    
 
Twenty-five famous faces were sourced from the Internet. Images were chosen that 
contained writing in either the foreground or the background so as to ensure that 
pictures had not been mirror-reversed prior to publication on the world-wide-web. 
Face images were rotated so as to bring the pupils into alignment with the horizontal 
plane, cropped around the outline of the head, converted to greyscale and resized to 
380 pixels X 570 pixels. For each image I flipped the image horizontally using Adobe 
Photoshop to create a mirror-reversed copy. The face images measured 8cm by 11cm, 
pertaining a visual angle of 7.6 by 10.5 degrees (at 60cm), and were centred 13cm 
apart (visual angle= 6.2 degrees). 
 
Method and Procedure 
 
26 subjects from the undergraduate and postgraduate populations at the University of 
Glasgow agreed to participate in the study.  The sample consisted of 17 female and 11 
male subjects ranging from 17 to 29 years in age (mean 22). Subjects were sat in front 
of  a  Macintosh  workstation  running  the  software  Psyscope  and  the  experimenter 
explained their task to them. Subjects were told that in each trial they would be shown 
a famous name followed by a famous face and that they were to respond using the 
keyboard in front of them as quickly and as accurately as possible. 
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Each  trial  consisted  of  a  fixation  cross  in  the  centre  of  the  screen  for  1000ms, 
followed by a famous name for 1500ms and then by the presentation of a face for 
200ms. Subjects’ responses and response latencies were recorded. Each of the 25 
stimuli appeared twice in each of the two conditions (one positive/matched and one 
negative/mismatched trial per condition) giving a total of 100 trials. Order of stimulus 
presentation was fully randomised. The experiment was approximately 7 minutes in 
duration. 
 
Results 
 
Two subjects were extracted prior to analysis on account of their performance falling 
below two standard deviations of the group mean. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: NB Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals. 
 
A related sample t-test shows the difference between mean response latencies (for 
positive  trials)  for  the  two  experimental  conditions  [original=  564ms  (sd=  70), 
reversed=  596ms  (sd=  79)]  to  be  reliable [t(1,23)=2.896;  p<0.01]. There  were  no 
significant  differences  between  error  rates  for  the  two  experimental  conditions 
[t(1,23)= 0.496; p=0.625].  
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Figure 3.4: Difference scores were calculated by subtracting average response latency to the 
veridically oriented version of the test stimulus from average RT to the mirror reversed copy. 
 
An additional by-item analysis was executed on the data by firstly calculating the 
difference  in  average  response  latency  between  mirror-reversed  images  and  non-
reversed images (positive values signal faster response to the veridical orientation). 
These differences were then compared to difference scores as predicted by chance 
performance (i.e. with a mean of zero) and were found to differ significantly from 
chance [t(24)=2.57; p<0.05]. 
 
Discussion 
 
The results reported above are in direct contradiction to Brooks et al (2002), as they 
suggest that mental representations of familiar faces contain information relating to 
their  veridical  left-right  orientation.  This  is  most  likely  a  result  of  the  different 
methodology used to investigate the question of reflectional invariance in the present 
study. The name verification paradigm used in their study was slightly different to the 
one  used  here  as  the  name  preceded  the  face  in  the  present  experiment,  whereas 
subjects in their study responded to the presentation of a name that had been preceded 
by a face. Nevertheless it is difficult to explain why they found no difference between 
identical image and reflectional change conditions.  It may be that recalling the visual 
representation from memory is more effectively achieved using the method reported 
in  the  present  experiment.  Regardless  of  these  slight  methodological  concerns   72 
however,  the  effect  of  reversal  is  clear  and  demonstrates  cognitive  sensitivity  to 
mirror reversal. 
 
Further investigation may also seek to investigate the process underlying the delay in 
reaction time elicited by mirror reversal in the present study. It may be that the mind 
is in some way applying the reverse transformation to the reversed image prior to 
recognition: this possibility was previously suggested by Hole et al (2002) as a way of 
explaining  subjects  invariant  performance  to  globally  transformed  face  images. 
However it could also be that the increased response latency is due to a process of 
transformation  that  aligns  our  stored  representation  to  the  incoming  (reversed) 
stimulus. Given that experiment 2 in the present thesis showed no effect of reversal on 
an unfamiliar face-matching task, it is likely that the normalisation is not dependent 
on the existence of a stored representation, but rather this ‘mirror’ transformation is 
made independently of such constructs.  
 
A further explanation is that this effect is due to the novel nature of the reversed 
image, which captures attention mechanisms, thus delaying response. It is therefore 
not certain that the increased response latency is reflective of additional cognitive 
processing.  Regardless  of  the  explanation  chosen  however,  it  is  clear  that  the 
cognitive system is responding selectively to mirror reversed images and therefore 
that lateral orientation is specified at some level of cognitive representation.  This 
result  is  therefore  in  keeping  with  previous  studies  demonstrating  a  sensitivity  to 
mirror reversal (e.g. Mita et al., 1977; Rhodes, 1986; McKelvie, 1983; Brédart, 2003). 
 
Experiment 5: The effect of Mirror Reversal on Recognition 
of Half-Faces 
 
Introduction 
 
An experiment was designed to extend the findings reported in experiment one. I 
sought to determine whether the same decrement in reaction time, found to be a result   73 
of mirror reversal, would occur when only half a face was shown (i.e. when bilaterally 
distributed configural information was not displayed). 
 
Method 
 
Stimuli and Materials     
 
Forty  famous  faces  were  sourced  from  the  Internet.  Images  were  chosen  that 
contained writing in either the foreground or the background so as to ensure that 
pictures had not been mirror-reversed prior to publication on the world-wide-web. 
The images used in this experiment had not been used in any previous experiments, 
though some of the identities had been. Face images were rotated so as to bring the 
pupils into alignment with the horizontal plane, cropped around the outline of the 
head, converted to greyscale and resized to 380 pixels X 570 pixels. For each image a 
mirror-reversed copy was created by flipping the image horizontally using Adobe 
Photoshop.  
 
For each subset of images (original/reversed) a further two subsets containing forty 
images each were created. One subset was created by erasing the pixel information to 
the left of the axis of symmetry (right half-face), and another by erasing the pixel 
information to the right of the axis of symmetry (left half-face). The full-face images 
measured 8cm by 11cm, pertaining a visual angle of 7.6 by 10.5 degrees (at 60cm), 
and were centred 13cm apart (visual angle= 6.2 degrees). Example stimuli are shown 
in figure 3.5.   74 
 
Figure 3.5: Example stimuli from experiment 5. 
 
 
Method and Procedure 
 
38 subjects from the undergraduate and postgraduate populations at the University of 
Glasgow agreed to participate in the study.  The sample consisted of 21 female and 17 
male subjects ranging from 18 to 29 years in age (mean 21). Subjects were sat in front 
of  a  Macintosh  workstation  running  the  software  Psyscope  and  the  experimenter 
explained their task to them. Subjects were told that in each trial they would be shown 
a famous name followed by a famous face and that they were to respond using the 
keyboard in front of them as quickly and as accurately as possible. They were told 
that sometimes only half a face would appear but they were to not let this distract 
them, but instead they must concentrate on making their response as early as possible. 
 
Each  trial  consisted  of  a  fixation  cross  in  the  centre  of  the  screen  for  1000ms, 
followed by a famous name for 1500ms and then by the presentation of a face (or 
half-face) for 200ms. Subjects’ responses and response latencies were recorded. Each 
of the 40 stimuli appeared twice in each of the six conditions (one positive and one   75 
negative  trial  per  condition)  giving  a  total  of  480  trials.  The  experiment  was 
approximately 20 minutes in duration. 
 
Results 
 
Figure 3.6: Mean RT’s for positive trials (correct response). NB Error bars denote standard 
error.  
 
   FULL FACE  LEFT HALF  RIGHT HALF 
ORIGINAL  87.7 (SD=14.7)  86.6 (SD=14.7)  85.5 (SD=14.5) 
REVERSED  87.7 (SD=15.0)  86.0 (SD=15.1)  86.5 (SD=14.8) 
Table 3.1: Mean accuracy data (percentage correct) for name verification task 
 
Data from this experiment was subjected to a 2 (original/reversed) X 3 (full/right 
half/left half) within-subjects ANOVA. There was found to be a significant effect of 
presentation  type  [F(2,37)=14.462;  p<0.01]  with  full-face  presentation  resulting  in 
significantly  faster  reaction  times  than  both  half-face  conditions.  There  was  no 
significant main effect of orientation and no interaction. Furthermore, there were no   76 
significant  effects  of  the  experimental  manipulations  on  participants’  response 
accuracy (see Table 1).  
Discussion 
 
The only significant effect to be reported in this experiment was the significantly 
faster  reaction  times  to  whole  face  relative  to  hemi-face  presentations.  That 
participants recognised faces more quickly when the full face was shown is hardly 
surprising given that half of the visual information is unavailable in the hemiface 
conditions.  What is more interesting however is that there was no effect of deleting 
half the available visual information on participants’ response accuracy. Given that 
the  configural  information  that  is  considered  important  in  face  recognition  is 
distributed bilaterally, one might reasonably expect that obscuring one half of the face 
might impair participants’ ability to recognise the person. This does not appear to be 
the case however. It would appear that participants are able to recognise faces on the 
basis  of  a  reduced  amount  of  information,  and  this  ability  has  been  previously 
demonstrated (e.g. Gosselin & Schyns, 2001).  
 
The  difference  in  response  latency  between  hemi-face  and  full-face  conditions  is 
notably slight (in the region of 25ms), and this again suggests that the bilaterally 
distributed  configural  information  is  not  important  in  familiar  face  recognition.   
Although  slight,  this  difference  in  response  latency  may  conceal  some  additional 
processing that is necessary when identifying a hemi-face. Further investigation could 
ascertain  whether  this  latency  is  reflective  of  some  perceptual  ‘filling-in’  prior  to 
successful identification, or whether the delay in response is reflective of disruption to 
face  detection  processes.  Face  detection  is  reliant  on  the  ‘first-order’  relational 
information in a face (Maurer et al. 2002), and this information is disrupted by the 
manipulation in this experiment.  
 
The most striking aspect of the data reported above is that I failed to replicate the 
effect of mirror-reversal reported in the previous experiment. This may suggest that 
this earlier finding was a statistical anomaly, however this is not certain. Another   77 
likely  explanation  is  that  effect  was  washed  out  in  the  present  experiment  as  a 
consequence  of  practise  effects.  The  stimuli  were  each  presented  twice  in  each 
condition  and  therefore  each  image  appeared  12  times  in  one  form  or  another. 
Therefore participants may have been using memory of the experimental stimuli to 
make their response as opposed to recalling their stored representation from memory, 
as the experimental design requires.  
 
Experiment 6: Does degree of asymmetry affect the degree 
of disruption when recognising a mirror-reversed face? 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous two experiments show that there is a slight effect of mirror reversal on 
response latency in a name verification task. It is uncertain whether this effect is 
reflective  of  some  cognitive  normalisation  or  whether  attentional  mechanisms  are 
responsible for the delayed response. In addition, it is currently uncertain whether or 
not  this  effect  is  indeed  reliable.  The  failure  to  replicate  the  effect  observed  in 
experiment four may suggest that this result was merely a statistical anomaly. The 
experiment reported here is an attempt to resolve these two concerns. 
 
Primarily this experiment is designed as a replication of experiment four. However, a 
different set of stimuli is used here, and it is anticipated that these will provide a more 
direct test of the main hypothesis. One limitation of the previous two experiments was 
that superficial aspects of the images might have contributed to the effect of reversal. 
For  instance,  asymmetry  in  hairstyle  may  have  contributed  to  the  effect  and  this 
would weaken the argument that delayed response is reflective of a retention of the 
left-right configuration of the face itself, as subjects’ delayed response could merely 
reflect the unusual direction of the hairstyle.  In addition, the direction of lighting may 
have  had  an  effect  as  it  has  been  previously  demonstrated  that  subjects  respond 
optimally  to  stimuli  that  are  lit  from  the  left  hand  side  (Sun  &  Perona,  1998;   78 
McManus et al 2004). The stimuli used in the present experiment are unaffected by 
these transient image qualities by virtue of the averaging process from which they are 
derived and therefore will enable a more rigorous test of the hypothesis.  
 
The stimuli used in the present experiment were created for use in a previous study 
(Burton et al 2005). These images were created by averaging pixel information across 
a set of twenty photographs of a given celebrity. In all there were fifty famous faces 
used and twenty images of each were sourced from the World Wide Web. Images 
were rotated so as to align the pupils to the horizontal, cropped so as to frame the 
head  snugly,  resized  to  190  X  285  pixels,  converted  to  greyscale  and  saved  in 
BITMAP format. All images were then morphed to a standard shape using an in-
house program based on bi-polar interpolation and these standardised images were 
then averaged together. An average shape was then calculated by subjecting the 20 
files containing shape information and the average image files were morphed back to 
this average shape to produce the final average (see figure 3.7). 
 
 
Figure 3.7: An illustration of the image averaging process. Original images (A) were set to a 
standard  shape  configuration  (B)  and  then  averaged  to  produce  the  ‘shape-free’  texture 
average (C), this image was then morphed to the average shape to give the final stimulus  (D). 
 
It was considered that the use of average faces would enable more accurate symmetry 
ratings as these representations are unaffected by transient visual characteristics that 
are prevalent in typical photographs (e.g. lighting direction, expression, head angle 
and  asymmetry  in  hairstyle).  These  artefacts  would  contribute  to  image-level   79 
asymmetries that may bias subjects to make their judgements based on this superficial 
information instead of the structural symmetry of the face itself. 
 
As the images used in this experiment do not suffer from ambient asymmetries in the 
way  that  standard  (unconstrained)  images  do,  it  enabled  symmetry  ratings  to  be 
collected for the celebrity faces. There are a number of factors that contribute to the 
asymmetry of a given image (e.g. head angle, expression, lighting direction), however 
these factors are ‘washed-out’ in the average process described below. For this reason 
it was anticipated that the average images would allow for more reliable symmetry 
rating data to be collected than would have been attainable using single images of the 
celebrities. This symmetry data will be used to assess whether the effect of mirror 
reversal reported in experiment four is modulated by the degree of symmetry in a 
face.  
 
There are a number of reasons why the degree of symmetry may modulate this effect. 
Firstly,  if  the  effect  of  mirror  reversal  were  due  to  the  increased  novelty  of  the 
stimulus then one would expect this effect to increase proportionately with the degree 
of asymmetry in the face. The greater the degree of asymmetry, the more different an 
image will be to its mirror image and therefore the more ‘novel’ it should appear. The 
manner in which asymmetry would affect a process of cognitive normalisation is less 
certain  however.  It  could  be  that  increasing  asymmetry  would  actually  make  this 
process easier as the left-right orientation is more explicitly apparent in a face that is 
highly asymmetric. That is, if recognition relies on initially distinguishing the left side 
of  a  face  from  the  right,  then  this  would  be  more  readily  achieved  in  a  highly 
asymmetric face, where the direction of asymmetry is less ambiguous.  
 
Method 
 
Symmetry Ratings 
 
All fifty face averages were presented on two sheets of A4 paper, with space below 
each  image  for  participants  to  write  their  symmetry  score  for  each  face.  Images 
measured 2.5 cm by 3.6 cm. Participants marked their score on the paper using a pen.     80 
 
Sixteen undergraduate students [8 male, 8 Female; mean age= 20.6 (sd=1.4)] from the 
University  of  Glasgow  each  rated  all  fifty  experimental  stimuli  for  degree  of 
symmetry on a scale of 1 to 7 where 1 was defined as a very asymmetrical face and 
where 7 was perfectly symmetrical. Participants were encouraged to use as much of 
the  scale  as  possible  and  to  inspect  the  images  closely  before  rating  each  image. 
Ratings were subsequently collated and an average rating for each face was obtained. 
 
Symmetry Measurements 
 
Method and Procedure 
 
In addition to the ratings of  symmetry it was decided that a physical measure of 
asymmetry should also be calculated. This was calculated using the four coordinates 
shown below (figure 3.8), which were taken from the average shape files generated as 
part of the procedure used to create the average faces. 
 
 
Figure 3.8:  An illustration of the method used to derive the physical asymmetry measure 
reported in experiment 5. Area ‘A’ was subtracted from area ‘B’ and this difference was used 
to calculate an absolute value of asymmetry. 
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Name-Verification Task 
 
Stimuli and Materials    
 
The sixteen averages with the highest symmetry rating and the sixteen with the lowest 
ratings were selected for use in the experiment. 
 
Method and Procedure 
 
Subjects sat in front of a Macintosh workstation running the software Psyscope and 
the experimenter explained their task to them. Subjects were told that in each trial 
they would be shown a famous name followed by a famous face and that they were to 
respond using the keyboard in front of them as quickly and as accurately as possible. 
 
Each  trial  consisted  of  a  fixation  cross  in  the  centre  of  the  screen  for  1000ms, 
followed by a famous name for 1500ms and then by the presentation of a face for 
200ms. Subjects’ responses and response latencies were recorded. Each of the 32 
stimuli appeared twice in each of the two conditions (one positive and one negative 
trial per condition) giving a total of 128 trials. Order of stimulus presentation was 
fully randomised. The experiment lasted for approximately 10 minutes.  
 
Results 
 
 Symmetry Ratings  
 
The  average  symmetry  rating  was  4.57  (sd=0.65)  and  the  sample  had  a  median 
symmetry rating of 4.63. The sixteen celebrities with highest mean symmetry ratings 
were assigned to the ‘high symmetry’ condition [mean rating= 5.26, sd=0.17] and the 
sixteen  with  the  lowest  rating  below  this  were  assigned  to  the  ‘low  symmetry’ 
condition [mean rating= 3.80, sd=0.45]. An independent samples t-test confirmed that 
the degree of perceived symmetry in these two stimulus groups differed significantly 
[t(30)= 2.14; p<0.05].   82 
 
2AFC Name Verification 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Mean RT data for experimental conditions (error bars denote 95% confidence 
intervals calculated using the method described by Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
 
A  within-subject  two-factor  ANOVA  was  performed  on  reaction  time  data.  This 
analysis revealed no reliable main effect of symmetry [F(1,31)=2.84.; p=0.10] and no 
effect of reversal [F(1,31)=0.413; p=0.53]. In addition, the interaction between these 
experimental factors was not statistically reliable [F(1,31)=0.26; p=0.62]. 
 
Symmetry Measurements 
 
The direction of asymmetry was not considered to be important for the analysis and 
so  asymmetry  measurements  were  converted  to  absolute  values.  Additionally,  for 
each stimulus I calculated the average difference (across subjects) between response 
latency when the stimulus was presented in its original orientation compared to when 
it was presented in its reverse orientation.    83 
 
Figure 3.10: NB Higher values on the y-axis indicate higher levels of physical asymmetry, 
and positive values on the x-axis indicate that the original stimulus was responded to more 
quickly than the mirror-reversed copy. 
 
The  correlation  between  physical  asymmetry  and  the  effect  of  reversal  was  non-
significant (r= -0.19; p>0.05), and this was also true when the differences between 
mean  response  latencies  in  original  and  reverse  orientations  were  converted  to 
absolute values (r=0.28; p>0.05).  The mean difference between original and reversed 
presentations across items was 26.4 ms, and although this result suggests that reversal 
might on average decrease reaction time, this difference did not differ significantly 
from chance (0) when tested using a two-tailed hypothesis test [t(31)=1.89; p=0.068]. 
 
Discussion 
 
The null effects reported here represent a second failure to replicate the significant 
effect reported in experiment three. Again there was found to be no reliable difference 
in either response latency or response accuracy when recognising faces either in their 
original or reversed lateral orientation. Although this weakens the certainty at which it 
can be asserted that the cognitive system is sensitive to mirror reversal, our data do 
not  rule  out  this  possibility.  In  fact,  in  the  previous  three  experiments  I  found  a 
consistent pattern in response latencies, with mirror reversed images being responded 
to  slower  than  non-reversed  images  in  each  experiment.  In  experiment  four  this   84 
difference (32 ms) was significant and in experiment five and six this difference was 
not significant (3ms and 9ms respectively), however in each instance mean response 
latency for non-reversed images was shorter than for reversed images. 
 
It is possible that in the present experiment the effect of reversal was attenuated by the 
nature of the stimuli. The process of making the average images involved collecting 
twenty images of each celebrity in the corpus and crucially there was no attempt made 
to ensure that these images were in their original lateral orientation. Therefore the 
averages may have included a number of images in their reverse orientation, which 
would have served to ‘wash-out’ some of the asymmetry in the faces.   
 
There is no evidence in the data reported here that the symmetry of a face modulates 
the effect of reversal. However, as no main effect of reversal was observed in the 
present experiment, this question remains largely unresolved. Using a larger stimulus 
set may help to resolve this question and such an investigation would improve our 
understanding of the mechanisms underlying the invariance displayed by recognition 
systems to mirror reversal. However, as the effect of reversal on response times is 
evidently slight and has proved difficult to detect reliably thus far, it is anticipated that 
an extremely powerful design would be required to detect  an interaction between 
reversal and degree of symmetry.  
 
It  is  very  difficult  to  collect  a  sufficient  number  of  famous  face  images  that  are 
unambiguous with respect to their mirror orientation and are additionally symmetric 
with regards to head pose, eye gaze and direction of lighting. Therefore, in order 
investigate this question properly one would need to capture images of faces under 
controlled conditions. In addition, symmetry ratings should be replaced by a more 
objective measure of symmetry based on bipolar measurements of the face. Finally, it 
would be necessary to familiarise participants with each face prior to a familiarity 
decision and this would be a lengthy procedure. Collectively, the endeavour necessary 
to investigate this question exhaustively would be extremely time consuming and it is 
considered that it would be more revealing to measure the effect of mirror reversal 
using other established paradigms in face recognition literature.  
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Experiment 7: Repetition priming from reversed and non-
reversed images of celebrities 
 
Introduction 
 
In  their  2002  paper,  Brooks  Rosielle  and  Cooper  demonstrated  that  priming  of 
familiar faces is invariant to the lateral orientation of the test stimulus. In line with 
previous  research  demonstrating  the  same  null-effect  in  object  recognition 
(Biederman & Cooper 1991) they concluded that our representations of familiar faces 
are  ‘invariant  to  mirror  reversal’  (p307)  and  that  ‘…no  time  consuming 
transformations of mirror orientation occur during the process of face recognition’ 
(p312).  That  representations  of  faces  and  objects  are  similar  in  this  respect  is 
surprising  given  that  face  and  basic-level  object  processing  are  dissociable  by 
reference to their susceptibility to the ‘inversion effect’ and also by the supposed 
reliance on second-order relations in face recognition (see Maurer et al. 2002 for a 
review). In addition, previous research has shown the cognitive system to be sensitive 
to mirror reversal of faces (e.g. Mita et al., 1977; Rhodes, 1986; McKelvie, 1983; 
Brédart, 2003). 
 
The  priming  paradigm  used  by  Brooks  et  al  (2002)  was  identical  to that  used  in 
Biedemann and Cooper’s (1991) demonstration of reflectional invariance in object 
recognition. In this task participants are shown a face for a short duration, and they 
must  respond  to  the  subsequent  presentation  of  a  name  by  signalling  whether  it 
matched the face or not. The faces at test were either presented in a previous name-
verification  decision  (primed)  or  had  not  been  seen  previously  (non-primed). The 
typical  finding  is  that  primed  images  are  responded  to  quicker  than  non-primed 
images, but in their experiment Brooks et al found no additional advantage for the 
image being presented in the same orientation in priming and test. Crucially, Brooks 
et al (2002) used the same image at priming as they did at test, and so it is uncertain 
whether their null effect is constrained to same-image priming, or whether an effect of 
reversal  might  be  detected  by  using  different  images  in  the  two  phases  of  the 
experiment.   86 
 
In  this  experiment  I  sought  to  replicate  Brooks  et  al  (2002)  using  a  different 
repetition-priming paradigm. The paradigm used in this experiment has been used in 
previous studies of face priming (e.g. Jenkins et al. 2002). Subjects are required to 
make a nationality decision to images of famous celebrities in the priming phase of 
the  experiment,  and  priming  is  measured  by  the  degree  to  which  this  exposure 
facilitates response time in a subsequent familiarity decision relative to non-primed 
stimuli. In this experiment a different image of the primed identities was used at 
prime phase and test phase, and in addition the experimental manipulation of reversal 
was  performed  on  images  presented  in  the  prime  phase  (not  the  test  phase  as  in 
Brooks et al, 2002). It is considered that these differences in design will probe the 
cognitive representations more directly and therefore provide a better test of whether 
face priming is sensitive to lateral orientation. Repetition priming is modulated by the 
similarity between prime and test stimuli (e.g. Bruce & Valentine, 1985) and therefore 
it was hypothesised that reversal would lead to a reduction in the degree of observed 
priming.   
 
Method 
 
Stimuli and Materials 
 
Images of ubiquitous celebrity faces were sourced from the World Wide Web. Only 
images in which there was writing visible in either the foreground or the background 
were selected for use in the experiment, so as to ensure that the images had not been 
subjected to mirror reversal prior to publication on the Internet. Thirty celebrities 
were selected for use in the experiment on the criterion that it was possible to obtain 
two  images  in  which  some  form  of  writing  was  visible  (typically  at  promotional 
events and outside award ceremonies), and all images were full-face shots with both 
ears visible. For these thirty faces, a mirror-reversed copy was created for use in the 
priming phase (experimental manipulation). A further thirty celebrities (of equivalent 
fame) were used as non-primed stimuli in the test phase of the experiment, and in 
addition images of sixty unfamiliar faces were taken from an existing database for use 
in the familiarity decision phase of the experiment.    87 
 
Each of these images was cropped neatly around the head and resized to 300 by 500 
pixels. All images were presented in greyscale and were histogram equalised. Images 
were centrally presented with a black background on a computer monitor displaying a 
resolution of 1680 by 1050 pixels and measured roughly 7.5cm by 10cm (pertaining 
to a visual angle of 7.2 by 9.5 degrees of visual angle at a distance on 60cm). 
 
Design and Procedure 
 
Thirty two (21 female) subjects with an average age of 20.4 (sd=2.8) were recruited 
from  the  undergraduate  population  at  the  University  of  Glasgow  and  they  either 
received  course  credit  or  participated  on  a  voluntary  basis.    Two  subjects  were 
removed prior to analysis because of technical problems with the data output. 
 
Each participant was sat in a darkened room so that their eyes were level with the 
centre of the screen and were told that their task was to decide whether the faces 
displayed  on  the  screen  were  American  or  non-American  (two  alternative  forced 
choice). Trials consisted of a fixation cross for 1500ms, followed by the face for 
500ms, and then a blank screen indicating that they must respond.  There were thirty 
trials in total (15 original orientation/15 mirror reversed) and the priming phase lasted 
only a minute or so. The identity of the reversed images was counterbalanced across 
subjects to ensure that effects of distinctiveness and familiarity were controlled. 
 
Subjects were given instructions for the test phase roughly a minute after the prime 
phase had been completed. Participants were told that they were to be shown a series 
of faces and that they must respond as quickly as possible to whether the faces were 
familiar or unfamiliar to them. They were then shown a series of images comprising 
of  30  new  images  of  the  primed  identities  (all  in  their  veridical  orientation),  30 
famous unprimed faces, and 60 images of unfamiliar faces. Order of presentation was 
fully  randomised.  Responses  and  response  latencies  were  recorded  for  subsequent 
analysis. 
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Results 
 
Figure 3.11: Mean reaction time data for ‘familiar’ responses  (error bars denote 95% 
confidence intervals, calculated using the method described by Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
 
Reaction time data coded as a ‘familiar’ response in the familiarity decision task was 
analysed  using  a  one-way  ANOVA.  There  was  found  to  be  a  main  effect  of 
experimental condition [F(2,29)= 22.299; p<0.01]. Planned t-tests confirmed that this 
effect was reflective of the faster reaction for items primed with either the original 
orientation  [t(29)=  5.20;  p<0.01]  or  the  mirror  orientation  [t(29)=  6.23;  p<0.01]. 
There was no significant difference between reaction time data for items primed by 
the  original  orientation  relative  to  items  primed  in  their  reverse  orientation 
[t(29)=1.02; p>0.05]. This analysis, whilst confirming that a general priming effect 
was observed, shows priming to be invariant to the lateral orientation of the prime 
stimulus. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Discussion 
 
The results reported in this experiment are in agreement with Brooks et al (2002), and 
confirm that face priming is invariant to lateral mirror orientation. It can now be 
accepted  that  the  null  effects  reported  by  Brooks  et  al  were  not  limited  to  the 
paradigm they used. However, in the context of previous demonstrations showing a   89 
sensitivity to the lateral orientation (e.g. Mita et al., 1977; Rhodes, 1986; McKelvie, 
1983; Brédart, 2003), and given that an effect of reversal on name verification was 
detected in experiment three, it is uncertain whether this invariance in priming studies 
translates to a more general invariance of our face representations to mirror reversal. 
More certainly, it appears that whether or not an effect of mirror reversal is detected 
depends largely on the method used to probe the memory representations. 
 
Whereas  I  failed  to  detect  a  difference  in  priming  with  mirror  reversed  versus 
veridically  orientated  stimuli,  I  did  find  a  difference  between  these  stimulus 
conditions  in  response  latency  when  participants  were  tested  using  a  name-
verification paradigm. This is somewhat puzzling given that the differences between 
the name-verification paradigm used in experiment four and that used in the test phase 
by Brooks et al (2002) are slight. Furthermore, if existing data is to be accepted, it 
would  appear  that  the  veridical  orientation  of  faces  is  embodied  in  our  cognitive 
system  (e.g.  Rhodes,  1986).  If  this  is  the  case  then  it  is  necessary  to  dissociate 
mechanisms responsible for priming effects from those enabling the  sensitivity to 
mirror reversal reported in previous research. 
 
Previous research has shown that memory for the left-right orientation of familiar 
objects (a US penny) is improved when participants are encouraged to visualise the 
stimulus prior to identifying its mirror orientation, and that when the use of imagery is 
discouraged performance is typically at chance (Kosslyn & Rabin, 1999). Although 
this finding has not been replicated with faces it does suggest that for object memory 
at least there is some dissociation between the memory representations (which appear 
to preserve left-right orientation) and the process that matches this representation to 
an incoming stimulus (which is not sensitive to left-right orientation). If this were to 
be true for face stimuli also it may explain why an invariance to mirror reversal was 
found in the present experiment but not in the name verification paradigm used in 
experiment four. 
 
In the name verification procedure used in experiment three the name of a familiar 
face is shown previously to the presentation of the face and participants make a 2AFC 
decision  (match/mismatch)  to  the  image.  In  this  case  it  can  be  assumed  that  the 
memory representation of the face is activated prior to the image being presented,   90 
much like the procedure used for successful identification of left-right orientation by 
Kosslyn & Rabin (1999). This procedure is in contrast to that used by Brooks et al 
(2002) where face images were presented prior to presentation of the name and a 
2AFC decision was made to the person’s name. This paradigm discourages the use of 
imagery and this may explain recognition was unaffected by reversal in Brooks et al 
(2002) and also why repetition priming is invariant to mirror reflection. 
 
Experiment  8:  The  effect  of  mirror  reversal  on  memory 
recall for faces 
 
Introduction 
 
McKelvie (1983) demonstrated using a classical recognition paradigm that memory 
for faces is disrupted by mirror reversal. However, given that the data reported thus 
far is inconclusive as to whether cognitive representations of faces specify lateral 
orientation, it was decided that this finding should be subjected to further scrutiny. 
The series of experiments reported by McKelvie (1983) all used the same images at 
learning as at test, and this limits the scope of  their conclusions. Given that face 
recognition (as defined in the introduction to this chapter) is characterised by the 
ability to abstract information from our experience of a face in a given environmental 
context, using exactly the same image at test may enable subjects to use mechanisms 
other than face recognition to recall the faces from memory. Also, image specific 
memory can be dissociated from face memory (Schweinberger et al, 2002; Dyer et al. 
2002), so a replication of McKelvie’s (1983) data using a different image at learning 
than at test was considered necessary. 
 
Method 
 
Stimuli and Materials 
 
Twenty female and twenty male identities were chosen from an in-house database of 
unfamiliar faces. Of these 40 identities, 20 (10 male, 10 female) were selected for use   91 
in the learning phase of the experiment and the remaining 20 were to be used as ‘new’ 
stimuli in the test phase. For each of the 20 faces chosen for the learning phase, two 
images that were taken using different cameras and under slightly different lighting 
conditions were used as stimuli. All experimental stimuli were presented in 256 levels 
of greyscale on a 15” computer monitor set to a screen resolution of 1152 X 864 
pixels, and each face measured roughly 220 X 330 pixels. Images were all centrally 
presented. 
 
Design and Procedure 
 
Forty-four  people  participated  in  the  study  and  all  were  recruited  from  the 
undergraduate and postgraduate populations at the University of Glasgow. Of the 44 
subjects, 28 were female and 16 were male, and it was ensured that an equal number 
of males and females were assigned to the between-group conditions. The average age 
of the sample was 21.7 (SD= 2.6). 
 
Participants were sat in front of the computer monitor and were told that the task they 
were about to take part in would test their memory for unfamiliar faces. All subjects 
were shown the same 20 images and told to remember the people in the pictures as 
well as possible because their memory for the faces would be subsequently tested. 
Twenty seconds after the final learning image had been presented the instructions for 
the test phase appeared on the screen.  Subjects were told that they were to be shown 
40 images of 40 different people, half of which they would have seen in the learning 
phase, and half of them they would not have seen. Participants were to respond as to 
whether the face was ‘old’ (i.e. appeared at learning) or ‘new’ by pressing the key 
corresponding to their decision. 
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Figure 3.12: An illustration of the experimental design used in Experiment 8 
 
At test phase, half of the participants (8 male, 14 female) were tested using the same 
images that had been presented in the learning phase, and the other half were tested 
using images taken by a different camera, under slightly different lighting conditions 
(see Figure 3.13). In addition, half of the test images were mirror reversed relative to 
the learning image (within subjects factor). Counterbalancing ensured that the reversal 
manipulation was not confounded by the distinctiveness of the individual faces used. 
 
 
Figure 3.13: The between-group experimental manipulation: Subjects either saw the same 
image, or a different image of the ‘old’ identities at test. 
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Results 
 
Figure 3.14: Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals, which were calculated using the 
method described by Loftus & Masson (1994). 
 
A mixed-factor, two way ANOVA showed the  effect of test image (same image/ 
different image) to be statistically reliable [F(1,21)= 12.66; p<0.01]. The effect of test 
orientation was non-significant, although only marginally so [F(1,21)= 3.56; p=0.66]. 
Crucially, there was also a statistically reliable interaction between the experimental 
factors [F(1,21)= 5.39; p<0.05].  
 
An  analysis  of  simple  main  effects  showed  that  the  effect  of  test  image  was 
significant only for images reversed at test [F(1,21)=17.65; p<0.01], and the effect of 
test orientation was only significant when a different image was shown at learning 
and test [F(1,21)=8.85; p<0.01]. 
 
Discussion 
 
These results confirm that memory representations of faces are selectively responsive 
to lateral orientation. This finding is in agreement with McKelvie’s (1983) previous 
demonstration of disrupted memory performance when test images are presented in 
the  opposite  lateral  orientation  relative  to  learnt  images.  In  addition,  this  data   94 
combines with previous demonstrations showing cognitive sensitivity to the lateral 
orientation of faces (e.g. Mita et al. 1977; Rhodes, 1986; Brédart, 2003) to provide 
evidence that cognitive representations of faces retain the left-right organisation of the 
veridical percept.  
 
The  significant  interaction  reported  does  however  necessitate  some  qualifying 
remarks. Primarily, it is difficult to explain the fact that the effect of reversal did not 
have a significant effect on memory performance in the same image condition. In all 
of the five experiments published by McKelvie (1983) a difference between memory 
recall of reversed versus non-reversed images was reported, and this occurred despite 
the fact that the same images were used at leaning as in test. There is one  clear 
difference  between  the  design  of  these  experiments  and  that  of  the  present  study 
however. The delay between learning and test phase was only thirty seconds in this 
experiment, yet McKelvie (1983) reports a rest duration of ten minutes.  
 
The most straightforward explanation for why this difference in methodology may 
account for the contradictory results is that the same-image task in the present study 
was too easy. If the performance on this task is at ceiling level then this may explain 
why an effect of reversal was not detected. Were participants’ memory for the images 
sufficiently reliable, it may be that seeing the test image in its original orientation 
provided no detectable advantage. This interpretation of the data is consistent with the 
findings of McKelvie (1983), as the long retention interval used in this study made for 
a more difficult memory task. However it should be noted that only 2 out of 22 
participants correctly recalled all of the test images in the  same image condition, 
which is not indicative of ceiling effects. 
 
Another proposed explanation is that the representation of orientation is facilitated by 
short-term memory decay and subsequent abstraction in long-term visual memory. 
This  proposal  is  somewhat  paradoxical,  as  one  would  expect  that  if  anything  the 
process of abstraction that occurs in long-term memory would enable the construction 
of a representation that is invariant with respect to orientation. However, such an 
explanation  is  not  without  precedent.  It  has  been  argued  that  the  visual  pathway 
represents  the  topography  of  the  retina  as  mirror  reflections  across  cerebral 
hemispheres (Orton, 1925; Noble, 1966, 1968; Corballis & Beale, 1976; Gross &   95 
Bornstein,  1978),  and  this  theory  is  supported  by  studies  of  commisured  animals 
(Noble,  1966,  1968)  and  by  neuronal  investigations  (Berlucchi  &  Marzi,  1970; 
Rollenhagen & Olson, 2000; Baylis & Driver, 2001).  
 
Some have argued that the tendency for many species to confuse mirror images is a 
consequence of the bilateral symmetry of the nervous system (Corballis & Beale, 
1976; Rollenhagen & Olson, 2000), and behavioural data in support of this assertion 
has been reported (Bradshaw et al, 1973). As face recognition appears to rely on brain 
areas predominantly in the right hemisphere (e.g. Sergent et al. 1992), it may be that 
as visual information ‘climbs’ the hierarchy of the visual system the representation 
becomes of a more uni-directional nature due to the increased laterality of function.  
Any such explanation must be proposed tentatively however, as it is in opposition to 
established  conceptions  of  object  constancy,  where  invariance  to  orientation  is 
thought to rely on higher-level cortical processes (e.g. Perrett & Oram, 1993). 
 
Experiment 9: Explicit memory for the left-right orientation 
of face images 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous experiment it was shown that mirror reversal significantly reduces our 
ability  to  recall  faces  from  memory  when  a  different  image  is  used  at  test.  This 
suggests  that  the  asymmetry  of  a  face  is  represented  in  the  mind  after  just  one 
presentation and that the direction of this asymmetry is also specified. When the same 
image was used in learning and test phases however, performance was unaffected by 
mirror reversal.  
 
The present experiment was designed to test whether or not the orientation of images 
of faces can be explicitly remembered. Previous research has shown that memory 
recognition  for  the  orientation  of  familiar  objects  is  around  70%  using  a 
same/different orientation memory procedure (Madigan & Rouse, 1974) but as yet 
this has not been tested using face stimuli. That recognition was not disrupted by   96 
mirror reversal in the previous experiment when the same image was used at test as at 
learning suggests that an image of a face in one orientation is cognitively equivalent 
to  the  mirror  image  of  that  image.  It  is  predicted  therefore  that  memory  for  the 
orientation of an image should be at chance. 
 
Method 
 
Stimuli and Materials    
 
Twenty-six famous and twenty-six non-famous faces were sourced from the Internet.  
Images were chosen that contained writing in either the foreground or the background 
so as to ensure that pictures had not been mirror-reversed prior to publication on the 
world-wide-web. Face images were rotated so as to bring the pupils into alignment 
with  the  horizontal  plane,  cropped  around  the  outline  of  the  head,  converted  to 
greyscale and resized to 380 pixels X 570 pixels. 
 
All fifty-two images were used at training, and half of the images in each condition 
were reversed prior to presentation so that there were no effects of prior memory. The 
face images measured 8cm by 11cm, pertaining a visual angle of 7.6 by 10.5 degrees 
(at 60cm), and were centred 13cm apart (visual angle= 6.2 degrees). 
 
Design and Procedure 
 
32 subjects from the undergraduate and postgraduate populations at the University of 
Glasgow agreed to participate in the study.  The sample consisted of 19 female and 13 
male subjects ranging from 17 to 24 years of age (mean 21).  
 
Subjects sat in front of a Macintosh workstation running the software Psyscope and 
the experimenter explained their task to them.  They were to be shown the 52 face 
images (half of which had been mirror reversed prior to presentation) in a random 
order and the task was to memorise the images as well as possible because their 
memory for the images would be tested later. Images appeared in the centre of the   97 
screen  for  2000ms  and  were  preceded  by  the  presentation  of  a  fixation  cross  for 
750ms. 
 
On completion of the training phase subjects were instructed to complete an unrelated 
filler task, which took three minutes in total. After the three minutes had elapsed the 
experimenter instructed the subject to begin the test phase.  Subjects were told that 
they were to be shown the same set of images as had been presented to them in the 
training phase, but that some of the images had been ‘mirror reversed’.  Their task 
was to decide if the image was as it had appeared earlier or if it had been reversed. 
Presentation of the images was preceded by a fixation cross (750ms) and the image 
was displayed on the screen until the subjects responded.  
 
Results 
 
Participants  overall  performance  accuracy  was  found  to  vary  significantly  above 
chance  levels  (50%)  using  a  one  sample,  one  tailed  t-test  [t(31)=1.939;  p<0.05]. 
However,  memory  for  image  orientation  [mean=  53.6%;  sd=10.2%]  did  not  vary 
significantly between experimental conditions [t(31)=.891; p=.380]. In addition, one-
sample, one tailed t-tests were executed on data from the two conditions separately. 
Image memory performance for images of familiar faces [mean= 54.9%; sd=11%] 
was found to vary significantly from chance [t(31)=2.525; p<0.01], however image 
memory for unfamiliar faces [mean= 52.3%; sd=9.2%] did not vary reliably from 
chance [t(31)=1.438; p>0.05]. 
 
Discussion 
 
Contrary to the prediction made, memory performance for left-right orientation of 
face images did vary significantly from chance. Overall performance was very poor 
however  and  participants  performed  above  chance  only  when  memorising  the 
orientation of images depicting famous people. It is most likely that this difference 
resulted from some image-level artefact as opposed to  above chance performance 
being  a  product  of  familiarity.  As  half  of  the  images  were  reversed  prior  to 
presentation in the learning phase the effect cannot be due to residual memory for the   98 
veridical orientation of the famous faces. Any effect of familiarity therefore can only 
be explained by a mechanism that promotes a more robust memory trace for some or 
all of the visual characteristics of an image when the subject is familiar.  
 
Though this provides a suitable explanation of the data reported here it is considered 
more likely that an artefact of the familiar stimulus set has caused the above chance 
memory performance. One difference between the unfamiliar and famous stimuli is 
there are more instances of gaze aversion in the familiar stimuli (8/26) than in the 
unfamiliar stimuli (3/26). It could be that memory for the orientation of familiar face 
images has been facilitated by this asymmetry. Given that recall accuracy for the 
mirror orientation images of more saliently asymmetric objects has been reported to 
be 70% (Madigan & Rouse, 1979) it would appear that the degree of image level 
asymmetry contributes to improved accuracy on this task. Therefore it is likely that 
hair style, eye gaze and other transient asymmetries would also improve memory for 
mirror orientation and this may explain the above chance performance reported for 
familiar faces. 
 
The data reported here is in agreement with the results of preceding experiments in 
this  chapter.  The  apparent  difficulty  in  remembering  the  left-right  orientation  of 
images of faces reflects the slight effect of mirror reversal on face recognition and 
also  the  null  effect  of  image  reversal  on  unfamiliar  face  memory  reported  in  the 
previous  experiment.  It  would  appear  that  some  underlying  process  in  the 
representation of faces promotes a perceptual invariance to the mirror orientation of 
faces. In addition, the ability to detect reversal appears to be confounded by the high 
degree of symmetry present in faces.  
 
Chapter Summary 
 
The principal hypothesis to be tested in this chapter was that memory representations 
of familiar faces specify lateral orientation. Previous studies have shown sensitivity to 
the mirror reversal in affective judgements (Mita et al. 1977), familiarity judgements 
(Rhodes,  1986;  Brédart,  2003),  and  memory  for  images  of  unfamiliar  faces 
(McKelvie, 1983). In the experiments reported in this chapter sensitivity to reversal   99 
was additionally detected in name verification (experiment 4) and also memory for 
unfamiliar faces (experiment 8).  This difference in behavioural response to mirror 
reversed faces was not detected in the name verification responses of experiment 5 
and  6,  the  repetition-priming  paradigm  in  experiment  7,  nor  in  the  same  image 
memory test in experiment 8.  Whereas the null effect in experiment 5 can most likely 
be explained by subjects’ over-exposure to the experimental stimuli, the null effect 
reported in experiment 7 would appear to confirm that repetition priming is invariant 
to the lateral orientation of the stimulus. 
 
In  addition,  the  differences  between  responses  to  images  in  reversed  orientations 
reported in this chapter are small. Presenting images of familiar faces in their reverse 
orientation  (experiment  4)  does  not  affect  accuracy  of  response  and  the  only 
detectable effect was a mean reaction time difference of 32ms relative to responses to 
faces in their original orientation. Furthermore, in a second experiment (experiment 5) 
this  difference  was  not  observed,  most  probably  due  to  practise  effects.  It  would 
appear  that  the  visual  system  is  minimally  responsive  to  changes  in  the  mirror 
orientation of faces, and it could be that the null effects of reversal are due to a lack of 
sensitivity  in  the  measure  used  to  detect  the  effect  of  reversal.  After  all,  the 
asymmetries in a face are small (Farkas, 1994; Farkas & Cheung, 1981; Farkas & 
Munro, 1978) and therefore one might expect that any sensitivity to reversal is also 
small. This problem of measurement sensitivity is highlighted in experiment 8 where 
in  the  less  difficult  task  of  same-image  memory  there  was  no  effect  of  reversal, 
whereas  in  the  more  difficult  different-image  memory  task  there  was  a  strongly 
significant effect of reversal.  
 
It is interesting therefore to speculate as to why our sensitivity to mirror reversal is so 
slight.  As  has  already  been  mentioned,  the  visual  information  disambiguating 
orientation  is  typically  modest  (e.g.  Farkas  &  Cheung,  1981).  However  as  our 
perceptual  mechanisms  are  tuned  to  detect  minute  differences  in  configuration  of 
facial  features  (Haig,  1984),  and  face  recognition  depends  on  the  ability  to 
discriminate  individuals  based  on  these  small  differences,  one  might  reasonably 
expect that the effect of reversal would be more easily detectable. Therefore it is 
likely  that  there  is  a  further  reason  for  the  resilience  displayed  by  cognitive 
representations to mirror transformation. It may be that the slight effects of mirror   100 
reversal  are  related  to  a  more  general  tendency  to  confuse  mirror  images  (e.g. 
Sutherland, 1960; Sekuler & Houlihan, 1968; Hamilton & Tieman, 1973).  If the 
mirror reflection of a perceived object is represented in the visual system (Noble, 
1966, 1968) then this may account for null effects of mirror inversion (e.g. Brooks et 
al. 2002).  
 
Though  this  may  be  the  case,  invariance  to  linear  transformations  of  faces  in 
recognition  has  previously  been  reported  for  transformations  other  than  mirror 
reflection (Hole et al. 2002). However, it has been suggested that the mechanisms 
enabling this invariance may have evolved out of a necessity for object constancy 
despite changes in depth rotation (Hole et al. 2002; Sinha et al. 2006), and it may be 
that a similar explanation can be given for the apparent robustness of face recognition 
systems to mirror reflection. That reversed faces are recognised despite the alteration 
of  configural  information  (experiments  2,  4,  5,  6  &  7)  may  be  a  result  of  some 
automatic normalisation process that has evolved for means more general than the 
recognition of mirror-reversed faces. It has been shown that ‘mirror confusion’ most 
probably results from the neurons in the visual system responding similarly to lateral 
mirror images (Rollenhagen & Olson, 2000). Tolerance to mirror reversal of familiar 
(chapter 3) and unfamiliar (chapter 2) faces may be enhanced by such generalisation. 
 
Though  face  processing  is  generally  unimpaired  by  mirror  reflection,  evidence  of 
sensitivity to this transformation has been detected both in this chapter (experiments 4 
& 7) and in previous research (e.g. Mita et al., 1977; Rhodes, 1986; McKelvie, 1983; 
Brédart, 2003). Furthermore, though the differences between response latencies to 
original and reversed images in experiments 5 and 6 were not significant, in both 
cases  a  faster  mean  response  time  was  reported  for  veridically  orientated  stimuli. 
Collectively these results prove not only that the subtle asymmetries present in a face 
are  represented  in  the  mind,  but  also  that  the  left-right  orientation  of  these 
asymmetries  is  preserved  to  some  degree.  For  the  cognitive  system  to  respond 
differently  to  a  reflection  than  to  a  veridical  percept  some  form  of  coding  must 
specify  the  veridical  orientation  in  memory.  That  said,  though  form  and  mirror 
orientation  can  be  considered  as  mutually  exclusive  properties  (e.g.  Rock,  1973; 
Hummel and Biederman, 1992), it would appear that in the case of face perception 
they are to some extent associated.       101 
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orientation of familiar faces 
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Introduction 
 
Though  the  bilateral  asymmetry  of  a  given  face  is  typically  small,  humans  are 
nonetheless  sensitive to this information. In the previous chapter two experiments 
were reported where a sensitivity to mirror reversal was detected. Though I failed to 
replicate the effect of reversal on reaction time reported in experiment four in two 
subsequent  experiments,  the  mean  response  latencies  in  these  experiments  were 
nonetheless  faster  for  images  in  their  original  orientation  than  it  was  for  mirror 
reversed images. In addition, previous research has shown recognition systems to be 
sensitive to mirror reversal (e.g. Mita et al., 1977; Rhodes, 1986; McKelvie, 1983; 
Brédart,  2003).  It  would  appear  therefore  that  although  the  representation  of 
reflectional  asymmetry  in  the  mind  is  a  non-salient  quality,  the  asymmetry  is 
nonetheless  represented  and  its  left-right  orientation  is  specified.  In  the  present 
chapter three experiments are reported which test whether or not this sensitivity is 
sufficiently robust to enable reliable identification of the veridical orientation of a 
familiar face. 
 
Previous research has shown that it can be surprisingly difficult to explicitly recall 
directional information relating to objects which we encounter everyday. Nickerson 
and Adams (1979) demonstrated that people have significant difficulty in recalling the 
appearance of a US coin and that they were particularly poor at remembering the 
orientation  of  Abraham  Lincolns  head,  a  finding  which  has  been  since  replicated 
(Kosslyn & Rabin, 1999). Further research has shown this difficulty to be strikingly 
profound,  with  Rubin  and  Kontis  (1983)  reporting  that  a  significant  majority  of 
participants incorrectly recalled the head’s orientation and studies using UK coins 
have reported similarly poor performance (Jones, 1990; Martin & Jones, 1997). This 
peculiar finding is thought to occur due to a generalised bias towards leftward head 
direction  in  images,  coins  and  paintings  (e.g.  McManus  &  Humphreys  1973; 
McKelvie & Aikins, 1993). 
 
Though this research suggests that the left-right orientation of objects is not specified 
in memory of common objects, a more recent study has demonstrated above-chance 
performance at recalling their orientation. Kelly et al (2001) asked British subjects to   103 
identify the real-world orientation of a two-pence coin and a postage stamp using a 
two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) paradigm and found performance on this task to 
be  70%.  The relatively  high  performance  level  obtained  by  Kelly  et  al  (2001)  is 
thought to be a product of the sensitivity inherent in the 2AFC paradigm, and the 
authors  report  accuracy  of  80%  when  testing  Japanese  subjects  on  asymmetrical 
stimuli ubiquitous within their culture (see figure 4.1).  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Japanese and British stimuli used by Kelly et al (2001). 
 
Given the sensitivity of this approach it provides a good test of whether participants 
can explicitly identify the correct orientation of a familiar face. One would anticipate 
this  task  to  be  very  difficult  however  as  the  asymmetries  in  faces  are  slight  in 
comparison to the gross asymmetries displayed by the stimuli used by Kelly et al 
(2001), where the direction is disambiguated by coarse elements of the image.  It is 
surprising therefore that the ability to discriminate between mirror images of faces has 
been previously demonstrated. Rhodes (1986) examined whether or not participants 
would chose the original orientation of a familiar face when asked to indicate which 
of  two  simultaneously  presented  images  (one  original  orientation,  one  reversed) 
appeared most ‘like’ the person. Using this mirror discrimination paradigm (MD) she 
reported that subjects correctly chose the original image on 72% of occasions for 
highly familiar faces and 58% of occasions for moderately familiar faces. This was 
taken as evidence that the mind preserves the subtle configural information of faces 
and furthermore that the lateral direction of this information is also retained.  
 
The experiments reported in the present chapter will ascertain whether this memory 
for lateral orientation affords subjects reliable performance on a task where they are   104 
explicitly asked to identify the ‘real-world’ orientation of a face. The studies reported 
in the previous chapter demonstrated that effects of mirror reversal on the cognitive 
processing of faces are difficult to detect and when they are detected these effects are 
typically slight. For this reason it is anticipated that participants will find it difficult to 
recall the real-world orientation of faces from memory when explicitly instructed to 
do  so.  Furthermore,  the  tendency  for  mirror  reversals  of  faces  to  be  treated  as 
equivalent stimuli (as reported in experiment 2) is predicted to additionally contribute 
to the difficulty of this task. 
 
Experiment 10: Perceptual sensitivity to mirror reversal of 
human faces 
 
Introduction 
 
Adapting the 2AFC paradigm used by Kelly et al (2001) this experiment sought to 
determine whether the sensitivity to reversal of familiar faces reported in chapter 3 
would  enable  reliable  performance  on  an  explicit  test  of  memory  for  reflectional 
orientation. Given that previous research has shown performance on this task to be 
poor even with grossly asymmetric stimuli that are perceived in everyday life, it was 
expected that participants would find it very difficult to explicitly identify the correct 
orientation of familiar faces.  
 
Method 
Stimuli and materials 
 
Twenty-four  famous  and  twenty-four  non-famous  faces  were  sourced  from  the 
Internet.  Images were chosen that contained writing in either the foreground or the 
background  so  as  to  ensure  that  pictures  had  not  been  mirror-reversed  prior  to 
publication on the world-wide-web. 
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Face images were rotated so as to bring the pupils into alignment with the horizontal 
plane, cropped around the outline of the head, converted to greyscale and resized to 
380  pixels  X  570  pixels.  For  each  image  a  mirror-reversed  copy  was  created  by 
flipping the image horizontally using Adobe Photoshop. Displays were then created 
by randomly allocating a position (left/right) to the mirror- reversed image for each 
identity. Original and mirror-reversed images were arranged side by side on a white 
background (see figure 4.2) measuring 1000 by 600 pixels. 
 
Design and Procedure 
 
18  subjects  (14  Female)  between  the  ages  of  18  and  32  (mean=  21)  from  the 
undergraduate population at the University of Glasgow consented to participate in the 
study. Participants were paid in cash or, if they were first year Psychology students, 
received course credits. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: An example of the stimulus presentation (original on the left). 
 
Subjects were sat in front of a Macintosh workstation running the software Psyscope 
and the experimenter explained their task to them. Participants were told that in each 
trial they would be presented with a pair of images and that these images would be of 
the same person and would be identical in everyway but that one of the images would 
have been mirror-reversed. Their task, they were instructed, was to decide which was 
the original image and to make their response by pressing the key on the left if the 
original appeared on the left and pressing the key on the right if the original appeared 
on the right. Subjects were told that they could take as long as they liked before   106 
making a response, and that they may find the task difficult to the extent they might 
feel as though they were guessing. 
 
Presentation  was  fully  randomised.  There  were  48  trials  in  total  (24  familiar/  24 
unfamiliar), and the task took an average of six minutes to complete. For each trial, a 
fixation cross appeared for 750ms, prior to the presentation of the image-pair. 
 
Results & Discussion 
 
Mean  performance  (i.e.  percentage  correct)  was  higher  for  familiar  (mean=  59.8; 
sd=9.84) than for unfamiliar faces (mean=47.6; sd=6.84). A related measures t-test 
showed this difference to be reliable [t(17)=3.83; p<0.001]. A one-way, one tailed t-
test confirmed performance for familiar faces was significantly greater than chance 
[t(17)=4.762;  p<0.01]  however  performance  on  unfamiliar  faces  did  not  vary 
significantly from chance levels [t(17)=1.752; p>0.05].  
 
A  follow-up-analysis  was  carried  out  to  ascertain  whether  certain  image  level 
qualities  of  the  familiar  face  stimulus  set  were  affecting  performance  on  the 
discrimination task. It is possible that participants were performing the MD task by 
relying  on  asymmetries  other  than  those  present  in  the  structure  of  the  faces 
themselves,  and  so  additional  analyses  were  deemed  necessary.  Participants  were 
found to be no more accurate at discriminating between mirror images of celebrities 
with asymmetric hairstyles (n=11) relative to those with symmetric hairstyle (n=13) 
using a two-tailed significance test [t(23)=0.784; p>0.05]. Likewise subjects did not 
perform  more  accurately  when  the  gaze  of  the  celebrity  was  averted  (n=12), 
[t(23)=0.049;  p>0.05]  or  when  the  angle  of  their  head  was  averted  (n=13), 
[t(23)=0.851; p>0.05]. 
 
It is unlikely therefore that participants were making their decision based on unstable 
factors  such  as  the  hairstyle  of  the  person  in  order  to  disambiguate  the  left-right 
orientation, and if they were it did not afford them reliable accuracy. In replication of 
Rhodes (1986) it was found that participants did not correctly identify the veridical 
orientation of celebrities with asymmetric hairstyles more accurately than those with   107 
symmetrical  hair,  and  furthermore  head  angle  and  gaze  direction  did  not  affect 
accuracy. In addition, the celebrities used did not have defining surface features (e.g. 
birthmarks) that could be used by participants to disambiguate the mirror orientation 
of the images. 
 
Discussion 
 
The results of this experiment show that when a face is familiar, subjects can identify 
its  veridical  mirror  orientation  with  accuracy  significantly  superior  to  chance 
performance. This finding supports earlier contentions (e.g. Rhodes, 1986) that the 
cognitive representations underlying face recognition are sufficiently detailed to code 
fine-grain  configural  asymmetries  in  the  face.  Though  accuracy  significantly 
exceeded that which would be predicted if subjects were not selectively sensitive to 
the original orientation of familiar faces, an average accuracy of 60% represents a 
poor level of performance. Accuracy in the experiment reported here is notably less 
than the 70% reported by Rhodes (1986), and there are a number of methodological 
differences that may explain these incongruous observations.  
 
Firstly, it may be that the stimuli used in the present experiment were not as familiar 
to  participants  as  those  used  by  Rhodes  (1986)  where  the  faces  used  were  of 
participants’ colleagues with whom they have daily face-to-face contact. It could be 
that both the quantity and quality of prior exposure to the faces are important factors 
in successful performance on the MD procedure. The familiar faces used in this task 
are typically encountered with less frequency than colleagues and familiarity may be 
additionally compromised by the nature of this exposure. Brédart (2003) contended 
that  the  competition  between  representations  of  our  own  face  as  perceived  in 
photographs (veridical orientation) and when looking in the mirror (mirror reversed 
orientation) causes poorer performance with our own faces relative to other highly 
familiar faces on a MD task. As was discussed in the previous chapter, famous faces 
are often reversed prior to publication in print media, and the prevalence of mirrored 
stimuli may therefore be an additional source of confusion for participants in this task.  
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 A further possibility is that the task instructions given to participants in the present 
experiment has in some way impaired performance relative to the performance of 
subjects in the task set by Rhodes (1986). In the present experiment participants were 
explicitly aware that one of the images had been mirror reversed and were asked to 
indicate  which  image  was  in  the  ‘real  world’  orientation,  whereas  in  Rhodes’ 
paradigm  participants  were  unaware  of  the  image  manipulation  and  were  simply 
asked  to  decide  which  image  looked  ‘most  like’  the  person.  It  may  be  that  by 
encouraging  participants  to  use  their  knowledge  of  the  veridical  orientation  in  an 
implicit manner Rhodes has made the task easier for them. In the present experiment 
all participants reported finding the task very difficult and that they felt as though they 
were guessing, and another common response was that they often ‘second-guessed’ 
themselves. When making explicit judgements participants may be more likely to 
‘second-guess’  themselves  whereas  the  ‘most  like’  decision  might  encourage 
participants to use their initial impression more confidently.  
 
In a previous experiment using the same explicit MD as used here Kelly et al (2001) 
found that 70% of participants could correctly identify the veridical orientation of 
commonly  perceived  objects,  and  for  some  more  salient  objects  in  their  visual 
environment a success rate of 80% was reported. This performance is notably superior 
to the accuracy displayed by participants in the present experiment where the same 
judgement was made to images of famous faces. This difference is not surprising as 
the mirror orientation of the stimuli used by Kelly et al (2001) was specified by 
salient and stable visual characteristics (i.e. the direction of the eagles head, see figure 
4.1).  
 
In  the  present  study  however,  subjects  had  to  rely  on  the  subtle  morphological 
asymmetry of the faces. Therefore, given that the ability to mirror discriminate would 
appear  to  result  from  the  structural  asymmetries  of  the  face  stimuli  used  in  this 
experiment,  it  is  little  wonder  that  performance  on  this  task  was  inferior  to  that 
reported by Kelly et al (2001). The structural asymmetries of faces are typically slight 
(Farkas & Cheung, 1981) and this is in contrast to the grossly asymmetric figures 
used in the MD task reported by Kelly and colleagues. Perhaps more surprising is the 
fact that subjects could perform this task at all given that the two images presented to 
participants were so similar.    109 
Experiment 11: Perceptual sensitivity to mirror reversal of 
human faces II 
 
Introduction 
 
A limitation of the previous experiment is that it failed to confirm that the above 
chance performance in the familiar condition was a product of familiarity per se or 
whether some artefact of the celebrity images was responsible for this effect. Though 
no evidence was found to suggest that either hairstyle (e.g. directional partings) or 
gaze direction differed between the experimental conditions, it was considered that a 
further experiment was necessary in order to isolate the effect of familiarity more 
convincingly.  
 
With  direction  of  lighting,  facial  asymmetry  and  other  transient  asymmetries  all 
potentially causing the effect reported in the previous experiment, an experiment was 
designed  that  ensured  such  superficial  qualities  would  not  obscure  any  difference 
between familiar and unfamiliar conditions. Using a design in which all face stimuli 
can  be  used  as  familiar  items  (for  participants  who  are  their  workmates)  and 
unfamiliar items (for participants from a different workplace) allowed for a more 
valid investigation. In addition, using images of participants’ colleagues will help 
clarify  whether  the  use  of  celebrity  identities  in  the  previous  experiment 
contributed to the MD performance reported in the previous experiment. 
 
Method 
Stimuli and Materials  
 
A digital camera was used to collect images of professors, lecturers, research staff and 
postgraduate students from the psychology departments at The University of Stirling 
and  the  University  of  Glasgow.  From  this  database  of  images  the  twenty-four 
identities  from  each  department  that  were  anticipated  to  be  most  familiar  to  the 
postgraduate students and research staff in their respective departments were selected 
for use in the experiment.   110 
 
Using Adobe Photoshop CS, each image was cropped around the contour of the head, 
converted to greyscale, and resized proportionately to 300 pixels in width. For each of 
the forty-eight images an array was created (figure 4.3) which contained the image in 
its original orientation and a mirror-reversed copy of the original placed side by side. 
The position of the original (left/right) was randomised, and the arrays measured 1000 
by 600 pixels.  
 
Design and Procedure 
 
Mirror Discrimination Task 
 
Subjects  were  recruited  from  the  psychology  departments  at  The  University  of 
Stirling and from The University of Glasgow. 14 Subjects were recruited from each 
department  so  as  to  counterbalance  the  images  used  within  the  two  experimental 
conditions. The sample consisted of 13 female and 15 male subjects ranging from 21 
to 45 years in age (mean= 25.8). 
 
Figure 4.3: Example of experimental stimuli (original on left). 
 
Subjects were sat in front of a Macintosh workstation running the software Psyscope 
and the experimenter explained their task to them. Participants were told that in each 
trial they would be presented with a pair of images and that these images would be of 
the same person and would be identical in everyway but that one of the images would 
have been mirror-reversed. Their task, they were instructed, was to decide which was   111 
the original image and to make their response by pressing the key on the left if the 
original appeared on the left and pressing the key on the right if the original appeared 
on the right. Subjects were told that they could take as long as they liked before 
making a response, that they may find the task difficult and that they were not to 
worry if they felt like they were guessing. 
 
Presentation  was  fully  randomised.  There  were  48  trials  in  total  (24  familiar/  24 
unfamiliar)  and  for  each  trial  a  fixation  cross  appeared  for  750ms  prior  to  the 
presentation of the image-pair. On completion of the test phase subjects were shown 
each  of  the  forty-eight  faces  used  in  the  experiment  and  were  asked  to  indicate 
whether  or  not  they  had  been  familiar  with  the  faces  prior  to  taking  part  in  the 
experiment. On average the experiment lasted roughly six minutes 
 
Symmetry Ratings 
 
Twenty  undergraduate  students  [9  female;  mean  age=  19.7  (sd=2.2)]  from  the 
University  of  Glasgow  volunteered  to  rate  the  experimental  stimuli.  Psychology 
undergraduates were not used so as to ensure that participants were unfamiliar with 
the faces, and subjects were asked after they had completed the ratings if they had 
been familiar with any of the faces they had rated. Each participant was given the 
experimental stimuli and asked to rate them for asymmetry on a scale of 1 (very 
symmetrical)  to  7  (very  asymmetrical).  The  stimuli  were  presented  in  greyscale 
format on a sheet of white paper. Eight stimuli were presented per page, and the order 
of the six pages was randomised across subjects. Under each stimulus there was a 
rating scale and participants were asked to circle the number they had chosen to rate 
the image. The rating task typically took subjects 5 to 10 minutes to complete. 
 
Results 
 
Mirror Discrimination Task 
 
Only data from trials where the intended condition and the actual condition were 
congruent was analysed (e.g. for participants from Stirling only the identities that   112 
were responded to as familiar and were from the Stirling subset of images would 
contribute towards the mean for the familiar condition, and only those confirmed to 
be unfamiliar from the Glasgow subset contributed to the unfamiliar data).  Some 
overlap  was  expected  as  the  two  departments  have  a  history  of  academic 
collaboration,  and  it  was  not  certain  whether  the  stimuli  collected  from  each 
department would be familiar to all participants from the respective department. 
 
Mean performance was higher for familiar (mean= 53.8; sd=2.09) than for unfamiliar 
faces  (mean=50.2;  sd=1.63).  However,  a  related  measures  t-test  showed  this 
difference to be unreliable [t(1,27)=1.58; p=0.126]. When subjected to a one way, one 
tailed  t-test  performance  data  for  the  familiar  condition  was  found  to  vary 
significantly  from  chance  [t(27)=1.788;  p<0.05].  Performance  in  the  unfamiliar 
condition did not vary significantly from chance levels [t(27)=0.108; p>0.05]. 
 
Figure 4.4: Bar graph showing the MD performance by participants from the two 
departments (error bars denote 95% confidence intervals). 
 
When subjects’ performance was split according to the department they belonged to, 
it was found that participants from Stirling performed significantly above chance for 
familiar [t(1,13)=2.842; p<0.01] but not for unfamiliar faces [t(1,13)=0.135; p>0.05], 
whereas the participants from Glasgow did not perform significantly above chance 
levels for either familiar [t(1,13)=0.391; p>0.05] or unfamiliar faces [t(1,13)=0.150; 
p>0.05].   113 
Symmetry Ratings 
 
An average asymmetry score was calculated for each stimulus used in the experiment 
using rating data collected from the 20 independent raters. The difference in mean 
asymmetry  scores  between  the  two  departments  [Stirling  mean=  3.56  (SD=0.74); 
Glasgow  mean=  3.39  (SD=  0.83)]  was  not  significant  [t(38)=  0.69;  P>0.05]. 
Furthermore, there was found to be no correlation between the asymmetry of a face 
and the proportion of correct responses made to that face in the MD task [r=0.119; 
p>0.05].  
 
Discussion 
 
Mirror discrimination performance in this experiment was only marginally superior to 
that which would be predicted if participants were making guess decisions. Not only 
did overall performance for familiar faces differ only very slightly from chance, but 
also in one of the departments performance was statistically equivalent to chance. 
Given that the familiar stimuli used were images taken of the participants colleagues 
this is somewhat surprising, as one would expect these faces to be encountered as 
commonly  as  the  famous  faces  used  in  the  previous  experiment.  It  is  possible 
however that we spend more time inspecting the faces of celebrities than we do our 
colleagues as it may be deemed socially inappropriate to stare at a colleagues face for 
an extended period of time. Regardless, even if the faces were minimally familiar to 
participants a more robust level of performance would have been expected given that 
Rhodes  (1986)  reported  an  accuracy  of  58%  in  a  MD  paradigm  to  faces  of  low 
familiarity. As previously discussed however, it could be that the explicit instructions 
used in the experiments reported here has made this task more difficult.  
 
Performance was found to be significantly above chance when discriminating mirror 
images of familiar faces for participants from the University of Stirling but not for 
participants from the University of Glasgow. This difference does not appear to be 
reflective of a difference in the asymmetry of the stimuli themselves and therefore the 
most likely explanation for this is that participants from the University of Stirling 
were more familiar with the faces in their department relative to the participants from   114 
the University of Glasgow. Though these two psychology departments are similar in 
size (e.g. number of staff), it is possible that some other factor such as the closer 
proximity of colleagues’ offices at Stirling may have caused more interaction between 
these colleagues. As no familiarity ratings were collected as part of this study it is 
difficult to assess the effect familiarity on performance, other than to say that a certain 
level of familiarity is necessary to perform the MD task above chance.  
 
Experiment 12: The effect of familiarity on performance in a 
mirror discrimination task 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous experiment performance of the mirror discrimination task was above 
chance for one group of participants but not the other. It is uncertain why this might 
be  and  it  would  not  appear  that  this  difference  results  from  differences  in  the 
morphology of the faces themselves, or in the  asymmetry of other aspects of the 
images.  Using  a  different  paradigm  Rhodes  (1986)  has  shown  that  increased 
familiarity improves MD performance and it is possible that the chance performance 
level  displayed  by  participants  from  Glasgow  University  is  a  result  of  these 
participants being less familiar with their ‘familiar’ set relative to the participants 
from  the  University  of  Stirling.  As  no  familiarity  ratings  were  collected  in  the 
previous  experiment,  another  experiment  was  designed  to  assess  the  effect  of 
familiarity on performance in the MD task.  
Method 
 
Stimuli and Materials 
 
Images of 14 contestants from the UK television show Big Brother 8 were sourced 
from the worldwide web (http://uk.tv.yahoo.com/big-brother/photos/). These images 
were originally captured from live streams of the television footage and were in their   115 
original lateral orientation. In addition, images of the television show’s presenters 
Davina McCall and Dermot O’Leary were used as stimuli. For each image a mirror 
reversed  copy  was  generated  using  Adobe  Photoshop  CS.  This  reversal  was  then 
placed  alongside  the  original  image  and  the  subsequent  pairs  were  presented  to 
participants, with the originals appearing an equal amount of times in the left-hand 
image as in the right. Image pairs measured 600 by 400 pixels and were presented in 
full colour (see figure 4.5). 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Example of a experimental stimuli (original on left). 
 
Design and Procedure 
 
Sixty-eight  participants  [37  female,  mean  age=  18.2]  were  recruited  from  the 
Psychology summer school at the University of Glasgow and they were tested during 
the introductory lecture. Prior to testing participants were asked to specify whether or 
not  they  had  watched  the  current  series  of  Big  Brother  and  if  so  to  indicate  the 
average amount of time spent watching the programme each week. They were also 
asked  to  give  familiarity  ratings  to  the  names  of  the  contestants  that  were  to  be 
presented.  When  all  participants  had  given  answers  to  these  questions  they  were 
shown the series of face pairs in a random order (same order for all subjects) and 
asked to specify, by marking the appropriate box on their answer sheet, which image 
had not been mirror reversed. Each image pair was presented for five seconds each on 
a projector screen in a lecture theatre and the sixty-eight participants were tested in 
three separate sessions.  After the task had been completed the students were thanked 
for their participation and their response sheets were collected. 
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Results 
 
Participants were split into three groups based on how often they reported having 
watched Big Brother 8. The unfamiliar group consisted of participants who had never 
watched the series (n=20), the low familiarity group contained those participants that 
reported having watched the programme for less than an hour per week (n=19) and 
the  high  familiarity  group  was  defined  as  those  participants  that  had  reported 
watching the series for an hour or more per week (n=29). The probability of correctly 
choosing the veridical orientation from the image pair was then calculated for each 
subject.  
 
Figure 4.6: NB The horizontal grey line represents chance performance and error bars denote 
95% confidence intervals. 
 
Performance  did  not  exceed  chance  level  (.5)  for  both  unfamiliar  [t(19)=-1.410; 
p>0.05] and low familiarity groups [t(18)=0.081; p>0.05]. Performance did however 
differ significantly from chance for the high familiarity group [t(28)=3.157; p<0.001], 
suggesting  that  the  ability  to  perform  the  MD  task  successfully  is  facilitated  by 
increased familiarity. However, though the overall accuracy data for experimental 
groups would suggest that familiarity improves performance, the correlation between 
average performance on an image pair and the  average familiarity rating was not 
significant [r=0.217; p=0.457].     117 
Discussion 
 
This  experiment  provides  evidence  that  performance  on  the  explicit  mirror 
discrimination task is improved as exposure to a face accumulates, and data from the 
previous two experiments are  also in  support of this contention. In both previous 
experiments performance on a MD task was shown to be above chance only for faces 
that were familiar to the subjects. In addition, chance level performance was reported 
in  experiment  9  for  participants  from  the  University  of  Glasgow  psychology 
department. In discussing this finding the most likely explanation was thought to be 
that the participants in the Glasgow psychology department were less familiar with 
the Glasgow stimulus set that the Stirling participants were with the Stirling stimulus 
set. The fact that there was not a statistically reliable difference between the stimulus 
sets  in  terms  of  perceived  asymmetry  would  suggest  that  the  difference  in 
performance was not due to some physical property of the stimuli.  
 
This  finding  replicates  Rhodes’  (1986)  previous  demonstration  of  superior  mirror 
discrimination performance for highly familiar faces, and is also in agreement with 
studies  showing  a  relationship  between  familiarity  and  the  ability  to  identify  the 
correct left-right orientation of common objects (Kelly et al. 2001) and works of art 
(Blount  et  al.  1975).  That  increased  familiarity  is  associated  with  improved 
performance  on  this  task  suggests  that  as  a  face  becomes  familiar  the  cognitive 
representation  of  its  shape  becomes  sufficiently  detailed  to  enable  participants  to 
discriminate between a mirror image and a normally oriented image of that face. For 
this  to  occur  the  cognitive  representation  must  not  only  be  finely  tuned  to  the 
relational information in the familiar face but it must also retain information that 
specifies the left-right orientation of this configural information.  
 
An interesting question arising naturally from the data reported in this experiment is 
whether performance on the MD task will improve proportionately with increasing 
exposure  to  a  given  face  or  whether  there  is  some  upper-limit  that  constrains 
performance. Though the correlation between average familiarity ratings and average 
accuracy on the MD task was not reliable, it is considered that this is reflective of the   118 
imprecise  measure  of  familiarity  used  as  opposed  to  a  functional  independence 
between familiarity and MD performance.  
 
Chapter Summary 
 
The  data  reported  in  this  chapter  provides  further  evidence  that  the  left-right 
orientation of highly familiar faces is explicitly coded in the mind. In the previous two 
chapters the evidence supporting this contention remained equivocal, as invariance to 
mirror reversal had been demonstrated as often as sensitivity to this manipulation. 
However, given that it has now been shown that participants can explicitly identify 
the  normal  orientation  of  a  familiar  face  there can  be  little  doubt  that  our  stored 
representations of faces are detailed enough to code for the subtle differences between 
the left and right sides of a face. In addition to this, the results reported in these three 
experiments  demonstrate  an  ability  to  recall  the  left-right  orientation  of  this 
information from memory.  
 
Though  these  two  conclusions  can  be  asserted  with  greater  conviction  given  the 
results  reported  in  the  present  chapter,  it  remains  unclear  which  property  of  the 
cognitive  representations  causes  MD  performance  to  be  so  poor.  Given  that  the 
process of identification requires the representation of precise spatial information (e.g. 
Farkas & Munro, 1987) it is unlikely that our memory for the configuration of faces is 
not detailed enough to detect the alteration in visual appearance induced by mirror 
reversal. Rather it seems more plausible that low MD performance is reflective of 
some  difficulty  in  recalling  the  orientation  of  this  information.  This  explanation 
would concur with demonstrations of poor memory for the left-right orientation of 
common objects (e.g. Nickerson & Adams, 1979) and would also connote that the 
cognitive representation of faces is to some degree ‘object-centred’ (see Biedermann, 
1987), or at least that such representations are not exclusively viewer-centred in their 
orientation. 
 
Another explanation is that participants perform MD with face stimuli by somehow 
judging the relative familiarity of the two images. If one assumes that recognition 
involves perceived familiarity exceeding a certain threshold (e.g. Burton et al. 1990)   119 
then  subjects  may  be  basing  their  judgement  on  the  relative  familiarity  of  each 
stimulus. It has been demonstrated already that recognition accuracy is unaffected by 
mirror reversal (experiment 4) and therefore this method would involve making subtle 
introspective judgements regarding ‘above-threshold’ sensations of familiarity. This 
would be a quite unnatural process and one which participants may find difficult.  
 
Though  the  performance  reported  in  this  chapter  is  poor,  it  would  appear  that 
familiarity improves the ability to identify correct mirror orientation, and this is in 
agreement with previous demonstrations of successful MD performance to images of 
familiar faces (Rhodes, 1986), common objects (Kelly et al. 2001) and works of art 
(Blount et al. 1975). Why familiarity might improve performance on this task remains 
uncertain however. It could be that exposure encourages the refinement of cognitive 
representations  which  results  in  a  more  precise  mapping  of  the  faces  shape  thus 
allowing for the correct orientation to be detected more readily. However it could also 
be that familiarity encourages the left-right orientation of this information to be more 
unambiguously specified in memory (i.e. with successive exposure the representation 
becomes increasingly viewer-centred). If these two processes are indeed separable 
then their relative contribution to the exposure-driven improvement in MD accuracy 
is considered to be a question worthy of further investigation. 
 
A  more  general  question  arising  from  the  data  reported  here  is  whether  MD 
performance can provide a reliable index of familiarity. The results of experiment 
twelve suggest that above-chance performance is dependent on a sufficient level of 
exposure  to  the  faces  prior  to  testing  however  this  investigation  is  somewhat 
incomplete. Since the participants in the ‘high familiarity’ group had relatively little 
exposure to the majority of the faces (some of the contestants had only been on the 
show for a matter of days) it is considered that this condition was not reflective of the 
highest level of familiarity attainable. It would be interesting to measure the MD 
performance  of  groups  varying  in  frequency  of  exposure  at  incremental  stages 
throughout the course of a television series. Using this method it would be possible to 
determine  whether  the  rate  of  improvement  at  MD  varies  as  a  function  of  the 
frequency of exposure, whether this improvement is accumulative and whether an 
upper-limit of performance constrains this growth. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Implicit memory for the left-right 
orientation of unfamiliar faces 
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Introduction 
 
The two experiments in chapter 4 show that the probability of choosing the veridical 
orientation of an unfamiliar face is equivalent to chance. This finding is corroborated 
by  previous  research  requiring  participants  to  mirror  discriminate  images  of 
unfamiliar faces (e.g. Rhodes, 1986) and unfamiliar works of art (Blount et al. 1975). 
Both of these studies show that familiarity with the stimuli allows for above-chance 
performance  but  in  neither  study  does  performance  with  unfamiliar  faces  exceed 
chance. This is taken as evidence that mirror discrimination is not achievable on the 
basis of extractable rules relating to asymmetry in general, such as the tendency in 
portraiture for subjects to be depicted with their left cheek showing to the viewer 
(McManus & Humphrey, 1973).  
 
As well as improving mirror discrimination performance it has been demonstrated 
that familiarity promotes higher ratings of preference to objects (Zajonc, 1968) and 
faces (Mita et al., 1977). In what has become a classical research paper Zajonc (1968) 
demonstrated  that  objects  to  which  we  have  been  exposed  (even  if  we  are  not 
consciously aware of this exposure) are more favourably judged than objects that we 
have not previously encountered. Although some recent research has suggested that 
this effect may not occur independently of recognition (e.g. Newell & Shanks, 2007), 
the prevailing account remains that positive affect can be induced by both conscious 
and non-conscious exposure (see Zajonc 2001).  
 
In the present chapter, two experiments are reported that investigate whether exposure 
to directional asymmetry in human faces results in a preference towards the veridical 
left-right  orientation  of  unfamiliar  faces.  This  would  be  expected  if,  contrary  to 
previous  reports  (Rhodes,  1986;  McManus  &  Humphrey,  1973),  extractable  rules 
relating  to  the  asymmetry  of  faces  in  general  are  cognitively  represented.  It  has 
previously been shown that positive affect is associated with frequently encountered 
grammatical rules (Newell & Bright, 2001; Zizak & Reber, 2004). This is thought to 
be an example of the more general “structural” mere exposure effect that increases 
positive affect to novel stimuli that conform to implicitly acquired rule systems (e.g. 
Gordon & Holyoak, 1983). It is possible therefore that a similar preference will be   122 
observed towards unfamiliar faces shown in their veridical orientation when the face 
displays asymmetry conforming to an underlying rule system. 
 
Facial asymmetry has been shown to conform to general rules of asymmetry that 
occur in all biological organisms. The term directional asymmetry (DA) is used to 
refer  to  any  anatomical  asymmetry  present  in  an  organism  that results  from  non-
random  developmental  and/or  genetic  processes  (Klingenberg,  2003;  Palmer  & 
Strobeck, 2003). This is distinguished from fluctuating asymmetry (FA) which results 
from  the  organism  being  unable  to  resist  environmental  and/or  genetic  stressors 
during the course of development (e.g. Parsons, 1990a, 1990b; Polak, 2003), and as 
such has been implicated in attractiveness research emphasising the importance of 
perceived genetic health in mate preference (Møller & Thornhill, 1998; Thornhill & 
Møller, 1998). It is generally agreed that there is a mild degree of the former source of 
asymmetry (DA) present in human faces, with the right side of the face generally 
larger  than  the  left  (Farkas  &  Cheung,  1981;  Peck  et  el.  1991;  Sackeim,  1985; 
Simmons et al. 2004).  
 
Simmons et al (2004) made measurements of 172 male faces and 205 female faces 
and reported that there was a general tendency for faces to be larger on the right-hand 
side.  Interestingly,  they  also  found  that  when  participants  were  asked  to  make 
asymmetry  or  attractiveness  judgements  to  these  faces  they  appeared  to  do  so 
independently of this general asymmetry. The degree of DA in the faces did not affect 
asymmetry or attractiveness judgements towards them but participants instead based 
their judgements on the asymmetry variance around DA. This finding shows that the 
cognitive system is sensitively tuned to perceive the subtle asymmetries in faces that 
are thought to reflect the underlying developmental instability (FA). In addition, they 
show that the cognitive system is capable of adapting to consistent qualities of facial 
structure, which is in line with previous research (Rhodes, 1996; Rhodes et al. 2003a, 
2003b;  Webster  &  MacLin,  1999).  This  study  implies  that  population-wide 
asymmetries in facial structure are to some extent cognitively represented.  
 
Previous research has demonstrated incidental learning of real world regularities for 
common objects (Kelly et al. 2001). In addition, it has been shown that participants 
can readily abstract prototypical representations after exposure to a series of visually   123 
similar objects (e.g. Posner & Keele, 1968). It is possible therefore that the cognitive 
representation  of  DA  present  in  faces  will  result  in  a  bias  towards  choosing  the 
veridical  orientation  of  an  unfamiliar  face  in  a  2AFC  paradigm.  The  ‘mirror 
discrimination’  task  used  in  the  previous  experiment  failed  to  detect  such  a  bias, 
however it is possible that this was because the measure lacked sensitivity. In the 
present chapter the ‘likeability paradigm’ (Zajonc, 1968) is used to determine whether 
our cognitive systems are sufficiently impressible to allow for the representation of 
DA.  
 
Previous research has shown that the mere exposure effect (as outlined earlier) is 
capable of generalising to an average representation of previously exposed stimuli 
even if the prototype stimulus has not itself been encountered.  This effect has been 
demonstrated for artificial grammar (Gordon & Holyoak, 1983; Manza et al. 1998; 
Zizak & Reber, 2004), matrices of coloured squares (Gordon & Holyoak, 1983) and 
human  faces  (Rhodes  et  al.  2001).  An  abstractive  process  of  this  kind  would  be 
necessary  for  the  cognitive  representation  of  DA,  which  has  been  previously 
demonstrated by Simmons et al (2004), and also for participants to show preference 
to veridically presented unfamiliar faces relative to their mirror reversal. However, in 
more recent investigation the same researchers failed to find evidence for an increase 
in likeability ratings towards composites of previously seen faces despite finding a 
preference towards the individual faces that had been previously encountered (Rhodes 
et al. 2005). This was taken as evidence that increased positive affect towards familiar 
faces does not generalise across individual faces to prototypical representations and 
therefore that the attractiveness of average faces cannot be explained in terms of a 
generalised mere exposure effect. 
 
Although  the  mere  exposure  effect  has  rarely  been  demonstrated  following 
naturalistic exposure (Cutting, 2003) the learning of incidental regularities in lateral 
orientation has previously been established (Kelly et al. 2001). Given that information 
relating to DA in faces is to some extent available to our cognitive systems (Simmons 
et al. 2004), and that the Mere Exposure Effect has been shown to generalise across 
stimuli (e.g. Gordon & Holyoak, 1983; Rhodes et al. 2001) the experiments in the 
present chapter were designed to test for behavioural sensitivity to the mirror reversal 
of  unfamiliar  faces.  Using  the  paradigm  designed  by  Zajonc  (1968),  veridically   124 
oriented images of unfamiliar faces were presented alongside a mirror reversed copy 
of the image and participants were required to decide which image they ‘liked’ more. 
If DA is cognitively represented then a bias towards preferring the originally oriented 
image should be detected, as the form of this image should (in general) be more 
familiar to participants relative to the mirror reversed copy. 
 
A further reason to expect that veridically oriented stimuli would be more likely to 
stimulate  preference  is  that  prototypical  faces,  amongst  other  object  classes  (see 
Halberstadt  &  Rhodes,  2003)  are  rated  as  being  more  attractive  (e.g.  Rhodes  & 
Tremewan,  1996;  Rhodes  et  al.  1999).  Given  that  the  ‘prototypical  face’  is 
asymmetrical (e.g. Farkas & Cheung, 1981; Farkas & Munro, 1987; Sackeim, 1985; 
Simmons  et  al.  2004)  reversing  the  orientation  of  faces  will  (on  the  majority  of 
occasions) make the resultant image less similar to this average representation. This 
should  translate  to  a  detectable  bias  in  response  behaviour,  with  participants 
perceiving the original orientation as more attractive.  As this prediction is the same 
as is predicted by the generalised mere exposure hypothesis (see Zizak & Reber, 
2004)  it  is  anticipated  that  dissociating  the  underlying  concepts  of  attraction  and 
likeability will not be possible here. 
 
Experiment 13: Implicit sensitivity to the mirror reversal of 
unfamiliar faces I 
 
Introduction 
 
Faces have been shown to display an increasing degree of asymmetry with age, and 
female faces are thought to undergo a more gradual change in morphology during the 
process of aging than male faces (Farkas, 1994). For this reason the stimuli used in 
this experiment were split into four groups according to the age and the sex of the 
person in the photograph.  Were directional asymmetry to be represented in the mind 
then a response bias towards the veridical stimulus would most likely be detected for 
images of elderly male faces, where DA is at its most pronounced. 
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Method 
 
Stimuli and Materials 
 
Unfamiliar face images were taken from an existing database (Minear & Park, 2004). 
This database categorises faces by age, expression and sex. In the present study a 
sample of 44 faces was selected from each of the following categories: young female, 
young male, old female, and old male. In the “young” subset ages ranged from 18 to 
29, the age-range in the “old” subset was 69 to 93. All faces used were of neutral 
expression.  
 
Images  were  cropped  and  rescaled  to  a  standard  size  (365  pixels  horizontally), 
however no attempt was made to remove the external features (hair, ears, jewellery 
etc.). For every image in the experimental corpus, a mirror reversed (x axis) copy was 
generated. Example stimuli are shown in figure 5.1. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Example stimuli from experiment 13. 
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Design and Procedure 
 
36 subjects from the undergraduate and postgraduate populations at the University of 
Glasgow agreed to participate in the study.  The sample consisted of 21 female and 15 
male subjects ranging from 19 to 32 years in age (mean 23).  
 
Subjects  were  sat  in  front  of  a  Macintosh  workstation  running  the  experimental 
software package Psyscope X. For each trial, one face appeared in both its original 
and reversed form and the presentation was preceded by a fixation cross in the centre 
of the screen (750ms). The images were presented at either side of the screen and the 
original image appeared on each side an equal amount of times in each condition. The 
images remained on screen until the subject made a response. 
 
Subjects were told that they would be presented (in each of the 176 trials) with two 
images of the same person, one at either side of the screen. They were told that they 
must indicate which of these two images they “liked” better. Furthermore, they were 
instructed not to take too long to make these decisions and to rely on their initial 
instinct. Two sets of response keys corresponded to the two sides of the screen. Three 
keys corresponded to the left side, and three to the right. These three keys allowed the 
subject to indicate the strength of their preference to the respective image. The red 
key indicated strong preference, blue medium preference and green weak preference. 
The positioning of these keys was symmetrical with respect to the centre of the screen 
(fixation). Responses and response latencies were recorded for subsequent analysis. 
 
Results 
 
Mean proportions of responses to the veridically oriented stimulus are shown in the 
graphs below, with chance level performance being indicated by the grey line. One-
sample t-tests were carried out to determine whether experimental conditions varied 
from chance levels (mean population value assumed to be p = .5). Using two-tailed 
significance testing, a bias towards the original (non-reversed) stimulus was detected, 
but only in the old-male stimulus condition, and only for the strongest confidence 
level  [t(1,35)=2.357;  p<0.05].  No  other  conditions  reached  statistical  significance.   127 
Thus,  of  the  twelve  t-tests  carried  out  on  the  data  only  one  was  found  to  vary 
significantly from chance with a probability of less than 5%. 
 
 
Figures 5.3 & 5.4: Bar graphs showing the proportion of responses made in preference to the 
veridically oriented stimulus for male (fig. 5.2) and female (fig. 5.3) faces. NB Error bars 
denote 95% confidence intervals. 
 
It was considered that a two-tailed test was most suitable in this case, because it was 
possible that some stimulus factors may in fact bias response in the opposite direction 
to  that  which  was  hypothesised  (for  instance  a  systematic  asymmetry  in  lighting   128 
direction was present in the stimulus set). However even when using one-tailed tests 
of significance the only result to exceed chance performance was for ‘sure’ responses 
towards elderly male faces [t(1,35)=2.357; p<0.01].  
 
Discussion 
 
The  present  experiment  has  provided  very  limited  evidence  for  the  cognitive 
representation of Directional Asymmetry in faces. In the old male face condition a 
preference towards the veridical orientation of the stimuli was detected in responses 
made with the highest level of confidence. Although it was hypothesised that this 
group  of  stimuli  would  display  the  highest  degree  of  directional  asymmetry  and 
therefore that participants would be most likely to prefer the veridical orientation in 
this condition, the possibility of this data being anomalous cannot be overlooked. 
Given that twelve t-tests were carried out in this analysis the likelihood of one of 
these tests being significant due to chance is quite high and for this reason the null 
hypothesis  in  this  condition  should  be  rejected  with  the  necessary  caution. 
Furthermore  it  could  be  that  the  higher  incidence  of  asymmetric  hairstyles  (side-
partings) in the images of elderly male faces contributed to this observed bias. 
 
That said, it was hypothesised that because male faces are typically subject to a more 
profound change in morphology during the course of aging, directional asymmetry 
would be more pronounced in this stimulus set. Any effect of generalised familiarity 
for  veridical  lateral  orientation  relative  to  mirror  reversals  would  presumably  be 
enhanced by high levels of DA and therefore a preference towards the non-reversed 
image would be most likely to occur in this condition. If this finding were to be 
replicated using another class of stimuli displaying high levels of DA then it would be 
possible to reject the null hypothesis with greater certainty.  
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Experiment 14: Implicit sensitivity to the mirror reversal of 
unfamiliar faces II 
 
Introduction 
 
In addition to DA in facial morphology, faces become additionally asymmetric during 
the expression of emotion: a phenomenon that results from the lateralisation of brain 
function responsible for the production of facial expression (e.g. Borod et al. 1997). 
For this reason a preference towards veridically oriented stimuli is more likely to be 
detected in images of faces that are expressing emotion relative to images of non-
expressive  faces.  Should  such  a  bias  be  detected  it  could  be  concluded  that  the 
significant bias towards normally oriented images of old male faces reported in the 
previous experiment was not simply a statistical anomaly, but instead is reflective of a 
generalised  Mere  Exposure  Effect  to  DA  in  faces.  If  Mere  Exposure  Effects  can 
generalise to consistent patterns in the appearance of faces then a preference towards 
normally oriented images of smiling faces should be detected, as their form in general 
will be more familiar to participants than their mirror reversals. 
 
 
Method 
 
Stimuli and Materials 
 
200  unfamiliar  face  images  were  selected  from  the  database  of  images  used  to 
compile the stimulus set used in experiment one (Minear & Park, 2004).   These 
images  comprised  of  50  female  and  50  male  identities,  with  each  identity  being 
pictured displaying both neutral and smiling expressions. Images were cropped and 
rescaled to a standard size (365 pixels horizontally), however no attempt was made to 
remove  the  external  features  (hair,  ears,  jewellery  etc.).  For  every  image  in  the 
experimental corpus, a mirror reversed (x axis) copy was generated.    130 
 
Figure 5.5: Example stimuli from two of the four experimental conditions. 
 
Design and Procedure 
 
30 subjects from the undergraduate and postgraduate populations at the University of 
Glasgow agreed to participate in the study.  The sample consisted of 19 female and 11 
male subjects ranging from 19 to 32 years in age (mean 22). The methodology used 
was identical to the previous experiment, however with 50 presentations per condition 
there were slightly more stimulus presentations (200 trials). 
 
Results 
 
Mean proportions of responses to the veridically oriented stimulus are shown in the 
graphs below, with chance level performance being indicated by the grey line. Two 
tailed  one-sample  t-tests  were  used  to  analyse  whether  each  of  the  experimental 
conditions differed (at each confidence level) from chance performance (population 
mean= 0.5). Performance did not differ significantly from chance levels in any of the 
experimental conditions. 
 
   131 
 
 
Figures 5.6 & 5.7: Bar graphs showing the proportion of responses made in preference to the 
veridically oriented stimulus for male (fig. 5.2) and female (fig. 5.3) faces. NB Error bars 
denote 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Discussion 
 
Given the null effects reported in this experiment it would appear unlikely that Mere 
Exposure Effects are suitably robust to generalise to population-wide patterns in facial 
asymmetry. In addition, failure to replicate the above-chance bias reported for old 
male faces in experiment twelve would suggest that a reappraisal of this result is 
necessary.  If the significance of this bias were indeed due to the relatively high   132 
degree of DA in the stimulus condition then it would be predicted that a ‘veridical 
orientation  bias’  would  also  be  detected  when  participants  made  likeability 
judgements towards mirror reversals of expressive faces. This was not found to be the 
case and therefore it would appear unlikely that this previous finding was reflective of 
cognitive sensitivity to DA. 
 
Further to the structural asymmetry present in faces and the underlying rules that this 
structure conforms to, there may have been other sources of systematic variation in 
the  asymmetry  of  the  experimental  stimuli.  As  no  attempt  was  made  to  remove 
hairstyle, jewellery or other such stimulus artefacts it might have been expected that 
sensitivity  to  regularities  in  (for  instance)  the  ear  in  which  earrings  are  most 
commonly worn may have induced a bias towards the normal orientation. People 
most commonly wear their wristwatches on their left wrist, and a similar pattern may 
also  be  true  for  jewellery.    Additionally,  patterns  in  spontaneous  head  angle  (see 
McManus  et  al.  2004)  could  also  have  been  expected  to  induce  bias  towards  the 
original orientation. However no bias was detected in any of the stimulus conditions 
suggesting  that  these  regularities  (in  addition  to  structural  regularities)  did  not 
contribute to a generalised mere exposure effect. 
 
Chapter Summary 
 
Given that the prototypical face is asymmetrical (Farkas & Cheung, 1981; Peck et el. 
1991; Sackheim, 1985; Simmons et al. 2004) and that prototypical faces are rated as 
being more attractive (e.g. Rhodes & Tremewan, 1996; Rhodes et al. 1999) it was 
expected that a preference towards the veridical orientation of unfamiliar faces would 
be detected using the methodology described in the present chapter. This hypothesis 
was not supported by the empirical data reported here. Although a preference was 
detected for the veridical orientation of elderly male faces, this result is reported in the 
context  of  23  other  non-significant  statistical  tests,  suggesting  that  this  was  most 
probably a type one error.  
 
Given the apparent sensitivity of the experimental paradigm at detecting changes in 
affective  response  resulting  from  exposure  to  visual  form  (Zajonc,  2001)  and  the   133 
reported ability for such sensitivity to extend to prototypical examples of stimulus 
classes (Gordon & Holyoak, 1983; Rhodes et al. 2001) it is perhaps surprising that a 
veridical orientation bias was not detected. After all, previous research has shown that 
DA is cognitively represented (Simmons et al. 2004). 
 
One explanation for this discrepancy is simply that Mere Exposure Effects are very 
difficult to detect following naturalistic exposure. As only one example of this has 
been reported in the literature (Cutting, 2003) it is probable that the classical result is 
more  difficult  to  observe  when  the  experimental  procedure  does  not  include  a 
controlled  exposure  period.  It  is  considered  that  by  employing  a  methodology  in 
which  exposure  is  experimentally  induced  the  likelihood  of  observing  the 
hypothesised effect would be increased. Such an experimental method would require 
that participants were exposed to stimuli under controlled conditions so that the effect 
of exposure to DA on subsequent preference decisions (between veridical and mirror 
oriented faces) could be systematically explored. Exposure to varying levels of DA 
(i.e. the degree to which a face conforms to the structural norms, or doesn’t) may 
differentially effect subsequent preference towards normally oriented and reversed 
stimuli and using the classical MEE paradigm would enable such an investigation. 
 
The question of whether a preference for the veridical orientation can be induced by 
exposure  to  varying  proportions  of  DA  in  faces  is  however  a  deviation  from  the 
question posed in the present chapter. The question posed here was whether or not 
exposure to consistencies in the structural asymmetry of faces in everyday lives leads 
to  the  cognitive  representation  of  these  regularities.  Although  a  previous  study 
suggested  that  attractiveness  judgements  are  made  independently  of  DA  (thus 
providing  good  evidence  for  the  implicit  learning  and  subsequent  cognitive 
representation of the rules underlying structural asymmetry in faces, Simmons et al. 
2004), this remains the only demonstration of cognitive representation of this kind. 
For this reason further demonstrations of additional psychological consequences are 
necessary to support this hypothesis. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Perceptual asymmetry in face processing  
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Introduction 
 
To  this  point,  the  experiments  reported  have  investigated  the  manner  in  which 
physical asymmetry in faces is psychologically represented. However, there is another 
factor  in  addition  to  the  morphological  asymmetry  of  the  human  face  that  may 
contribute to asymmetrical cognitive representations of faces. It has been repeatedly 
shown that the perceptual importance of the two sides of the face is asymmetrically 
distributed (e.g. Wolff, 1933; Heller & Levy, 1981). It has further been shown, in free 
viewing  conditions,  that  the  left  side  of  the  face  is  more  commonly  attended  to 
(Yarbus, 1967; Butler et al. 2005), and information to the left of the face has been said 
to be more ‘diagnostic’ of a faces identity (Vinette et al. 2004).  
 
In studies using ‘chimeric faces’ it is typically found that chimeras made using the 
half of the face to the viewers left are judged as being more ‘like’ the person than are 
the right chimeric faces (e.g. Wolff, 1933). In addition, these images are thought to 
express more emotion (Heller & Levy, 1981; David, 1993; Ferber & Murray, 2005), 
and  are  more  readily  classified  by  gender  (Luh  et  al.  1991;  Butler  et  al.  2005). 
Although  there  is  some  debate  as  to  the  universality  of  this  bias  across  cultures 
(Gilbert & Balkan, 1973; Vaid & Singh, 1989), the overwhelming consensus is that 
face perception is prone to a powerful left perceptual bias, and this phenomenon is 
generally ascribed to a right hemisphere bias for face processing (De Renzi et al. 
1994; Dutta & Mandal, 2002; Hugdahl et al. 1993). 
 
Importantly, this perceptual bias exists independently of morphological asymmetry 
and contributes to asymmetrical mental representations (Brady et al. 2005). In the 
context of the questions posed so far in this thesis, the existence of this perceptual 
asymmetry  should  be  considered  an  important  point  of  discussion.  I  have 
demonstrated (under certain conditions) that participants are commonly sensitive to 
the mirror reversal of familiar faces, and have so far argued that this sensitivity stems 
from  the  representation  of  asymmetrical  facial  morphology.  However,  given  that 
faces are perceived asymmetrically it is likely that this bias interacts with the physical 
asymmetry of a face to produce asymmetrical cognitive representations.  
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In  this  final  empirical  chapter  two  experiments  are  reported  that  demonstrate  an 
increased  reliance  on  the  left  eye
1  relative  to  the  right  eye  in  a  face  recognition 
procedure. These experiments are designed essentially as a replication of a previous 
study investigating the manner in which faces are cognitively represented (Cooper & 
Wojan, 2000). In this paper, the researchers addressed the question of whether faces 
are represented using ‘coordinate’ or ‘categorical’ relations. In order to address this 
question they manipulated images of famous people by repositioning either one eye or 
both eyes and recorded the extent to which these alterations affected recognition (i.e. 
coordinate relations are more disrupted by moving both eyes, but relational is less 
compromised  by  this  manipulation).  Cooper  and  Wojan  (2000)  found  that  face 
recognition  was  detrimentally  affected  by  moving  both  eyes  but  not  one  eye  in 
isolation (see figure 6.1) and offered this finding as support for a ‘coordinate system’ 
of representation for face recognition.  
 
 
Figure 6.1: Reproduction of stimulus conditions as described by Cooper & Wojan (2000). 
 
In this chapter I demonstrate that the experimental design employed by Cooper and 
Wojan (2000), and the analysis they report, does not provide a valid test of their 
hypothesis.  The  analysis  overlooks  existing  literature  demonstrating  perceptual 
asymmetry in face perception. Given that a perceptual bias towards the left side of the 
viewed  face  has  been  repeatedly  demonstrated,  it  is  likely  that  the  null  effect  of 
moving one eye reported in their research disguises an asymmetrical pattern in their 
‘one-eye move’ condition. Data for left-eye displacement and right-eye displacement 
                                                 
1 Henceforth any reference to the ‘left eye’ refers to the eye appearing in the viewers left 
visual field   137 
are  not  reported  separately,  but  instead  both  contribute  to  the  overall  response 
measures associated with the ‘one eye’ move condition. This is considered to be a 
flaw  in  their  experimental  design  and  (in  light  of  the  existing  research  noted 
previously) one would expect that these two manipulations would differentially affect 
recognition. The two experiments reported in this chapter are designed to investigate 
whether the effect of displacing (experiment 14) and masking (experiment 15) the eye 
appearing in the viewers left visual field is more detrimental to face recognition than 
identical manipulations made to the eye displayed to the viewers right.  
 
Experiment 15: The effects of configural manipulations of 
facial features on face recognition: Left eye Vs Right eye 
 
Introduction 
 
The experiment reported here replicates the ‘one-eye move’ condition detailed by 
Cooper and Wojan (2000) however the procedure used here is slightly different. In 
the present experiment an alternative 2AFC name-verification paradigm is employed, 
one which has become established within our research group as a reliable way in 
which to test the congruency between internal representations and presented stimuli 
(see  Burton  et  al.  2005).  Whereas  the  presentation  of  the  face  precedes  the 
presentation of the name (test stimulus) in the task favoured by Cooper and Wojan, 
the  order  of  presentation  is  reversed  in  the  present  study,  with  ‘match/mismatch’ 
responses  being  made  to  the  face  images.  Given  that  a  robust  left-bias  has  been 
established  in  the  face  perception  literature  it  is  expected  that  face  recognition 
performance will be more detrimentally effected by moving the left eye of the test 
images (i.e. the eye on the left of the presented stimulus from the viewers perspective) 
relative to the effect of an identical manipulation made to the right eye. 
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Method 
 
Stimuli and materials 
 
Sixty  high-resolution  images  of  famous  celebrities  were  sourced  from  the  World 
Wide Web. Only images where the entire face was visible in a full-face portrait were 
used. Images were subject to a process of standardisation. Firstly the pupils were 
brought into alignment with the horizontal. The image was then cropped so as to leave 
only  the  head  and  the  area  directly  surrounding  the  head.  Finally  the  image  was 
converted to greyscale and resized to 190 X 285 pixels. The twenty images allocated 
to the ‘original’ condition were to receive no further treatment. Images allocated to 
the ‘left eye move’ condition were to have the eye appearing to the left of the image 
moved upwards by 1/20 of the total height of the image. Images assigned to the ‘right 
eye move’ condition were to have an identical manipulation performed on the eye 
appearing  in  the  right  side  of  the  stimulus.  Counterbalancing  ensured  that,  across 
subjects, the famous identities appeared an equal amount of times in each stimulus 
condition. 
 
The movement of the eye was  achieved using the Adobe Photoshop CS  software 
package. For each eye manipulation, an area around the eye was selected so as to 
include the eye, the eyebrow, and any wrinkles or shadows cast by the eye socket. 
This selection was then moved so that the centre of the pupil was moved upwards by 
a  distance  equivalent  to  5%  of  the  image,  and  so  that  its  horizontal  coordinate 
remained constant. The blank area left by this manipulation was filled in using the 
‘clone stamp’ tool, which has the ability to copy areas of the image and is useful for 
copying surfaces with gradual tonal variation such as skin. Examples of the three 
stimulus conditions are shown in figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.2: Examples of the three stimulus conditions in experiment 15. 
 
Design and Procedure 
 
32 participants from the undergraduate and postgraduate populations at the University 
of Glasgow took part in the study, and were either paid in cash or received course 
credit. A within subjects design was used. The experiment consisted of 120 trials, 
with twenty positive and twenty negative trials in each of the three conditions. The 
experiment  lasted  a  total  of  five  minutes.  Counterbalancing  ensured  that,  across 
subjects, the famous identities appeared an equal amount of times in each stimulus 
condition. 
 
 Each  trial  consisted  of  the  presentation  of  a  fixation  cross  for  750ms,  this  was 
followed by the presentation of a famous name for 1000ms, and then the presentation 
of a famous face (belonging to one of the three conditions) for 1000ms. Participants 
were asked to respond as quickly as possible after the onset of presentation of the face 
whether  it  was  the  person  named  previously,  and  the  presentation  terminated  on 
depression of the response keys.  For positive trials the name matched the face, and 
for negative trials the name and face were mismatched with a random identity of the 
same sex (taken from the experimental stimulus set). Responses and response times 
were recorded, and counterbalancing ensured that there was no effect of lateralisation 
of response (left key press/ right key press).   140 
 
Stimuli were presented on a black background. Names were presented in bold, white, 
32-point  typeface.  Face  images  measured  190  X  285  pixels  and  were  centrally 
presented on a monitor display measuring 1152 by 864 pixels. Each participant was 
instructed to maintain fixation in the middle of the screen, to make their responses as 
quickly and accurately as possible and warned that the faces had been distorted in 
various  ways.  Participants  were  encouraged  not  to  focus  on  these  distortions  but 
instead to concentrate on recognising the face as quickly as possible. 
 
Results 
 
Error rates are calculated from positive trials only (i.e. when the face matched the 
preceding name). Please note that “right eye moved” refers to the eye appearing on 
the right of the viewed image. 
 
Figure 6.3: NB Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals which were calculated using the 
method described by Loftus & Masson (1994). 
 
A  one  factor  ANOVA  was  performed  on  subjects  mean  error  rates  for  the  three 
experimental conditions.  The main effect of moving the eye was found to be of 
statistical significance [F(1,31)=4.823; p<0.05]. Subsequent post-hoc analysis by way 
of a Tukey’s HSD test showed significant differences between left eye move and right   141 
eye move (p<0.05) and between left eye move and original images (p<0.05).  The 
difference  between  right  eye  move  and  original  conditions  was  not  found  to  be 
significant. 
 
Figure 6.4: NB Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals which were calculated using the 
method described by Loftus & Masson (1994). 
 
A  one  factor  ANOVA  showed  no  significant  main  effect  of  eye  movement  on 
response latency [F(1,32)=2.215; p=.118]. Post-hoc Tukey’s HSD tests showed no 
significant effects between the three levels of eye movement.  
 
Discussion 
 
As predicted, the experimental manipulations of moving the left and right eyes of the 
face stimuli had different effects on recognition performance. Whereas moving the 
left  eye  was  detrimental  to  recognition,  moving  the  right  eye  had  no  effect  on 
participants’ response accuracy. In light of this demonstration, Cooper and Wojan’s 
decision to report data from their ‘one-eye’ move condition as an aggregation of these 
two  conditions  would  appear  unjustified.  In  addition,  this  data  provides  a  further 
demonstration of perceptual asymmetry in face processing. 
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The data reported here show that moving the right eye to a new vertical position has 
no  effect  on  recognition  performance.  This  finding  is  somewhat  surprising  as  the 
stimulus produced by this manipulation is plainly altered in both first and second 
order configuration (see Maurer et al. 2002). However, similar results have previously 
been  reported  in  this  thesis.  Unfamiliar  face  matching  is  performed  equally  well 
whether half faces or whole faces are displayed (experiment 1) and showing half faces 
results in analogous recognition accuracy when compared to whole-face presentation. 
These results are consistent with the notion that face recognition proceeds with equal 
success when participants are presented with just half of a familiar face.  
 
It  is  not  possible  to  argue  that  the  processing  of  faces  is  entirely  unhindered  by 
removing or distorting one side of the face however. For instance, in experiment five 
it was demonstrated that removing either the left or right sides of the face increases 
response  latency  in  a  name  verification  decision,  and  in  the  present  experiment 
recognition accuracy was detrimentally affected by moving the left eye. Therefore, 
the  integrity  of  bilaterally  distributed  information  in  familiar  faces  contributes  to 
optimal conditions for recognition.   
 
There exists a clear inconsistency between the results reported here and the findings 
of experiment five however. Whereas there was not found to be any asymmetry in the 
effect of removing information to the left and right of the meridian in experiment five, 
in the present experiment moving the left eye worsened performance, but moving the 
right eye did not. The apparent incongruence of these two findings appears to suggest 
that the asymmetrical effects reported in this experiment are a result of the featural 
configuration being altered, as the same effect is not produced when half of the face is 
removed entirely. It is possible for instance that the left eye plays an important role in 
describing the configural relationships between the facial features, but that the right 
eye is not as heavily implicated in this process. As removing visual information does 
not  change  configural  relations  between  the  perceived  facial  elements,  this  might 
explain why no behavioural asymmetry was reported in experiment five.  
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Experiment 16: The effects of masking the left eye and the 
right eye on recognition performance 
 
Introduction 
 
This  experiment  was  aimed  at  replicating  the  pattern  of  results  reported  in  the 
previous experiment by using a different stimulus manipulation. Whereas the eyes 
were moved in the previous experiment to produce a different configuration of facial 
features, in this experiment the eyes were instead occluded.  Occlusion does not alter 
the relationships between the features and therefore it is hoped that this will provide a 
test  of  whether  the  asymmetric  effects  reported  in  the  previous  experiment  are 
restricted to positional alteration or whether similar effects are observed when the 
visual information is simply removed.  
 
Method 
 
Stimuli and materials 
 
The same sixty high-resolution images of famous celebrities that were used in the 
previous  experiment  were  used  here,  and  these  were  subjected  to  the  process  of 
standardisation  reported  previously.  The  twenty  images  allocated  to  the  ‘original’ 
condition  received  no  further  treatment.  Images  allocated  to  the  ‘left  eye  mask’ 
condition had the eye appearing to the left of the image masked by a solid black 
rectangle. The rectangle varied slightly in size from image to image, as it was sized so 
as to cover the area of the face containing the eye, the area directly around the eye, 
and the eyebrow. Images assigned to the ‘right eye erase’ condition were subjected to 
an identical manipulation performed on the eye appearing in the right side of the 
stimulus. Examples of the stimulus conditions are provided in Figure 6.5.  
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Design and procedure 
 
24 participants from the undergraduate and postgraduate populations at the University 
of Glasgow took part in the study, and were either paid in cash or received course 
credit. A within subjects design was used. The experiment consisted of 120 trials, 
with twenty positive and twenty negative trials in each of the three conditions. The 
experiment  lasted  a  total  of  five  minutes.  Counterbalancing  ensured  that,  across 
subjects, the famous identities appeared an equal amount of times in each stimulus 
condition. 
 
 Each  trial  consisted  of  the  presentation  of  a  fixation  cross  for  750ms,  this  was 
followed by the presentation of a famous name for 1000ms, and then the presentation 
of a famous face (belonging to one of the three conditions) for 1000ms. Participants 
were asked to respond as quickly as possible after the onset of presentation of the face 
as to whether it was the person named previously, and the presentation terminated on 
depression of the response keys.  
 
 
Figure 6.5: Examples of the three stimulus conditions in experiment 16. 
 
For positive trials the name matched the face, and for negative trials the name and 
face  were  mismatched  with  a  random  identity  of  the  same  sex  (taken  from  the 
experimental  stimulus  set).  Responses  and  response  times  were  recorded,  and 
counterbalancing ensured that there was no effect of response lateralisation.   145 
Stimuli were presented on a black background. Names were presented in bold, white, 
32-point. Face images measured 190 X 285 pixels and were presented centrally on a 
monitor display measuring 1152 by 864 pixels. Each participant was instructed to 
maintain fixation in the middle of the screen, to make their responses as quickly and 
accurately as possible and warned that the faces had been distorted in various ways. 
Participants  were  encouraged  not  to  focus  on  these  distortions  but  instead  to 
concentrate on recognising the face as quickly as possible. 
 
Results 
 
Error rates are calculated from positive trials only (i.e. when the face matched the 
preceding name). Please note that “right eye moved” refers to the eye appearing on 
the right of the viewed image. 
 
Figure 6.6: NB Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals which were calculated using the 
method described by Loftus & Masson (1994). 
 
A  one  factor  ANOVA  was  performed  on  subjects  mean  error  rates  for  the  three 
experimental  conditions.    The  main  effect  of  masking  the  eye  was  found  to  be 
unreliable [F(1,23)=0.320; p>0.05]. 
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Figure 6.7: NB Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals which were calculated using the 
method described by Loftus & Masson (1994). 
 
Subjects  median  response  latencies  for  the  three  experimental  conditions  were 
subjected  to  a  one  factor  ANOVA,  which  showed  a  reliable  main  effect  of  eye 
masking [F(1,23)=7.942; p<0.01]. A Tukey post-hoc analysis showed a significant 
difference between the left eye mask and the original image conditions (p<0.001), but 
no other reliable differences were detected. 
 
Discussion 
 
In  the  experiment  reported  above  there  was  found  to  be  no  difference  between 
accuracy performance after removing left and right eye information from familiar 
faces. The effect of removing the left eye produced a significant increase in reaction 
time however, with responses being significantly slower in this condition relative to 
when  no  information  was  removed.  The  difference  of  28ms  between  this 
manipulation and an identical treatment to the opposite side of the image was not 
significant however. This is in contrast to the previous experiment, where recognition 
was shown to be significantly more error-prone towards stimuli where the left eye had 
been moved relative to images in which the right eye had been displaced.     147 
 
It  is  considered  that  this  difference  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  featural 
configuration was not altered in the present experiment. If one assumes that the first 
feature participants commonly look at in the face is the left eye (e.g. Gallois et al. 
1989), then it can be reasonably anticipated that this initial orientation would produce 
different  perceptual  effects  in  the  two  experiments  reported  in  this  chapter.  In 
experiment 15, when the left eye has been moved, our perception of the configural 
relations becomes grossly altered (i.e. the absolute distance and angular relationships 
between the left eye and every other feature are altered), and recognition is therefore 
detrimentally affected. However, when we look at this eye and it is the right eye that 
has been moved, only the inter-ocular relationship is compromised (relative to the 
first fixation) and therefore recognition is largely unaffected. 
 
In the present experiment our tendency is also to look at the left eye first and to judge 
the face relative to this reference point, however as no visual information exists in this 
location our attention is merely shifted towards a more informative region, but our 
perception  of  the  face  remains  uncompromised.  There  exists  no  misleading 
information in this location, just no information at all, and therefore this manipulation 
is  less  disruptive  towards  recognition.  This  reasoning  explains  why  the  only 
manipulation (in experiments 4, 15 and 16) that had a detrimental effect on accuracy 
was relocation of the left eye in experiment 15, and why reaction time data in the 
present  experiment  is  suggestive  of  a  tendency  for  left  eye  occlusion  to  be  more 
disruptive than right eye occlusion (i.e. this reflects the time taken to shift attention 
towards more informative regions). 
 
Chapter Summary 
 
It  has  previously  been  demonstrated  that  memory  representations  of  faces  are 
asymmetric with respect to the prominence of the facial hemispheres (Brady et al. 
2005),  and  one  might  expect  this  given  that  encoding  is  influenced  by  a  robust 
leftward bias. It is not possible to confirm however, based on the data reported in this 
chapter, whether the asymmetric effect of moving the left and right eyes is reflective 
of an asymmetric representation of leftward information in memory, or whether it   148 
merely shows that when viewing a face we initially look to the left. Instead, it is 
considered that the data reported here demonstrate an interaction between a leftward 
perceptual bias characteristic of face processing and the manner in which familiar 
faces are represented in memory. 
 
It has been repeatedly demonstrated that faces are processed in a manner that affords 
particular  salience  to  the  configuration  of  facial  features  (e.g.  Yin,  1969). 
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that manipulating these spatial relationships 
can disrupt face recognition and that we are extremely sensitive to such alterations 
(Haig, 1984), especially when the internal features are displaced (Hosie et al. 1988). 
In this chapter I have demonstrated that the disruption caused by manipulating the 
spatial relationships of familiar faces varies across the left and right sides of the face. 
That the effect of spatial displacement does not conform to the bilateral symmetry 
common  to  the  structure  of  faces  suggests  that  there  exists  an  asymmetry  in  the 
manner  in  which  faces  are  perceived  by  the  visual  system,  and  this  finding is  in 
agreement  with  previous  research  (e.g.  Heller  &  Levy,  1981;  Wolff,  1933).  It  is 
commonly  accepted  that  this  asymmetry  is  most  likely  to  be  caused  by  the 
asymmetric distribution of the face processing across the cerebral hemispheres (e.g. 
Vinette et al. 2004; Butler et al. 2005). 
 
It is of interest however that this perceptual asymmetry was only apparent in one of 
the two experiments reported in this chapter. Occlusion, it would appear, does not 
affect  the  accuracy  with  which  we  identify familiar  faces.  Displacement  of  facial 
features does however cause poorer recognition performance, but it would appear that 
certain displacements are more disruptive than others. The stimulus manipulations 
used in experiment 15 were chosen because they could be similarly applied to the 
right  and  left  sides  of  the face  without  compromising  the  appearance  of  any  one 
feature. Any detrimental effect can therefore be attributed to the resultant alteration of 
spatial  relationships  between  facial  features.  As  feature  displacement  was  only 
detrimental to performance when the left eye was moved, it is argued that the left eye 
is more heavily implicated in configural processing than the right eye. 
 
In discussing the results of experiment 15 and 16 it was proposed that this asymmetry 
could be explained by the fact that the left eye is more commonly fixated than the   149 
right (e.g. Yarbus, 1967). However it is not certain that this effect relies on eye-
movements per se. On the basis of the data reported here it is equally plausible that 
asymmetry in the memory representations of configural relationships is responsible 
for  the  observed  effects.  It  has  been  shown  that  the  leftward  perceptual  bias 
demonstrated in the perception of chimeric faces exists even in the absence of eye 
movements  (Butler  &  Harvey,  2005;  David,  1993),  and  it  is  possible  that  the 
perceptual asymmetry reported here may occur independently of eye movements also.  
 
This is considered to be an interesting research question that could be addressed quite 
simply. If cognitive representations of faces contain more information describing the 
left side of the face than the right side, then it would be expected that an asymmetric 
effect would still be observed at presentation times of less than 100ms. This question 
could be pursued in future research, however the data are not reported here. It is likely 
that  asymmetry  would  still  be  observed,  as  asymmetric  representations  are 
presumably  generated  and  maintained  by  the  asymmetric  scanning  strategy 
characteristic of face perception.  
 
Given  that  the  data  reported  here  is  suggestive  of  a  memory  representation  (or 
encoding strategy) that promotes an asymmetric reliance on the left eye relative to the 
right,  it  would  appear  that  cognitive  representations  of  faces  are  necessarily 
asymmetric. Furthermore, it would appear that the asymmetry in these representations 
is a product of both physical and perceptual asymmetries. As perceptual asymmetries 
proceed  independently  of  physical  asymmetry  however  (Brady  et  al.  2005),  it  is 
unlikely that this contributes towards the sensitivity to reversal reported in chapters 2 
and 3. Rather, it would appear that perceptual asymmetry results from an automatic 
bias  that  is  driven  by  underlying  functional  asymmetry  and  therefore  should  not 
influence the detection (implicit or otherwise) of a mirror reversed face.  
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Chapter 7 
 
General Discussion 
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The first experiment reported in this thesis demonstrated that when participants are 
presented with two opposite halves of an unfamiliar face they commonly report them 
as belonging to two different people. Having established that the asymmetry in a face 
is sufficient in degree to produce such an effect, the remainder of the thesis (excluding 
chapter  6)  concentrated  on  trying  to  detect  cognitive  effects  produced  by  mirror 
reversing faces. It was considered that this approach would allow conclusions to be 
drawn  regarding  the  importance  of  facial  asymmetry  in  familiar  face  recognition. 
However, the results reported in the experimental chapters indicate that any cognitive 
effects  are  largely  undetectable  and  that  when  such  effects  are  detected  they  are 
commonly slight. 
 
Invariance  to  mirror  reversal  is  commonly  thought  to  facilitate  object  recognition 
despite changes in viewpoint (Vetter et al. 1994) and this may also be true for face 
recognition  (Troje  &  Bülthoff,  1998).  Faces  can  be  recognised  after  just  one 
presentation even when the face is subjected to large changes in orientation (e.g. Troje 
& Bülthoff, 1996) and therefore recognition systems would appear to be relatively 
robust to changes in viewpoint. Troje and Bülthoff (1998) present data that suggests a 
form  of  ‘cognitive  mirror  reversal’  supports  this  ability.  Recognition  accuracy  of 
three-quarter views of faces was found to be superior when a mirror reversal of this 
view was presented at test compared with when the opposite three-quarter angle was 
shown (see figure 7.1). This data suggests that mirror approximations of three-quarter 
views are generated by perceptual systems and  that identity judgements are made 
based on these representations when a face is originally encountered in the opposite 
angle.  
 
Although recognition performance for mirror reversed images was worse than when 
tested with the original orientation of study images, this difference was slight, and in 
one of the experiments Troje and Bülthoff (1998) report this difference to be non-
significant. Thus, the implications of their findings are twofold. Firstly, this study 
shows that generalisation across viewpoint (for a given image of an unfamiliar face) is 
more dependent on an image based transformation than any sophisticated abstraction 
of this information. Furthermore, it demonstrates that this image-based transformation 
occurs  without  significant  loss  of  information  and  without  any  great  degree  of 
cognitive effort.   152 
 
Figure 7.1: An illustration of Troje & Bülthoff’s (1998) finding. The study face (left) was 
recognised more reliably when its mirror image (right) was presented at test, compared with 
when  the  opposite  three  quarter  view  was  presented  (centre).  NB  Troje  &  Bülthoff  used 
computer-generated stimuli in their experiment. 
 
This result is reflective of data reported in this thesis. It would appear likely from the 
data reported here and from previous research (e.g. Cooper et al. 2002), that face 
recognition is unaffected by mirror reversal. Although this invariance has previously 
been  demonstrated  in  object  recognition  (Biedermann  &  Cooper,  1992),  it  was 
anticipated that this same result would not be found when using faces as stimuli. It 
was considered that memory for the visual form of faces would be represented in a 
manner which retained the structural asymmetry of a face as this would be necessary 
for the perceptual system to successfully match the incoming stimulus to a stored 
representation. In general, this assumption was not supported by the data reported in 
this thesis and these null effects require explanation in this final chapter. 
 
As early as experiment two there was a strong indication that sensitivity to mirror 
reversal of faces would be difficult to detect behaviourally. In this experiment it was 
reported that mirror reversing one image in a face pair had no effect on performance 
in an unfamiliar face matching procedure. As it had been previously confirmed that 
the  two  halves  of  a  face  were  sufficiently  asymmetric  to  produce  a  tendency  for 
subjects  to  report  these  stimuli  as  representing  two  separate  identities,  this  data 
suggests that face processing is subject to a process of ‘mirror normalisation’ prior to 
identification.  As  both  accuracy  and  response  time  were  unaffected  by  this 
manipulation it appeared likely that performance on this task was mediated by two 
forms  of  internal  representation:  one  which  represents  the  perceived  face  in  its 
original orientation and one which represents it in its mirror reversed orientation. 
   153 
The invariance to mirror orientation demonstrated in experiment two was replicated a 
number of times in chapter three using familiar faces as stimuli. Recognition accuracy 
was found to be unaffected by mirror reversal in experiments four, five, six and seven. 
Furthermore in three of these experiments the time taken to recognise a familiar face 
in its mirror orientation was not significantly slower than the time taken to recognise 
the same face in its original orientation. In combination these results provide strong 
evidence that face recognition processes depend upon a form of representation that is 
tolerant to mirror reversal. Given that the effect of mirror reversal on face recognition 
would appear negligible, it is of value to speculate as to why this may be, and also to 
consider what this result tells us about the nature of representations underpinning face 
recognition.    
 
It has been previously hypothesised that the visual system represents stimuli in both 
their  original  and  mirror  reversed  orientation  by  the  left  and  right  hemispheres 
respectively (Orton, 1925). Orton proposed this theory as an explanation for ‘mirror 
confusion’, which he argued was a probable cause of reading disorders. That language 
processing is highly lateralised in the brain is offered as support for this hypothesis, 
which  predicts  that  highly  lateralised  functions  allow  for  less  ambiguous 
representation of orientation. As reading is dependent upon a uni-directional parsing 
strategy,  representation  of  mirror  orientations  should  cause  disruption,  and  Orton 
proposed  that  dyslexia  is  caused  by  sub-normal  development  of  left-hemisphere 
specialisation  (Orton,  1928).  This  theory  was  further  developed  by  Corballis  and 
Beale (1976) who also suggested that the two hemispheres represent visual stimuli as 
mirror  symmetric  representations.  According  to  their  theory  however,  this 
organisation  is  not  a  product  of  the  initial  representation  of  visual  stimuli  (they 
conceded that the visual  system is not  structured in such a way as to enable this 
phenomenon) but instead is created by the nature of neural connections between the 
hemispheres, which connect symmetrical points.  
 
Although these theories have an intuitive appeal, they have very little evidence to 
support them. As Gross and Bornstein (1978) point out, severe left-right confusion is 
most commonly caused by damage to the left-hemisphere only (Critchley, 1953). In 
addition, when stimuli are presented to one hemisphere in isolation, images are not 
perceived as being identical to their mirror reversal when this stimulus is presented to   154 
the opposite hemisphere (Bradshaw et al. 1973). Further studies have demonstrated 
this result in monkeys with  severed corpus callosum (Hamilton & Tieman, 1973; 
Lehman & Spencer, 1973), and these results combine to disprove both Ortons (1925) 
and Corballis and Beales’ (1976) hypotheses. 
 
Gross and Bormstein (1978) argue convincingly that the tendency for mirror images 
to be treated as equivalent stimuli does not stem from the symmetrical organisation of 
the nervous system but instead evolved to complement the organisation of our visual 
environment. Mirror images, they contest, are treated as equivalent because often in 
the  natural  world  they  represent  opposite  views  of  the  same  subject.  Vertebrates 
generally  are  bilaterally  symmetric  and  therefore  mirror  images  accurately 
approximate to the opposite profile view of an animal. This view is advocated, and 
empirically  supported,  in  the  research  of Troje and  Bülthoff (1998).  Furthermore, 
more recent studies have provided a neurological basis for this hypothesis, showing 
that  neurons  in  the  inferotemporal  cortex  of  monkeys  generalise  mirror  images 
(Baylis & Driver, 2001; Rollenhagen and Olson, 2000). 
 
If the brain generalises mirror images, this may cause problems for face recognition. 
A  point  that  has  been  emphasised  in  this  thesis  is  that  asymmetry  in  faces  is 
diagnostic  of  identity,  and  this  is  evidenced  by  the  discriminatory  power  of  this 
information  (e.g.  Burke  &  Healey,  1993)  in  addition  to  the  usefulness  of  this 
biometric in automatic face recognition systems (e.g. Mitra et al. 2007). Furthermore, 
an implicit assumption has been that for a face to be recognised the perceived face 
must be successfully matched to some form of stored representation. To ascertain 
whether or not the asymmetry of a face is retained in this stored representation was 
the principal concern of the experiments reported in this thesis.  
 
The way in which the mind creates representations of familiar faces is an issue that 
has received a surprisingly small amount of attention. Though the nature of these 
representations is often probed by researchers, relatively little time has been spent 
trying  to  understand  the  way  in  which  these  representations  are  derived  from 
experience.  Burton  et  al  (2005)  provide  a  rare  attempt  to  explain  this  process, 
proposing that face recognition is underpinned by an ‘average’ representation of the 
visual exposure that an individual receives. These representations are said to provide a   155 
more reliable basis for recognition as they negate sources of information present in 
images  that  are  unimportant  for  the  recognition  process  (e.g.  lighting  direction).  
Furthermore average images of faces have been shown to improve face recognition in 
humans relative to individual ‘naturalistic’ images (Burton et al. 2005), and recently 
have been shown to enable perfect performance in an automatic recognition system 
(Jenkins & Burton, 2008). Given that a form of object constancy that allows mirror 
reversed images of faces to be treated as equivalent would appear to underpin face 
processing, it is interesting to speculate as to how this might  affect such internal 
representations.  
 
 
Figure 7.2: The averaging technique described by Burton et al (2005) was applied to images 
of Harrison Ford in their veridical (left) and reversed (right) orientations. The image in the 
middle shows the symmetrical image generated by averaging these representations together.  
 
Should  both  veridical  and  mirror  reversed  orientations  of  faces  contribute  to  the 
memory of a face, then according to Burton et al (2005) the resultant representation 
should  be  symmetrical  (Figure  7.2,  centre  image).  Intuitively  speaking,  this 
representation does not look very much like Harrison Ford as losing the asymmetries 
present in the face would appear to have removed aspects of the face that describe his 
appearance (e.g. his crooked nose and lopsided smirk). Although the hypothesis has 
not been tested it would seem highly likely that this stimulus would be recognised less 
well  by  both  humans  and  computers  than  the  original  asymmetric  stimulus.  In 
experiment seven I demonstrated that ‘face averages’ shown in reversed orientation   156 
are recognised just as quickly as when they are presented in the original orientation. It 
is likely that this result is reflective of some normalisation process that allows the 
perceived asymmetries to be reversed as opposed to the existence of a representation 
that is a composite of both orientations. 
 
Although mirror image generalisation is a ubiquitous phenomenon, the tendency to 
treat mirror images as equivalent is rarely absolute. For instance, Rollenhagen and 
Olsen (2000) found that neurons responded more similarly to lateral mirror images 
than to vertical mirror images, however these neurons were still less responsive to 
mirror images than to identical images. In addition, Troje and Bülthoff (1997) found 
that in two memory experiments, recognition of a face was superior when an identical 
image was presented at test compared to when a mirror reversed copy was presented 
in  the  test  phase  (though  this  difference  was  only  significant  in  one  of  the 
experiments).  Indeed,  the  complete  inability  to  discriminate  between  two 
simultaneously  presented  mirror  images  is  only  found  in  rare  instances  of 
neurological damage (e.g. Davidoff & Warrington, 2001). It is likely therefore that 
although recognition systems are tolerant to lateral reversal, they still retain the ability 
to separate representations of the veridical and reversed orientations, thus enabling the 
representation of facial asymmetry. 
 
In general, the results of the experiments carried out in this thesis demonstrate that 
despite  an  apparent  invariance  to  lateral  orientation  in  face  recognition,  facial 
asymmetry is to some degree represented in memory. Though the observed sensitivity 
to  mirror  reversal  of  familiar  faces  was  typically  slight,  there  are  a  number  of 
instances  in  which  this  sensitivity  was  statistically  significant.  In  experiment  4 
recognition  time  was  found  to  be  slower  for  reversed  relative  to  veridical 
presentations  of  famous  faces.  Though  this  effect  was  not  replicated  in  two 
subsequent experiments (experiments 5 and 6), responses made to reversed images in 
these experiments were on average marginally slower than the responses made to 
veridically oriented stimuli. Furthermore, in the same chapter reversal was found to 
impede memory performance for previously unfamiliar faces, a result that replicated 
previous research (McKelvie, 1983). 
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That  cognitive  processes  are  impeded  by  the reversal  of  a  face  demonstrates  that 
facial asymmetry is retained in memory. In chapter four this finding was confirmed 
using a 2AFC procedure whereby participants were required to identify the real-world 
orientation  of  a  familiar  face  (i.e.  to  discriminate  it  from  its  mirror-image).  In 
accordance with a previous report (Rhodes, 1986), participants could perform this 
task, though performance was only marginally superior to chance (experiments 10, 11 
and  12)  and  performance  on  mirror  discrimination  was  facilitated  by  increasing 
familiarity (experiment 12).  Thus, the marginal cognitive sensitivity detected in the 
previous chapter was replicated in chapter four. From this data it is clear that explicit 
knowledge of veridical orientation is very difficult to recall, and performance on this 
task is poorer than in the ‘likeness’ judgements used by Rhodes (1986). It is possible 
that this difference reflects the implicit nature of memory for lateral orientation, with 
Rhodes’ measure being more sensitive to this form of implicit representation.  
 
Though  the  data  reported  here,  in  conjunction  with  previous  research,  serves  to 
confirm that facial asymmetry is represented in memory, it is perplexing why effects 
of  mirror  reversal  are  found  in  some  cases  but  not  others.  As  has  already  been 
discussed, these effects are likely to be constrained by the fact that the visual system 
readily  generalises  mirror  images.  Furthermore, the  fact  that  faces  display  a  high 
degree of symmetry means that mirror reflections differ only in small ways from the 
original  stimulus,  and  therefore  only  slight  effects  of  this  manipulation  could 
realistically  have  been  predicted.  Indeed,  that  any  effects  of  reversal  have  been 
detected in this thesis is testament to the accuracy with which spatial relationships on 
the human face are represented, and I have demonstrated that this accuracy improves 
with exposure to a face (experiment 12). 
 
 Although the lack of a consistent effect across experiments may simply reflect the 
slightness of the reversal effect, it is considered that some attempt should be made to 
explain  why  reversal  did  not  produce  behavioural  effects  in  all  the  paradigms 
employed. The stimulus conditions used in experiment seven provide an example of a 
case in which the reversal effect was detected and also an example of a case in which 
it was not. When participants were tested using the same image that they had been 
exposed to in the learning phase the proportion of images correctly identified was 
unaffected by mirror reversal of the test stimulus. However, when different images of   158 
the same identity were used across learning and test, participants recalled significantly 
less mirror reversed test images than non-reversed images. This difference is evidence 
that the asymmetry in a face has been reliably represented by cognitive systems and 
that this asymmetry exists within a representation that enables face recognition to 
occur  despite  intervening  image-level  variation.  However,  just  why  there  was  no 
detectable effect of mirror reversal on the recollection of images when participants 
were tested using the same images remains unclear.   
 
As has already been discussed in chapter three, the most likely explanation for the 
interaction between test image and mirror reversal is that the same image memory test 
was too easy for the subtle effect of reversal to be detected. Such an explanation 
implies that performance on the same image memory task had reached ceiling level, 
however the support for this assertion is rather weak. Indeed, only two out of the 
twenty-two  participants  in  the  ‘same  image’  test  condition  correctly  recalled  all 
twenty of the learnt images. Another possible explanation is that the visual system 
supports two separate forms of representations, one that is invariant to mirror reversal, 
and another that is not. The representation of image-level ‘surface’ characteristics can 
be separated from a more abstract form of object representation (Hitch, Brandimonte 
& Walker, 1995) and if this framework can be equally applied to memory for faces 
then it could be that somewhere in the abstractive process lateral orientation becomes 
specified.  
 
That separate forms of internal representation can be differentially sensitive to the 
lateral orientation of objects has previously been demonstrated by Kosslyn and Rabin 
(1999). In this study participants either selected the correct left-right orientation of a 
coin from a pair (2AFC), or had to form a mental image before performing this task. 
Kosslyn and Rabin (1999) report that in the 2AFC procedure performance was not 
significantly superior to chance, but when using the imagery method 22 out of 30 
participants correctly recalled the orientation of the coin head. However, this result 
was only obtained when participants were instructed to imagine a specific coin and 
not when asked to bring to mind a general representation of a coin. In explaining their 
findings, Kosslyn and Rabin (1999) argue that the availability of the mirror reversals 
to perceptual systems in the 2AFC task make the task more difficult but that this 
difficulty could be remedied by recalling the form of a coin form memory prior to   159 
being presented with the two alternatives. Long-term memory representations, they 
contend,  represent  left-right  orientation,  but  the  process  that  matches  a  perceived 
object to these representations is invariant to reflection. 
 
This dissociation may provide a resolution to an inconsistency between the findings 
reported in experiment four of this thesis and previous published research (Brooks et 
al. 2002). The name verification paradigms used in these two experiments are almost 
identical, however they generated different results. In experiment four of this thesis 
mirror reversal of a face was found to significantly increase response latency when 
verifying that this face belonged to the person whose name the participant had just 
previously seen. Brooks et al (2002) presented the stimuli in the opposite order (i.e. a 
face in either veridical or reversed orientation was presented prior to presentation of a 
name) and found that there was no effect of reversal. It could be that the design 
employed in the present thesis encouraged participants to recall the face from long-
term memory more than the stimulus order used in the previous study, and therefore 
engaged processes that are sensitive to lateral orientation. This same methodological 
difference may also account for why there were no reported differences in recognition 
responses between moving the left eye and right eye in Cooper and Wojan (2000), yet 
these differences were detected in experiments 15 and 16.  
 
Further research could attempt to determine whether the effect of mirror reversal is 
modulated by task difficulty, or by the degree to which a given representation can be 
said to be ‘abstract’ (e.g. see experiment 7). Also, in light of the study by Kosslyn and 
Rabin  (1999),  the  effect  of  imagery  on  the  ability  to  correctly  identify  left-right 
orientation should be investigated. If the use of imagery improves performance on the 
coin-head orientation task it may be that it also can improve performance in the 2AFC 
procedure  used  in  chapter  four.  Indeed,  a  dissociation  between  perceptual  and 
imagery  ability  has  been  demonstrated  in  prosopagnostic  patients  (Michelon  & 
Biedermann, 2002), and this raises the possibility that separate mechanisms mediate 
performance  on  these  two  types  of  task.  Whether  or  not  imagery  can  improve 
performance on mirror discrimination task is an empirical question that could also be 
addressed using the paradigm described in chapter 5 to ascertain whether the ‘general 
schema’ of a face is asymmetrical. 
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The  course  of  investigation  followed  in  this  thesis  was  designed  to  improve 
understanding of the way in which familiar faces are cognitively represented. Slight 
effects of mirror reversal were observed in a number of face processing tasks and 
sensitivity to the lateral orientation of familiar faces was therefore established. In line 
with  previous  research  (e.g.  Mita  et  al.,  1977;  Rhodes,  1986;  McKelvie,  1983; 
Brédart, 2003), this finding shows that the mind represents faces in a detailed enough 
manner  to  allow  subtle  structural  asymmetries  to  be  represented.    Given  that  the 
effects of reversal were most probably obscured by a general tendency for mirror 
reversals to be treated as equivalent, in addition to the high volume of redundant 
information present in faces in the task of recognition (e.g. Vinnete et al. 2004), it is 
likely that the structural asymmetry of familiar faces is coded in memory in a fairly 
robust manner.   
 
It has previously been proposed that mechanisms responsible for detecting symmetry 
interact  with  higher-level  cognitive  processes  responsible  for  face  recognition 
(Rhodes et al. 2005). The contribution of symmetry detection mechanisms to face 
processing,  in  addition  to  the  close  proximity  of  cortical  areas  supporting  these 
functions  (Chen  et  al.  2007),  is  assumed  to  enable  reliable  preferences  for 
symmetrical faces (Little & Jones, 2006). In light of the findings reported in this 
thesis however, it remains possible that brain mechanisms responsible for symmetry 
processing  may  also  support  face  recognition.  Further  research  manipulating  the 
degree  of  asymmetry  in  faces  would  help  to  clarify  the  contribution  of  facial 
asymmetry to face recognition.  
 
Rhodes  (1986)  argues  that  cognitive  sensitivity  to  the  reversal  of  familiar  faces 
implicates  a  configural  coding  strategy  in  face  memory  and  sensitivity  to  this 
manipulation has been demonstrated on a number of occasions in this thesis. Whether 
this  implies  that  familiar  faces  are  stored  in  memory  primarily  in  terms  of  the 
configural  relations  between  features  remains  uncertain  however.  Just  because 
asymmetry can be expressed as a holistic property of the configural relations of a face 
doesn’t mean that perceptual sensitivity to reversal of this information demonstrates 
that faces are described configurally in memory. As has already been discussed in 
chapter one, definitions of ‘configural’ and ‘featural’ representation are inherently 
circular, however mirror orientation of face images can clearly be disambiguated by   161 
both configural and featural information (Harrison Ford’s crooked nose provides an 
example of the latter possibility).  
 
Given the high degree of redundant information in the task of recognising faces, it is 
not possible to conclude whether ‘reversal effects’ result from an underlying system 
that represents faces as a product of their ‘configuration’ or as a sum of the facial 
features. However, the data reported in chapter 6 would suggest that the configuration 
of facial features forms at least part of this representation, and that the contribution of 
inter-featural  relations  to  the  overall  representation  of  a  face  is  not  uniformly 
distributed.  The  salience  of  relational  metrics  would  appear  to  be  asymmetrically 
distributed,  with  the  eye  to  the  left  of  fixation  being  more  heavily  implicated  in 
configural processing.  
 
The effects of mirror reversal reported in this thesis are slight in comparison to the 
profound  decrement  in  face  recognition  performance  that  result  from  vertical 
inversion (e.g. Yin, 1969). This difference can be explained in terms of the relative 
instability  of  the  left-right  axis  compared  with  the  up-down  axis  in  the  visual 
environment as well as in neuronal processing (e.g. Davidoff & Warrington, 2001). 
Furthermore,  because  first-order  featural  relations  are  preserved  in  mirror 
transformation,  perceptual  processes  developed  for  parsing  facial  stimuli  are  not 
interrupted as severely by this manipulation. It was hypothesised that mirror reversal 
would nonetheless disrupt recognition processes because the second-order relations 
pertaining to identity are altered. The disruption caused by this transformation was 
however found to be slight, and participants typically find it extremely difficult to 
identify the correct left-right orientation of a face.  
 
Finally, the data reported here serves to highlight the uniqueness of the inversion 
effect. Global transformation of face stimuli by stretching along the x-axis and y-axis 
does not impair face recognition performance (Hole et al. 2002). As has been shown 
here, neither does reflection across the y-axis. Reflection across the x-axis severely 
impairs face processing however, but this effect is mediated by the angle of rotation. 
It would appear therefore that uni-dimensional geometric operations on face stimuli 
are disruptive to recognition only in as much as they cause the stimulus to be oriented 
away from upright.   162 
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